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The rapid increase in the amount of data stored by cloud servers has resulted
in growing privacy concerns for users. First, although keeping data encrypted at
all times is an attractive approach to privacy, encryption may preclude mining and
learning useful patterns from data. Second, companies are unable to distribute
proprietary programs to other parties without risking the loss of their private code
when those programs are reverse engineered. A challenge underlying both those
problems is that how data is accessed – even when that data is encrypted – can leak
secret information.
Oblivious RAM is a well studied cryptographic primitive that can be used to
solve the underlying challenge of hiding data-access patterns. In this dissertation,
we improve Oblivious RAMs and oblivious algorithms asymptotically. We then show
how to apply our novel oblivious algorithms to build systems that enable privacy-
preserving computation on encrypted data and program obfuscation.
Specifically, the first part of this dissertation shows two efficient Oblivious
RAM algorithms: 1) The first algorithm achieves sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup
while only incurring an inexpensive XOR computation for performing Private Infor-
mation Retrieval operations, and 2) The second algorithm is the first perfectly-
secure Oblivious Parallel RAM with O(log3N) bandwidth blowup, O((logm +
log logN) logN) depth blowup, and O(1) space blowup when the PRAM has m
CPUs and stores N blocks of data. The second part of this dissertation describes
two systems – HOP and GraphSC – that address the problem of computing on
private data and the distribution of proprietary programs. HOP is a system that
achieves simulation-secure obfuscation of RAM programs assuming secure hard-
ware. It is the first prototype implementation of a provably secure virtual black-box
(VBB) obfuscation scheme in any model under any assumptions. GraphSC is a
system that allows cloud servers to run a class of data-mining and machine-learning
algorithms over users’ data without learning anything about that data. GraphSC
brings efficient, parallel secure computation to programmers by allowing them to
express computation tasks using the GraphLab abstraction. It is backed by the first
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The rapid increase in the amount of data stored by cloud servers has resulted
in growing privacy concerns for users. Keeping data encrypted at all times is an
attractive approach to privacy; however, if this is done then cloud servers are unable
to derive the benefits of mining user data for large-scale trends. A complementary
problem is that of the distribution of proprietary programs. Presently, if a phar-
maceutical company outsources its proprietary genomic testing algorithm, it would
compromise its intellectual property. A challenge underlying both of these problems
is that how data is accessed – even when the data is encrypted – can have significant
privacy implications. For instance, even if we can operate on encrypted data, how
a program (say binary search) makes decisions based on this data, can reveal parts
of the input (the element searched for).
To allow mining on user data while still ensuring privacy from the cloud
provider, ideally, we would like to enable cloud servers to perform computations
on encrypted user data. While cryptographic primitives such as functional encryp-
tion [26] can achieve this in theory, such primitives are impractical. An alternative
is to leverage efficient multiparty computation [66,149] run by two servers who each
hold shares of user data such that they only learn an aggregate result and nothing
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about individual user inputs. A key challenge here is to express the computation
efficiently such that the memory trace produced by the computation is input-data
independent.
In the first problem, the input to the program (i.e., user data) is hidden whereas
the program itself (e.g., a data-mining algorithm) is not. Protecting proprietary
software is the complementary problem where the program should remain hidden
but can be executed by a third party on inputs of its choice. This is generally
known as obfuscation. Although there has recently been theoretical progress on
software-only obfuscation, it is extremely inefficient in practice [98].
Finally, an issue that arises in both the above problems is that memory accesses
can leak information. For example, when a user accesses files stored in the cloud,
even when those files are encrypted, the memory locations accessed may reveal
information about when a particular file is being read. Similarly, when a program
accesses memory, the locations in memory being read can reveal information about
the internal workings of the program. Informally, data obliviousness means that the
physical memory locations accessed are independent of secret information (the total
number of accesses are still revealed).
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky is a tech-
nique for making any RAM program data-oblivious [65,67]. In this dissertation, we
design efficient oblivious techniques and prototype systems to address the problems
of computing on encrypted data and protecting proprietary programs. Moreover,
we design novel Oblivious RAM algorithms that are efficient and secure.
In this chapter, we will first explain the problem addressed by an Oblivious
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RAM and the high-level approach used in the seminal work of Goldreich and Ostro-
vsky (Section 1.1). We will present a survey of the relevant literature to explain the
different approaches used by subsequent works to strengthen the results by Goldreich
and Ostrovsky (Section 1.2). Finally, in Section 1.3, we will describe the high-level
results in this dissertation. Specifically: 1) our contributions on the design of ORAM
algorithms, and 2) our two prototype systems, HOP and GraphSC.
1.1 Protecting Memory Access Patterns via an Oblivious RAM
Oblivious RAM is a cryptographic primitive that hides a program’s access
patterns to sensitive data. The scenario envisioned by Goldreich and Ostrovsky
consisted of programs that are executed on a shielded CPU that is communicating
with untrusted memory. During this execution, an adversary observes the execution
and tries to learn about the program and its inputs. The shielded CPU has the
following characteristics: 1) it is assumed to have a small number of CPU registers
as trusted storage, 2) it is assumed to be tamper-proof, i.e., an adversary cannot
modify or observe the contents of the CPU registers, and 3) it stores a symmetric
secret key that is used to keep the program and data in the memory encrypted. The
contents of the memory itself are observable, although they are kept encrypted by
the CPU. Moreover, whenever a program is executed, in addition to the state of the
memory, the adversary can also observe the memory location that is being fetched
or written to.
Intuitively, given that the memory is always encrypted, the key information
3
available to the adversary is the memory locations that are accessed, whether the
access is a read or a write, the times at which these accesses are made, and potentially
some other side-channels such as heat dissipation, etc. Among these, an Oblivious
RAM answers the following question:
How can a CPU constrained to a few registers access memory without revealing





5: . . .
Figure 1.1: Memory access pattern revealing secret variables
At first sight, one may ask – if an adversary is trying to learn information about
a program or its inputs, how does revealing the memory location help the adversary?
To understand this, let us consider a simple program shown in Figure 1.1. Suppose
the program itself is public and known to the adversary but input variable secret
should be hidden. Now, depending on the value of secret, the program accesses
either memory location x or memory location y. This clearly shows that access
patterns can reveal secrets from a program.
While the example in Figure 1.1 is simplistic, similar attacks have been used
in practice. Ohrimenko et al. [121] used network level access patterns during a
MapReduce job to infer sensitive data from an encrypted census dataset. Simplified
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to the setting of a shielded CPU and an encrypted untrusted memory, their program
computed the frequency of a specific attribute, say, age of the population. This
attribute was stored on one array A: each entry of the array referred to a person in
the census database. The frequency of ages was computed on another array F : the
i-th entry in this array stored the number of people with age i. Initially, F stores
all 0s. To compute F , the program would scan through A and increment the data
stored at the appropriate index in F . While the scan through A is data-independent,
which index is accessed in F clearly reveals the age of a person. In effect, age is
analogous to the secret variable in our example from Figure 1.1, which is revealed
by the exact memory location accessed in F .
A generalization of the same idea from Figure 1.1 has also been used by Xu
et al. [148]. They use Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) [45] as their
shielded CPU and could observe only page faults through an untrusted operating
system. One of the programs that they considered was used for JPEG decoding. In
the program, whenever a portion of the input image consisted of all zeroes (analo-
gous to the secret variable), the decoding algorithm would incur fewer page-faults
than otherwise (analogous to reading memory location x, vs. memory location y).
Thus, the number of page-faults effectively reveals a portion of the contents of the
encrypted image.
Although these attacks were discovered relatively recently, the theoretical
study of protecting access patterns started with the seminal work of Goldreich and
Ostrovsky and subsequently improved in a series of works over the last three decades.
Before explaining these results, we will make a short remark on the terminology used
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in this and subsequent chapters. As explained earlier, a shielded CPU stores the
secret key and is trusted to observe the logical access pattern. The memory, on the
other hand, is always assumed to store encrypted data observable to the adversary.
Moreover, if the adversary has physical access to the data bus between the CPU and
memory, he/she can modify the data being passed to/from the memory. Thus, we
can also think of the memory as being stored by the adversary. Alternatively, one
can model the same idea in a cloud-outsourcing scenario where a client wishes to
outsource data blocks to an untrusted server (the cloud). Consequently, we will in-
terchangeably use the term ‘client’ to refer to the trusted CPU and the term ‘server’
to refer to an adversary storing the memory. Moreover, we also refer to the data
stored in a memory location as a memory block, or a data block, or simply, a block.
A näıve solution. As a näıve solution, a CPU that wants to read a memory
location addr could read all memory locations. It stores the contents of addr in one
of its registers and it ignores the contents of other memory locations. Writes to a
memory location are handled in a similar manner – read all memory locations and
rewrite the unmodified content back to each of the locations other than addr. For
memory location addr, write the content from the register. Recall that the adversary
only has access to the encrypted memory, but does not have the key to decrypt it.
So, assuming the encryption algorithm is secure, all that the adversary observes
is that all memory locations have been accessed. The different treatment of addr
happens within the processor and cannot be detected by the adversary. While this
solution works, the obvious downside to this approach is the number of memory
locations that are read for each memory location that needs to be accessed, a metric
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that is also referred to as bandwidth blowup. In the näıve scheme, the bandwidth
blowup is O(N) when N memory locations are stored memory.
Algorithms like this näıve ORAM scheme, which on execution result in a
memory-access trace that is independent of input data, are called “data oblivious
algorithms.” An ORAM construction makes any RAM program data oblivious.
Intuitively, an ORAM construction is said to be secure if (i) for any two memory
access sequences ~y and ~z such that |~y| = |~z|, their access patterns A(~y) and A(~z)
are indistinguishable to anyone but the processor, and (ii) the ORAM construction
is correct in the sense that it returns on input ~y; output data that is consistent with
~y with all-but-negligible probability.
The seminal result. For any construction that does not scan the entire memory,
it turns out that the key ingredient to obliviousness is to shuffle memory locations
after one or more accesses. If the adversary does not know the permutation used for
shuffling, it will not be able correlate it to the input request sequence. Goldreich and
Ostrovsky used this idea in their ORAM construction. Their construction stores a
hierarchy of O(logN) levels that are geometrically increasing in size. Specifically,
level i is capable of storing 2i memory locations. One could think of this hierarchical
data structure as a hierarchy of caches where smaller levels act as stashes for larger
levels. Each level is individually permuted and a memory location can be looked
up using a pseudo-random function (PRF) whose secret key is only known to the
CPU but not the adversary. To access a memory location at logical address addr,
the CPU sequentially looks in every level of the hierarchy (from small to large)
for the logical address addr. Once the block has already been found in some level,
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for all subsequent levels the CPU just looks for a dummy element, denoted by ⊥.
When a requested block has been found, it is marked as deleted in the corresponding
level where it is found. Every 2i memory requests, a rebuild operation is performed
to merge all levels smaller than i (including the memory location just fetched and
possibly updated if it was a write request) into level i — at this moment, level i
is considered to be rebuilt. Intuitively, this scheme is secure, because every block
is always accessed from a permuted list such that the adversary does not know the
permutation used. By laying out the memory in hierarchical layers, they improved
the bandwidth blowup of the näıve scheme from O(N) to an amortized blowup of
O(log3N).
We make multiple observations about this result and the model considered
by Goldreich and Ostrovsky. First, since they use a PRF, the access patterns are
indisinguishable to a computationally-bounded adversary. Second, their model as-
sumes the server to be a simple storage device that is capable of only read and write
operations. Third, they assumed the number of bits stored in a memory location to
always be Ω(logN) bits. Finally, they only consider a model where there is exactly
one server and exactly one client.
1.2 A Short Literature Survey
Over the last three decades, several works have improved on the seminal re-
sult. Some of these have been algorithmic improvements while many of the results
have modified the modeling assumptions used by Goldreich and Ostrovsky. We
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next describe a short summary of the relevant results classified by the modeling
assumptions that they use.
1. Security guarantees: Computational vs. statistical vs. perfect. The
original construction had access patterns that were secure only against a
computationally-bounded adversary. Ajtai [11] showed the first ORAM con-
struction that is statistically-secure with a bandwidth blowup of O(log3N).
This was followed by the statistically-secure ORAM construction by Shi et
al. [134], who introduced the tree-based paradigm. ORAM constructions in
the tree-based paradigm have improved the bandwidth blowup from O(log3N)
to O(log2N) [43,61,134,140,143]. Most tree-based ORAMs achieved statisti-
cal access pattern security, and obtained the desired bandwidth blowup in the
worst-case instead of an amortized blowup.
Damg̊ard et al. were the first to study a perfectly secure ORAM and to show a
construction with O(log3N) bandwidth blowup and storing O(N logN) mem-
ory blocks on the server [47].
2. Non-uniform/large block sizes. Goldreich and Ostrovsky assumed that
the block size addressable by the ORAM is the same as the size of the memory
location. Their results hold for any block size Ω(logN) bits. However, if we
are allowed to assume non-uniform block sizes, i.e., the data blocks addressable
in the ORAM is larger than the word size supported by the underlying RAM,
then the metadata required by the ORAM algorithm to access a block is
asymptotically smaller than the cost to access a block. In such a scenario,
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the effective bandwidth blowup can be computed as the ratio of the number
of bits transferred while making an ORAM access to the size of a data block.
Using this idea and assuming block sizes to be Ω(log2N) bits, certain tree
based ORAM constructions can be improved to achieve a bandwidth blowup
of ω(logN) [140,143].
3. Assuming server computation. Goldreich and Ostrovsky assume the server
to be a read/write store. However, one can reduce the number of data blocks
transferred by allowing the server to perform some computation on the data
blocks [12, 48, 51, 62, 110, 115, 126, 137, 138, 146, 147, 153]. The key results in
this category are the ones by Apon et al. [12], and Devadas et al. [51], which
use fully homomorphic encryption and additively homomorphic (or somewhat
homomorphic) encryption respectively to achieve an O(1) bandwidth blowup.
4. Assuming multiple non-colluding servers. ORAMs in this category as-
sume multiple non-colluding servers to improve bandwidth blowup [80, 97,
106, 144]. A representative construction is by Lu and Ostrovsky [106], which
achieved a bandwidth blowup of O(logN).
5. Oblivious Parallel RAM (OPRAM). An Oblivious Parallel RAM (OPRAM)
transforms a Parallel RAM (PRAM) program into a secure form such that the
resulting PRAM’s access patterns leak no information about secret inputs.
It was first proposed by Boyle, Chung, and Pass [28], and subsequently im-
proved in several followup works [35, 36, 38, 39, 117]. In addition to the band-
width blowup, another metric that is relevant for an OPRAM is the depth
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blowup. Here, depth characterizes the parallel runtime of a program assuming
ample number of CPUs. State of the art OPRAM schemes are statistically
secure and achieve a bandwidth blowup of O(log2N) and a depth blowup of
O(logN log logN) [35].
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
In this section, we will describe, at a high-level, the results presented in this
dissertation.
1.3.1 An Oblivious RAM with a Sub-logarithmic Bandwidth Blowup
In Chapter 3, we describe a tree-based Oblivious RAM scheme with a sub-
logarithmic bandwidth blowup of O(logdN) (where d is a free parameter) assuming
the servers are capable of handling non-uniform block sizes, there are multiple non-
colluding servers that are capable of performing inexpensive computation. We also
show a Ω(logcDN) lower bound on bandwidth blowup in the modified model in-
volving PIR operations. Here, c is the number of blocks stored by the client and
D is the number blocks on which PIR operations are performed. Our construc-
tion matches this lower bound implying that the lower bound is tight for certain
parameter ranges.
Chapter 3 is based on a paper I co-authored with Ittai Abraham, Christo-
pher W. Fletcher, Benny Pinkas, and Ling Ren and is published in Public Key
Cryptography (PKC), 2017 [8].
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1.3.2 A Perfectly Secure Oblivious Parallel RAM
In Chapter 4, we show that PRAMs can be obliviously simulated with per-
fect security, incurring only O(logN(logm+ log logN)) blowup in parallel runtime,
O(log3N) blowup in total work, and O(1) blowup in space relative to the original
PRAM. Prior to our work, no perfectly secure Oblivious Parallel RAM (OPRAM)
construction was known; and we are the first in this respect. Even for the sequential
special case of our algorithm (i.e., perfectly secure ORAM), we not only achieve log-
arithmic improvement in terms of space consumption relative to the state-of-the-art,
but also significantly simplify perfectly secure ORAM constructions.
Chapter 4 is based on a paper co-authored with Elaine Shi and T-H. Hubert
Chan, and is currently in submission to a conference [37].
1.3.3 Executing Obfuscated Programs using HOP
Program obfuscation is a central primitive in cryptography, and has important
real-world applications in protecting software from IP theft. However, well known
results from the cryptographic literature have shown that software only virtual black
box (VBB) obfuscation of general programs is impossible. In Chapter 5 we propose
HOP, a system (with matching theoretical analysis) that achieves simulation-secure
obfuscation for RAM programs, using secure hardware to circumvent previous im-
possibility results. To the best of our knowledge, HOP is the first implementation
of a provably secure VBB obfuscation scheme in any model under any assumptions.
HOP trusts only a hardware single-chip processor. We present a theoretical
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model for our hardware design and prove its security in the UC framework. Our
goal is both provable security and practicality. To this end, our theoretic analysis
accounts for the optimizations used in our practical design, including the use of a
hardware Oblivious RAM (ORAM), hardware scratchpad memories, and context
switching. We then detail a prototype hardware implementation of HOP. The pro-
totype design requires 72% of the area of a V7485t Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) chip. Evaluated on a variety of benchmarks, HOP achieves an overhead of
8× ∼ 76× relative to an insecure system.
Chapter 5 is based on a paper co-authored with Christopher W. Fletcher,
Ling Ren, Nishanth Chandran, Satya Lokam, Elaine Shi, and Vipul Goyal, and is
published at Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS), 2017 [116].
1.3.4 Parallel Secure Computation for Graph-parallel Algorithms
In Chapter 6, we propose parallel oblivious algorithms to enable a secure ex-
ecution of “graph-parallel algorithms” on large datasets using secure computation.
We present GraphSC, a framework that (i) provides a programming paradigm that
allows non-cryptography experts to write secure code; (ii) brings parallelism to such
secure implementations; and (iii) meets the needs for obliviousness, thereby not leak-
ing any private information. Using GraphSC, developers can efficiently implement
an oblivious version of graph-based algorithms that execute in parallel with minimal
communication overhead. Specifically, for a graph with V vertices and E edges, and
N = |V|+ |E|, the primitives “Scatter” and “Gather” in GraphSC can be imple-
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mented with O(N logN) total work and O(logN) depth. Thus, our secure version of
graph-based algorithms incurs only a small logarithmic overhead in comparison with
the non-secure parallel version. We build GraphSC and demonstrate, using several
algorithms as examples, that secure computation can be brought into the realm of
practicality for big data analysis. Our secure matrix factorization implementation
can process 1 million ratings in 13 hours, which is a multiple order-of-magnitude
improvement over the only other existing attempt, which requires 3 hours to process
16K ratings.
Chapter 6 is based on a paper co-authored with Xiao Shaun Wang, Stratis
Ioannidis, Udi Weinsberg, Nina Taft, and Elaine Shi and is published at IEEE
Security and Privacy (SP), 2015 [118].
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Chapter 2: Definitions and Preliminaries
2.1 Parallel Random-Access Machines
We review the concepts of a parallel random-access machine (PRAM) and an
oblivious parallel random-access machine (OPRAM). Although the definitions are
only provided for the parallel case as required in Chapter 4, we point out that this
is without loss of generality, since a sequential RAM can be thought of as a special
case of PRAM with one CPU.
Parallel Random-Access Machine (PRAM).
A parallel random-access machine (PRAM) consists of a set of CPUs and a
shared memory denoted by mem indexed by the address space {0, 1, . . . , N − 1},
where N is a power of 2. We refer to each memory word also as a block, which is at
least B = Ω(logN) bits long.
We consider a PRAM where the number of CPUs is m and the i-th CPU is
denoted by cpustatei. Suppose the input to the PRAM program PRAM is denoted
by inp. In each step, each CPU executes a next instruction circuit Π(cpustatei, rdatai)
based on its internal state and the most recently fetched B bits of data denoted
rdatai. It updates its CPU state cpustatei; and further, CPUs interact with memory
through request instructions ~I(t) := (I
(t)
i : i ∈ [m]). Specifically, at time step t,
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CPU i’s instruction is of the form I
(t)
i := (read, addr), or I
(t)
i := (write, addr,wdata)




i = (read, addr) then CPU i should receive the contents of mem[addr] at
the beginning of time step t and is stored in rdatai. Else if I
(t)
i = (write, addr,wdata),
CPU i should still receive the contents of mem[addr] at the beginning of time step t;
further, at the end of step t, the contents of mem[addr] should be updated to wdata.
Write conflict resolution. By definition, multiple read operations can be exe-
cuted concurrently with other operations even if they visit the same address. How-
ever, if multiple concurrent write operations visit the same address, a conflict reso-
lution rule will be necessary for our PRAM to be well-defined. In this dissertation,
we assume the following:
• The original PRAM supports concurrent reads and concurrent writes (CRCW)
with an arbitary, parametrizable rule for write conflict resolution. In other
words, there exists some priority rule to determine which write operation
takes effect if there are multiple concurrent writes in some time step t.
• Our compiled, oblivious PRAM (defined below) is a “concurrent read, exclu-
sive write” PRAM (CREW). In other words, our OPRAM algorithm must
ensure that there are no concurrent writes at any time.
We note that a CRCW-PRAM with a parametrizable conflict resolution rule is
among the most powerful CRCW-PRAM model, whereas CREW is a much weaker
model. Our results are stronger if we allow the underlying PRAM to be more
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powerful but our compiled OPRAM uses a weaker PRAM model. For a detailed
explanation on how stronger PRAM models can emulate weaker ones, we refer the
reader to the work by Hagerup [77].
Henceforth, we assume that each CPU can only store O(1) memory blocks.
Further, we assume that the runtime T of the PRAM is fixed and publicly
known. Thus, PRAM is a PRAM program that belongs to a family of programs
PRAM[Π, T,N, `in, `out, B,m]. For any program that is run on the PRAM, `in and
`out denote the input and output lengths respectively (in terms of number of words).
`in and `out are relevant in Chapter 5 when the adversary executes obfuscated
programs on inputs of his choice to obtain the corresponding output. Moreover,
in chapter 5, we only use the special case of m = 1, i.e., RAM programs. Finally,
in all of the chapters except Chapter 5, we consider PRAMs that are stateful and
can evaluate a sequence of inputs, carrying state between them. Without loss of
generality, we assume each input can be stored in a single memory block.
CPU-to-CPU communication. Some of the algorithms in our constructions in-
volve CPU-to-CPU communication. For our OPRAM algorithm to be oblivious,
the inter-CPU communication pattern must be oblivious too. We stress that such
inter-CPU communication can be emulated using shared memory reads and writes.
Therefore, when we express our performance metrics, we assume that all inter-CPU
communication is implemented with shared memory reads and writes. In this sense,
our performance metrics already account for any inter-CPU communication, and
there is no need to have separate metrics that characterize inter-CPU communi-
cation. In contrast, some earlier works [39] adopt separate metrics for inter-CPU
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communication.
2.2 Oblivious Parallel Random-Access Machines
An OPRAM is a (randomized) PRAM with certain security properties, i.e.,
its access patterns leak no information about the inputs to the PRAM.
Randomized PRAM. A randomized PRAM is a special PRAM where the CPUs
are allowed to generate private random numbers.
Memory access patterns. Given a PRAM program denoted PRAM and a se-
quence inp of inputs, we define the notation Addresses[PRAM](inp) as follows:
• Let T be the total number of parallel steps that PRAM takes to evaluate inputs
inp.
• Let At := (addrt1, addrt2, . . . , addrtm) be the list of addresses such that the i-th
CPU accesses memory address addrti in time step t.
• We define Addresses[PRAM](inp) to be the random object [At]t∈[T ].
Oblivious PRAM (OPRAM). We say that a PRAM is oblivious, iff for any two




If a computationally-bounded adversary can distinguish the addresses pro-
duced on inp0 and inp1 with probability ≤ ε(N), we say that the OPRAM is com-
putationally secure. Similarly, if an unbounded adversary can distinguish between
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the distribution of addresses with probability ≤ ε(N), we say that the OPRAM is
statistically secure. If the distribution of addresses are identically distributed, i.e.,
ε(N) = 0, for all inputs, the OPRAM is said to be perfectly secure.
In this dissertation, we always assume that the original PRAM has a fixed
number of CPUs (denoted m) in all steps of execution. For the compiled OPRAM,
we consider two models 1) when the OPRAM always consumes exactly m CPUs
in every step (i.e., the same number of CPUs as the original PRAM); and 2) when
the OPRAM can consume an unbounded number of CPUs in every step; in this
case, the actual number of CPUs consumed in each step may vary. However, for an
ORAM scheme, we always assume that the compiled ORAM uses a single CPU.
Oblivious parallel algorithms. If the PRAM program or the parallel algorithm
belongs to a class of algorithms ALG that is fixed and available to the adversary, we
can define the notion of an oblivious parallel algorithm. A parallel algorithm ALG
∈ ALG is said to be oblivious, iff for any two inputs inp0 and inp1 to the algorithm
such that |inp0| = |inp1| and the adversary knows ALG, and for a negligible function
ε(.), it holds that
Addresses[ALG](inp0)
ε(N)≡ Addresses[ALG](inp0)
If the addresses are indistinguishable only to a computationally-bounded ad-
versary, we say that the oblivious algorithm is computationally-secure. Statistical
and perfect security are analogously defined.
Oblivious simulation metrics. We adopt the following metrics to characterize
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the overhead of (parallel) oblivious simulation of a PRAM.
• Simulation overhead (when the OPRAM consumes the same number of CPUs
as the PRAM). If a PRAM that consumes m CPUs and completes in T parallel
steps can be obliviously simulated by an OPRAM that completes in γ ·T steps
also with m CPUs (i.e., the same number of CPUs as the original PRAM),
then we say that the simulation overhead is γ. Note that this means that
every PRAM step is simulated by on average γ OPRAM steps.
• Bandwidth blowup (when the OPRAM consumes the same number of CPUs
as the PRAM). If a PRAM that consumes m CPUs and accesses B bits of
information can be obliviously simulated by an OPRAM that accesses γ · B
bits, also with m CPUs, then we say that the bandwidth blowup is γ.
• Total work blowup (when an unbounded number of CPUs maybe consumed).
A PRAM’s total work is the number of steps necessary to simulate the PRAM
under a single CPU, and is equal to the sum
∑
t∈[T ] mt. If a PRAM of total
work W can be obliviously simulated by an OPRAM of total work γ ·W we
say that the total work blowup of the oblivious simulation is γ. Similarly,
for a PRAM algorithm of total work W can be obliviously simulated by an
oblivious parallel algorithm of total work γ ·W , we say that the total work
blowup of the oblivious simulation is γ.
• Depth blowup (when an unbounded number of CPUs maybe consumed). A
PRAM’s depth is defined to be its parallel runtime when there are an un-
bounded number of CPUs. If a PRAM of depth D can be obliviously simulated
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by an OPRAM of depth γ · D we say that the depth blowup of the oblivious
simulation is γ. Similarly, for a PRAM algorithm of depth D can be oblivi-
ously simulated by an oblivious parallel algorithm of depth γ ·D, we say that
the depth blowup of the oblivious simulation is γ.
• Space blowup. Space blowup refers to the multiplicative blowup in space re-
quired on the server when comparing the OPRAM (or ORAM) and that of
the original PRAM (or RAM).
Note that the simulation overhead and bandwidth blowup are good standalone
metric if we assume that the OPRAM must consume the same number of CPUs as
the PRAM. If the OPRAM is allowed to consume more CPUs than the PRAM, we
typically use the metrics total work blowup and depth blowup in conjunction with
each other: total work blowup alone does not characterize how much the OPRAM
preserves parallelism; and depth blowup alone does not capture the extent to which
the OPRAM preserves total work.
Note that for ORAMs/OPRAMs with uniform block sizes, i.e., all blocks have
the same size, simulation overhead and bandwidth blowup are exactly the same.
For an ORAM, since we are only concerned with the scenario of using a single CPU,
bandwidth blowup and simulation overhead are the only relevant metrics.
Finally, the following simple fact is useful for understanding the complexity of
(oblivious) parallel algorithms.
Fact 1. Let C > 1. If an (oblivious) parallel algorithm Alg can complete in T steps




2.3 Private Information Retrieval Protocols
Private information retrieval (PIR) allows a user to download one item from
an unprocessed database known to a server, without revealing to the server which
item is downloaded [41]. More formally, the setting has a server which is holding
a list of records Y = (y1, y2, · · · , ym), and a user who wants to download record
yi without revealing i to the server. A PIR scheme must enable this operation
while requiring communication that is strictly smaller than the size of the database
(otherwise, a trivial solution could have the user hide i by simply downloading the
entire database.) This problem is similar to the problem addressed by an ORAM
except for the following differences: (i) In PIR, the database records are usually
public data records, or records which are owned by the server, and therefore the
user cannot encrypt or otherwise preprocess them, and (ii) Typically, only read
operations are performed on this database.
Two categories of PIR techniques exist – one operates in a setting with a
single server and the other requires the existence of two or more non-colluding
servers. Single-server PIR protocols, such as [30,64,94], have been adopted by Path-
PIR [110] and Onion ORAM [51] to improve bandwidth. A downside, however, is
that they require the server to perform operations on homomorphically encrypted
ciphertexts [101], making server computation the new bottleneck. PIR in the pres-
ence of two or more non-colluding servers is conceptually simpler and involves much
less computation — typically only simple XOR operations. It can also guarantee
security against an unbounded adversary.
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The original investigation of two-server PIR assumed that each database record
is a single bit. The initial PIR paper described a two-server PIR protocol with
O(m1/3) communication [41] (and more efficient protocols with more than two
servers). This result was only recently improved to obtain a communication of
mO(
√
log logm/ logm) [53].
In the setting of ORAM, we are interested in a PIR of long records, where
the number of bits in each record |yj| is in the same order as the total number of
records m. In this case there is a simple PIR protocol that was adopted in [122]:
The database of records is replicated across the two servers, S1 and S2. Suppose
that the user is interested in retrieving record i. For the request, the user generates
a random bit string of length m, X = (x1, x2, · · · , xm). He then generates X ′ =
(x′1, x
′
2, · · · , x′m) by flipping the i-th bit in X, i.e., x′i = x̄i and x′j = xj for j 6= i. The
user then sends X to S1, and X ′ to S2. S1 computes and responds with
∑
j xj · yj




j · yj. Here, the sums represent a bit-
wise XOR, and · represents a bit-wise AND. The user then sums up (XORs) the




j) · yj = yi. The above protocol is denoted as
TwoServerPIR(S1,S2, Y, i). The communication overhead is O(|yj|+m) = O(|yj|).
PIR-writes. Analogous to PIR, we can define PIR-write operations. A PIR-write
operation lets a user update one record among a list of records on a server without
revealing to the server which record is updated. Notice that now the records can no
longer be public data; they have to be encrypted. Otherwise, the server can trivially
figure out which record is updated by comparing their values before and after the
update.
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Chapter 3: Asymptotically Tight Bounds for Composing ORAM with
PIR
The standard ORAM model assumes the server to be a simple storage device
that only supports read and write operations. In this model, numerous works have
improved the bandwidth blowup from O(log3N) to O(logN) where N is the number
of logical data blocks. But none could achieve sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup so
far. In this sense, though not provably insurmountable [29], the Ω(logN) bandwidth
blowup barrier does seem hard to surpass.
To this end, a line of work deviates from the standard model and assumes
the existence of two non-colluding servers [106,122,136,144] with inexpensive server
computation (e.g., XOR) or no server computation. But these constructions have
been unable to surpass the Ω(logN) bandwidth blowup barrier.
Another line of work allows the server to perform some computation. The most
recent works involving server computation achieved O(1) bandwidth blowup [12,
51, 114, 115]. But this improvement in bandwidth comes with a huge cost in the
amount of server computation. In practice, in both schemes, the time for server
computation will far exceed the time for server-client communication and become
the new bottleneck.
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Thus, the state of the art leaves the following natural question:
Can we construct a sub-logarithmic ORAM without expensive computation?
In this chapter, we answer this question positively with a concrete and se-
cure construction. Our construction relies on a d-ary ORAM tree and a private
information retrieval (PIR) protocol involving two non-colluding servers, where the
servers perform simple XOR computations. Our construction achieves O(logdN)
bandwidth blowup with c = O(1) blocks of client storage and PIR operations on
D = d · polylog(N) blocks. PIR is closely related to ORAM as they both hide ac-
cess patterns. In fact, PIR is frequently used in ORAM constructions to improve
bandwidth blowup [110,114,115,122,153]. This led us to ask the following question:
What is the asymptotically optimal bandwidth blowup one can achieve by using
PIR in an ORAM construction?
In order to answer this question, we build on the seminal work of Goldreich
and Ostrovsky [67] and derive a Ω(logcDN) bandwidth lower bound for ORAMs
that leverage only PIR and PIR-write on top of the traditional model. Here, c is
the number of blocks stored by the client and D is the number of blocks on which
PIR/PIR-write operations are performed.
Our ORAM construction, in fact, matches this Ω(logcDN) lower bound when
d = Ω(logN), implying that under certain parameter ranges our construction is
asymptotically optimal and the lower bound is asymptotically tight. Moreover,
existing constructions such as C-ORAM [115] and CHf-ORAM [114] violate this
lower bound, and thus cannot be secure.
25
We remark that there is a concurrent and independent work, MSKT-ORAM,
that achieves comparable bandwidth blowup using similar techniques [154].1 Our
construction has several advantages over this work and we make a more detailed
comparison in Section 3.5.
Our Contributions
Our contributions in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
1. ORAM with sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup. We show a provably
secure ORAM construction that achieves a bandwidth blowup of O(logdN)
(where d is a parameter) using O(1) blocks of client storage. Our construction
uses a d-ary tree and a PIR protocol (Section 3.2).
2. Extending the Goldreich-Ostrovsky lower bound to allow PIR oper-
ation. For a client storing c blocks of data and performing a PIR on D blocks
at a time, we show that the ORAM bandwidth blowup is lower bounded by
Ω(logcDN) (Section 3.4). Our construction matches this lower bound imply-
ing that the lower bound is tight and that our construction is asymptotically
optimal for certain parameter ranges.
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Table 3.1: Comparison with existing Oblivious RAM schemes. N denotes
the number of logical blocks stored by the ORAM. In [126,140], a stash of Ω(λ) blocks
ensures a failure probability of eΩ(−λ). For a negligible (in N) failure probability,
these works set λ = ω(logN). Our work requires two non-colluding servers while
others require a single server.
Construction
Bandwidth Client Block Server
Blowup Storage Size Computation
Path ORAM [140] 8 logN O(λ) Ω(log2N) -
Ring ORAM [126] 2.5 logN O(λ) Ω(log2N) XOR
Onion ORAM [51] O(1) O(1) Ω̃(log5N) Homomorphic enc.




(with d = logN) 4 loglogN N Ω(λ log
2N)
Overview of our Construction
In tree-based ORAMs, the memory is organized in the form of a binary tree,
where every tree node is a bucket. Buckets hold blocks, where each block is either
dummy or real. The main invariant of tree-based ORAMs is that every block is
assigned to the path from the root to a randomly chosen leaf node. Accessing a
1The title of that paper claims “constant bandwidth”, which would have been immediately
ruled out by our lower bound. On a closer look, the bandwidth blowup is actually O(logd N). This
calls for our lower bound to clear the confusion in this direction.
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block in tree-based ORAMs has two phases. The first phase, called retrieval, fetches
and possibly updates the data block requested by the client. For security, the block is
also assigned a new random path. The second phase, called eviction, reshuffles some
data blocks on the server subject to the tree-ORAM invariant. Many recent ORAM
constructions [51, 126, 140, 143] are based on binary trees, in which the bandwidth
blowup on retrieval and eviction are both Θ(logN) due to the tree height.
Our construction uses a tree with larger fan-out d = ω(1), which decreases
the tree height to O(logdN) = O(
logN
log d
). Based on a d-ary tree, we design a new
eviction algorithm whose bandwidth blowup is O(logdN). However, it increases the
bandwidth blowup by more than a factor of d on retrieval in the standard model.
We then use two-server private information retrieval (c.f. preliminaries Section 2.3)
to reduce the retrieval bandwidth to O(1) (assuming moderately large block size).
Our basic eviction algorithm also requires Ω(d logN) blocks of client storage. We
again rely on two-server PIR to reduce the client storage to O(1). Overall, we obtain
a two-server ORAM with O(1) client storage and O(logdN), i.e., sub-logarithmic
bandwidth blowup.
Although our bandwidth blowup decreases with the tree fan-out d, we cannot
keep increasing d for free due to block metadata. We discuss the trade-off regarding
d in Section 3.3.4.
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1: function Access(addr, op, data)
2: l← PosMap[addr]
3: data← ReadBlock(l, addr)
4: l′ ← UniformRandom(0, dL − 1)
5: PosMap[addr]← l′
6: if op = read then
7: return data to client
8: else
9: data← data′
10: Write data to the root bucket
11: evict()
Figure 3.1: Tree-based ORAM data access algorithm. Here, PosMap is a map
from an address addr to a leaf l of the tree. ReadBlock(l, addr) retrieves a block of
data with address addr from a path of buckets along leaf l.
3.1 Tree-based ORAM
We first describe a generic tree-based ORAM construction. This will aid the
description of our final protocol. In a tree-based ORAM, server storage is organized
as a binary tree [134]. As mentioned in the introduction, instead of a binary tree,
in this work we use a d-ary tree. Hence this brief introduction presents the general
case and considers d as an independent parameter.
Server storage. We consider d-ary tree with L + 1 levels, from level 0 to level L.
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Thus, level i has di nodes. Recall that N is the total number of logical blocks stored
by the client. Then L is roughly logdN . Each node in the tree is called a bucket
and each bucket contains Z slots for logical blocks. A slot can also be empty — in
this case, we say it contains a dummy block; otherwise, we say it contains a real
block. Each block stores B bits of information. Dummy blocks and real blocks are
both encrypted using randomized symmetric encryption.
Metadata. Aside from the B bits of block data, tree-based ORAMs also store some
metadata for each block. The metadata stores the block identifier and whether the
block is real or dummy. The client also maintains a position map PosMap that maps
each real block to a random leaf in the tree.
In this chapter, we first assume that the client stores all the metadata locally.
We then describe how this metadata can be offloaded to the server (Section 3.3.3)
to achieve O(1) client storage.
Invariant. Tree-based ORAM maintains the invariant that if a block is mapped to
a leaf l of the tree, the block must be in some bucket on the path from the root to
the leaf l. Since a leaf uniquely determines a path and vice versa, we use the two
terms interchangeably.
Access. The pseudo-code for an access algorithm in a tree-based ORAM is de-
scribed in Figure 3.1. To access a block with logical address addr, the client performs
the following operations:
1. Look up the local PosMap to figure out the path l it is mapped to (line 2).
2. Download and decrypt every block on path p, discarding every block that does
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not have address addr. Due to the invariant, the client is guaranteed to find
block addr on path l. This is done by ReadBlock(l, addr) in Figure 3.1 line 3.
3. Remap block addr to a new random path l′ (i.e., update PosMap), i.e. logically
remove block addr from its old position (lines 4 and 5).
4. Re-encrypt block addr and append it to the root bucket (line 10, encryption
is not shown in the figure).
5. Invoke an eviction procedure to percolate blocks towards leaves (line 11).
The first four steps correspond to the retrieval phase, and are similar for
many tree-based ORAMs [51, 134, 140]. Tree-based ORAMs differ in their eviction
procedures (which also affect the bucket size Z). Existing tree-based ORAM schemes
when extended to use a d-ary tree do not achieve sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup
due to inefficient eviction. Hence, a main contribution of this chapter is to construct
such an eviction scheme (Section 3.2).
3.2 Main Construction
Our construction follows the tree-based ORAM paradigm in the previous sec-
tion. In this section, we present the changes in server storage and the retrieval and
eviction strategies to obtain a sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup. Figures 3.2 and
3.3 show the pseudocode of our construction. Figure 3.4 shows how servers store
blocks and an example eviction for our construction.
Server storage. Our construction uses two servers S1 and S2, both storing identical
31
1: Persistent variables cnt, G initialized to 0
2: cnt is the number of accesses performed so far since the previous eviction
3: G is the number of evictions performed so far, represented in base d
4: Let P(l) be the path from root to leaf l, and P(l, k) be the k-th bucket on
P(l).
5: function Access(addr, op, data′)
6: l← PosMap[addr]
7: data← ReadBlock(l, addr)
8: if op = read then
9: return data to client
10: else
11: data← data′
12: l′ ← UniformRandom(0, dL − 1)
13: PosMap[a]← l′
14: Write data to the cnt-th slot of the root bucket
15: cnt := cnt + 1 mod Z/2
16: if cnt = 0 then
17: le ← reverse(G)
18: EvictAlongPath(le)
19: G← G+ 1 mod dL
Figure 3.2: Access and eviction algorithm for our oblivious RAM construc-
tion.
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1: function ReadBlock(l, addr)
2: (id1, id2, . . . , idZL)← Retrieve block identifiers on P(l)
3: Suppose idi = addr
4: return TwoServerPIR(S1,S2,P(l), i)
5: function EvictAlongPath(le)
6: for k ← 0 to L− 1 do
7: Let s be the (k + 1)-th digit of G // For each bucket, (k + 1)-th digit
accesses slices in a round-robin manner.
8: EvictToSlices(le, k, s)
9: // Additional processing for the leaf bucket P(le, L) to make it empty
10: Read all blocks in P(le, L) and its auxiliary bucket P(le, aux)
11: Move all real blocks from P(le, L) to P(le, aux)
12: function EvictToSlices(le, k, s)
13: // Evict from bucket P(le, k) to the s-th slice of each of its d children
14: Download all blocks in P(le, k)
15: for t← 1 to d
16: Let S be the s-th slice of the t-th child of P(le, k)
17: Let T be the set of real blocks in P(le, k) that can be evicted to S
18: Upload T to S and pad remaining slots in S with dummy blocks
Figure 3.3: Access and eviction algorithm for our oblivious RAM construc-
tion. (..contd)
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Figure 3.4: Example eviction path for a three-level 4-ary tree at G =
2 i.e. G = (02)4. For evicting the root bucket into its children buckets, the
client downloads blue colored root bucket and writes to the blue colored slices of
its children. The figure shows load of the buckets just before eviction from the root
bucket.
information (hence, Figure 3.4 shows only one tree). Our d-ary tree has L+1 levels,
numbered from 0 (the root) to L (the leaves). Each node in the tree is called a
bucket. Each bucket consists of Z slots that can each store one block. Slots from
the non-root buckets are equally divided into d slices, each of size Z/d. Each leaf
bucket has an auxiliary bucket aux that can store Z blocks.
Metadata. Our construction requires metadata similar to the description in Sec-
tion 3.1, i.e., the position map PosMap and a block identifier for each slot. As
mentioned, we assume the client stores all metadata locally for the cloud storage
application, but can easily outsource them to the server without asymptotically
increasing bandwidth blowup (Section 3.3.3).
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Initialization. Initially, the ORAM tree at both servers contain all dummy blocks.
The position map is initialized to contain independent and uniformly random num-
bers for each block. The client initializes each block using a logical write operation.
If the client issues a logical read operation to a block that has never been initialized,
the behavior of the ORAM is undefined.
Access. Each client request is represented as a tuple (addr, op, data′) where addr
is the address of the block, op ∈ {Read,Write} and data′ is the data to be written
(data′ = ⊥ if op = Read). The client maintains a counter cnt for the total number of
accesses made so far. For each access (addr, op, data′), the client does the following
(refer Figure 3.2 and 3.3):
1. The client looks up position map PosMap[addr] to obtain the leaf l associated
with block addr (Figure 3.2, line 6).
2. Let P(l) represent the path from root to leaf l, and P(l, k) represent the
k-th bucket on P(l) . The client retrieves the block identifiers on the path
(id1, id2 . . . , idZL) from its local storage. Due to the tree-based ORAM invari-
ant, one of the identifiers on the path will be addr. Without loss of generality,
assume idi = addr (Figure 3.3, lines 2 and 3).
3. The client invokes a two-server PIR protocol TwoServerPIR(S1,S2,P(l), i) to
retrieve the block with address addr (Figure 3.3, line 4).
4. The client updates the data field of the block addr to data′ if op = Write. It
sets a new leaf l′ for the block and updates PosMap. It updates the metadata
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Figure 3.5: Buckets and slices accessed for 2d consecutive evictions. Here,
d = 4 and G = # evictions mod dL. (x)a denotes the number x represented in base
a. The dots in the slices represent real blocks at the end of the eviction operation.
Note that for each bucket, slices are accessed (written into) in a round-robin manner.
If an eviction path passes through a bucket at level i at t-th eviction then it passes
through it again at t+ di evictions.
to remove the block from the tree. It appends the block addr to the cnt-th slot
of the root bucket (Figure 3.2, lines 8-14).
5. The client increments cnt. If cnt = Z/2, the client resets cnt and performs the
eviction procedure described below (Figure 3.2, lines 15-19).
Eviction. The eviction procedure of our construction is a generalization of the
eviction procedure of Onion ORAM [51]. It differs from Onion ORAM in the fol-
lowing two ways. First, we apply the eviction scheme on a reverse lexicographical
ordering [61] over a d-ary tree instead of a binary tree. Second, when evicting from
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each bucket along a path, we write to only one slice of each child bucket (instead of
writing to the entire child buckets). This is essential for our construction to achieve
sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup.
As shown in Figure 3.3, we evict every Z/2 accesses along reverse lexicograph-
ical ordering of paths. Given that we have a d-ary tree instead of a binary tree,
we represent the paths as numbers with base d. We use a counter G to maintain
the next path le that should be evicted. Eviction is performed for each non-leaf
bucket on path P(le). For the k-th bucket from the root, denoted P(le, k), the client
first downloads the bucket P(le, k). It then uploads all real blocks to the s-th slice
(which will be empty before this operation) of each of its children where s is the
(k + 1)-th digit of G. (We show in Section 3.3.2 that there will be sufficient room
in these slices.) After this operation, the bucket P(le, k) will be empty. Due to the
reverse lexicographical order of eviction paths, P(le, k) will be a child bucket for the
next d − 1 evictions involving it (refer Figure 3.5 for an example), during each of
which the slice being written to will be empty. For the last level (level L), the client
downloads all blocks in the leaf bucket P(le, L) and its auxiliary bucket P(le, aux).
It moves all real blocks to the auxiliary bucket P(le, aux) and uploads both buckets
to the server.
Example. An example showing 2d consecutive evictions is in Figure 3.5 for d = 4.
In the example, we start with eviction number G = (02)4. Observe that the third
child of the root bucket is emptied at G = (02)4 as the reverse lexicographic eviction
path (20)4 passes through it. In the next d− 1 evictions, one slice of the bucket is
written to in a round-robin manner. Finally, at eviction number G = (12)4, when
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the path (21)4 passes through it again, the last slice is written into after which the
entire bucket is emptied again. Similarly, it can be easily seen that for each bucket




We show that the buckets (and slices) in the tree overflow with negligible
probability. In our construction, the root bucket and the auxiliary buckets are
not partitioned into slices. Eviction is performed every Z/2 accesses, so the root
bucket never overflows. Below, Lemma 1 analyzes auxiliary buckets while Lemma 2
analyzes slices in non-root non-auxiliary buckets.
Lemma 1. If the size of auxiliary buckets Zaux satisfies N ≤ dL ·Zaux/2, the proba-
bility that an auxiliary bucket overflows is bounded by e−
Zaux
6 .
Proof. For an auxiliary bucket b, define Y (b) to be the number of real blocks in b.
Each of the N blocks in the ORAM has a probability of d−L to be mapped to b
independently. Thus, E[Y (b)] ≤ N · d−L ≤ Zaux/2, and a simple Chernoff bound
completes the proof.
The following lemma generalizes Onion ORAM [51] Lemma 1 to the scenario
of a d-ary tree.
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Lemma 2. The probability that a slice of a non-root and non-auxiliary bucket over-
flows after an eviction operation is bounded by e−
Z
6d .
Proof. Consider a bucket b, and its i-th slice bi. Define Y (b) to be the number of real
blocks in b, and Y (bi) to be the number of blocks in bi after an eviction operation.
We will first assume that all slices have infinite capacity and show thatE[Y (bi)] ≤
Z/2d, i.e., the expected number of blocks in a non-root slice after an eviction oper-
ation is no more than Z/2d at any time. Then, we bound the overflow probability
given a finite capacity.
For a non-root and non-auxiliary bucket b, we define variables m and mi, 1 ≤
i ≤ d: the last EvictAlongPath operation where b is on the eviction path is the m-
th EvictAlongPath operation, and the EvictAlongPath operation where b is a sibling
bucket with eviction happening to slice i is the mi-th EvictAlongPath operation.
Clearly, during eviction to one of the d slices, the bucket b is on the eviction path.
Thus, one of mi is equal to m. We also time-stamp the blocks as follows. When a
block is accessed and remapped, it gets a time stamp m∗, if the next EvictAlongPath
would be the m∗-th EvictAlongPath operation.
Now consider bi and Y (bi) . There exist the following cases:
1. If m ≥ mi, then Y (bi) = 0, because the entire bucket b becomes empty when
it is a parent bucket during the m-th EvictAlongPath operation, and the next
eviction that evicts blocks to slice bi has not occurred.
2. If m < mi, we must have mi−1 < mi. Otherwise, mi is the smallest among
m1, . . . ,md and it must be that m ≥ mi. We consider blocks with what time
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stamp range can end up in bi.
• Blocks with time stamp m∗ ≤ m will not be in bi as these blocks would
have been evicted out of b in the m-th EvictAlongPath operation.
• Blocks with time stamp m < m∗ ≤ mi−1 or m∗ > mi will not be in bi as
these blocks are evicted to either slices ≤ i− 1 or slices > i respectively.
• Blocks with time stamp mi−1 < m∗ ≤ mi can be evicted to bi.
There are at most (mi −mi−1)Z/2 blocks with time stamp mi−1 < m∗ ≤ mi.
Each of these blocks go to bucket b independently with probability d−j, where
j is the level of b. Due to the deterministic reverse lexicographic ordering of
eviction paths, it is easy to see that mi −mi−1 = dj−1. Therefore, E[Y (bi)] ≤
dj−1 · Z/2 · d−j = Z/2d.
In either case, we have µ = E[Y (bi)] ≤ Z/2d. Now that we have independence
and the expected number of blocks in a bucket, using a Chernoff bound with δ = 1,
a slice bi overflows with probability





Combining the two lemmas, we can set Z = Ω(dλ) and Zaux = Ω(λ). The
probability that any slice or any bucket overflows is e−Ω(λ). Following prior work [51,
126,140], it suffices to set λ = ω(logN) for N−ω(1) failure probability, i.e., negligible
in N .
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Server Storage The amount of server storage in our construction is
Zaux · dL + Z · ΣLi=0di = Θ(N).
3.3.2 Security Analysis
Lemma 3. The above ORAM construction satisfies obliviousness and is statistically-
secure as per the definition in Section 2.2.
Proof. Similar to all tree based ORAMs, for each access, the client performs the
retrieval phase on a random path. The use of PIR hides the location of the requested
block on that random path. Moreover, the instance of the two-server PIR scheme we
use does not use any computational assumptions. Eviction is performed on a publicly
known reverse lexicographical ordering of paths. Along the eviction path, each
bucket and a predetermined slice in each child buckets are downloaded/uploaded.
Thus, all client operations observed by the servers are independent of the logical
client access patterns.
3.3.3 Reducing Client Storage
In the construction described so far, the client stores the Θ(N logN)-bit posi-
tion map, Θ(N logN)-bit metadata for all block and uses Θ(dλ) blocks of temporary
storage during the eviction operation. In this section, we optimize our scheme to
reduce the client storage to O(1) blocks.
A. Position map. The position map for the main ORAM has a Θ(logN)-bit entry
for each of the N blocks, amounting to Θ(N logN) bits of storage.
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Position map can be stored recursively in smaller ORAMs as discussed by Shi
et al. [134]. As discussed in [139], when the data block size is Ω(log2N) (which is the
case for our scheme), using a small block size for recursive position map ORAMs, the
asymptotic cost of recursion would be insignificant compared to the main ORAM
tree. Hence, recursion does not increase to the bandwidth blowup asymptotically.
B. Metadata for each block in the tree. For each block of the tree, we store
whether the block is real or dummy. If it is real, the identifying address is stored.
This amounts to another Θ(N logN) bits of storage.
We can store the metadata of each block along with the block data on the
server. However, this would require downloading metadata from the server during
retrieval before performing each PIR operation. For Z = O(dλ), L < logdN and a
size of O(logN) bits for storing the identifier and whether the block is dummy, the
total amount of metadata downloaded for an access is O(dλ logN logdN). Thus, for
a block size of Ω(dλ logN logdN) bits, the asymptotic bandwidth for downloading
this metadata is absorbed.
C. Temporary storage for an eviction operation. During an eviction opera-
tion, the client downloads a bucket and a slice from each of its d children. This is
equivalent to downloading two buckets. Thus, for each step of the eviction operation
the client needs to store Z = O(dλ) blocks.
We now show how this client storage can be reduced to O(1). At a high level,
the client needs to perform the eviction from a bucket to its children buckets without
downloading the entire buckets. If the client can only store one block, it needs to
download one block at a time from the parent bucket and upload it to one of its
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children buckets. And the client needs to do so obliviously. We achieve this by
hiding which block from the parent bucket is downloaded, again using PIR, and
letting the client upload to the children buckets in a deterministic order. The new
EvictToSlices algorithm for evicting a parent bucket to its children slices is shown in
Figure 3.6.
1: function EvictToSlices(le, k, s)
2: // Evict from bucket P(le, k) to the s-th slice of each of its d children
3: Download metadata for bucket P(le, k) from S1
4: for t← 1 to d
5: Let S be the s-th slice of the t-th child of P(le, k) and Si be its i-th slot
// S is empty
6: for each Si ∈ S
7: if ∃j such that the j-th block in P(le, k) can be evicted to S then
8: block = TwoServerPIR(S1,S2,P(le, k), j)
9: Locally update the metadata for the j-th block in P(le, k) to be
dummy
10: Upload block along with its metadata to Si on both servers
11: else // no such j exists, do a dummy PIR and a dummy upload
12: Run TwoServerPIR(S1,S2,P(le, k), 1) and discard its output
13: Upload a dummy block with a dummy identifier to Si on both servers
14: Upload the updated metadata of P(le, k) to S1
Figure 3.6: Evicting to children slices using O(1) blocks of client storage.
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To perform the eviction from a bucket P(le, k) to a slice S of its t-th child, the
client first downloads the metadata corresponding to P(le, k) (line 3). The client
uploads to each slot i in S (denoted Si) sequentially, one slot at a time (line 6).
Before this eviction, each slot Si will be empty due to Lemma 2. There are two
cases:
1. If there exists a real block in P(le, k) that can be evicted to S, the client
downloads that block from P(le, k) using PIR (thus hiding its location in
P(le, k)), and uploads it (re-encrypted) to Si (lines 7-10).
2. If no real block in P(le, k) can be evicted to S, the client performs a dummy
PIR to download an arbitrary block from P(le, k), discards the PIR output,
and uploads an encrypted dummy block to Si (lines 11-13).
Thus, for each Si ∈ S in order, the client downloads a block from the parent bucket
using PIR (without revealing its position or whether its a dummy PIR) and uploads
a block to Si. This eviction process requires O(1) blocks of storage.
3.3.4 Bandwidth Analysis
Lemma 4. Our ORAM construction requires a bandwidth blowup of O(logdN) for
block sizes B = Ω(dλ logN).
Proof. Let us first analyze the bandwidth blowup of our construction by ignoring
the number of bits accessed for metadata. We only read two blocks of data for PIR;
thus, the bandwidth blowup for retrieving a block using PIR is O(1). On evictions,
for each bucket on the path, the client downloads the parent bucket and uploads
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to one slice from each of the d child buckets, which is equivalent to two buckets of
bandwidth. Thus, an eviction costs 2ZL blocks of bandwidth and it is performed
every Z/2 accesses, giving an amortized bandwidth blowup of 4L < 4 logdN . Thus,
ignoring metadata, the bandwidth blowup of our scheme is O(logdN).
Although our bandwidth blowup decreases with d, we cannot keep increasing d
for free. The reason is that the client needs to download a Θ(logN)-bit metadata for
all dλ logdN blocks on a path, on each access and eviction. Recursion contributes
another O(log3N) bits, but that is no greater than the blowup due to the metadata.
So the raw bandwidth (in bits) per access is O(B logdN + dλ logdN logN). While
we usually focus on the multiplicative blowup term, when d becomes too large, the
additive term will dominate. Thus, due to the metadata in the PIR operation, the
aforementioned bandwidth blowup only holds if the block size is B = Ω(dλ logN).
As a consequence, the optimal d should be determined as a function of the
block size B and the number of blocks N . For instance, for an application using
moderately large block size B = Ω(λ log2N), we can set d = Θ(logN) and the
bandwidth blowup is O(logN/ log logN). If some application uses very large blocks
such as B = Ω(
√
Nλ logN), then we can set d = Θ(
√
N) and achieve a bandwidth
blowup of O(1).
Bandwidth vs. server computation in practice. Our scheme achieves a sublog-
arithmic bandwidth blowup of O(logdN) but also incurs XOR computation on poly-
logarithmic number of blocks (specifically, O(dλ logdN) blocks). When implemented
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in a cloud-server scenario, the computation will require the CPUs to read these poly-
logarithmic data blocks from disk to perform XOR computations. Thus, the gain
in bandwidth will improve performance only when the server computation (and the
time to read disks is small). In practice, this will be useful when the available
bandwidth is very small compared to the time required for server computation.
3.4 Extending the Goldreich-Ostrovsky Lower Bound
Goldreich and Ostrovsky [67] gave an Ω(logcN) lower bound on the bandwidth
blowup assuming perfect correctness, perfect security and assuming the client to be
restricted to the following operations: reading from a memory location and writing
to a memory location. Here, N represents the number of logical blocks stored on
the server and c is the number of logical blocks stored by the client.
In this section, we first review (a slight variant of) the original Goldreich-
Ostrovsky lower bound and its proof from [67]. We then extend the model to include
PIR and PIR-write as possible client operations, and analyze how this changes the
bound.
Following Goldreich-Ostrovsky and Boyle-Naor [29, 67] (both papers consid-
ered the client as a CPU) we will use client and CPU interchangeably, and refer to
client storage as c registers.
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3.4.1 Original Lower Bound
We present a slight variant of the CPU used in the original lower bound
work [67]:
Definition 1. A CPU is modeled as a probabilistic random-access-machine (RAM)
which has c registers and is restricted to the following operations:
• READi reads a block from memory into a CPU register: For an addr ∈ [N ],
set Reg[i]← val, where val is the content of the memory at location addr.
• WRITEi moves a block from a CPU register to memory: For some i ∈ [c] and
addr ∈ [N ], write the data in Reg[i] to location addr in the memory.
Our RAM model has slightly different operations than the original analysis
in [67] to simplify the exposition. This will cause only constant factor differences in
the bound. Given this model, the original lower bound can be stated as:
Theorem 2. Every statistically oblivious simulation of a probabilistic RAM (Defi-
nition 1), which can access N blocks of data and hold c blocks in the CPU, on input
y makes at least max{|y|,Ω(t · logcN)} accesses to simulate t = poly(N) steps.
Proof. As described by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [67], the task of simulating an
ORAM can be modeled as a game in between three players
1. The CPU, which can hold at most c blocks and has access to a random function
f
2. the program request sequence of length t
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3. the observer
The CPU knows the program request sequence ahead of time. Suppose the
request access sequence is represented as r1, . . . , rt. The game takes place on a
memory consisting of N cells, each capable of storing a single block.
The game proceeds for t rounds. In each round i, the CPU loads ri in one of
its registers in such a way that the observer does not learn ri. The CPU does so by
making a sequence of operations as described in Definition 1. At any time during
the game, the CPU can store at most c blocks in memory. Round i ends when the
CPU holds block ri.
For a t sized request sequence, the CPU’s response can be represented by
two q sized sequences. The first sequence consists of an externally visible access
pattern. Each entry in this sequence is a single address (each of which is sufficient
to implement either READi or WRITEi). The second sequence consists of hidden
operations performed by the CPU. Let us consider the possible number of hidden
actions that can be taken by the CPU, for a fixed visible access pattern. For each
visible read address, the block that is read can be stored in one of the c registers
in the CPU. Likewise, for each visible write address, the block written back could
have been removed from any one of the c registers in the CPU. Thus, hidden from
the observer, the system can evolve in c ways on a READ and c ways on a WRITE.
Given that the CPU stores c blocks, a q length sequence can satisfy at most
cq program access sequences. Therefore, each visible access sequence can satisfy
at most (2c)qcq program request sequences. For perfect security, the visible access
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sequence should be able to satisfy all N t possible request sequences, i.e.,
N t ≤ (2c)qcq
or q ≥ t logN
log c+log(2c)
= Ω (t logcN).
The above is a bound on the number of operations. Since each operation incurs
at least 1 block of bandwidth, we also obtain an amortized bandwidth blowup lower
bound of Ω(logcN).
2
3.4.2 Augmented Lower Bound (after adding PIR)
We now extend the above result to allow the CPU to perform PIR and PIR-
write.
Definition 2. A PIR-augmented CPU is modeled as a probabilistic random-access-
machine PIR-RAM which has c registers and is restricted to the following operations:
• READi as described in Definition 1.
• WRITEi as described in Definition 1.
• PIR-READi reads a block from memory into a CPU register using PIR: For a
set of at most D addresses, set Reg[i] ← val, where val can be the content of
the memory at any of the locations in the set.
2If we assume that the memory is initially permuted by the CPU unknown to the server, then
the total number of program request sequences is at most MM (2c)qcq where M = poly(N) is the
physical memory size. Hence, we have q = Ω((t−M) logc N).
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• PIR-WRITEi moves a block from a CPU register into memory privately using
a PIR-WRITE operation: For a set of at most D addresses, write the data in
Reg[i] to a location among one of the D addresses.
Theorem 3. Every statistically oblivious simulation of a probabilistic PIR-RAM
(Definition 2), which can access N blocks of data and hold c blocks in the CPU and
perform PIR on a maximum of D blocks, on input y makes at least max{|y|,Ω(t ·
logcDN)} accesses to simulate t = poly(N) steps.
Proof. The proof follows the same framework as the original lower bound. The
number of operations in the visible and hidden sequences due to READi or WRITEi
operations is unchanged. Now, the visible sequence additionally reveals the set of D
addresses accessed on a PIR request for PIR-READi/PIR-WRITEi. In each of these
operations, the client can select one out of D possible memory blocks to read/write
in the visible memory. Furthermore, for each of the above D outcomes, the client
can add the read block to (or remove the written block from) any one of the c local
registers. Thus, the system can evolve in cD possible ways for each of the PIR-READ
and PIR-WRITE operations.
Extending the original argument, each visible access sequence can satisfy (2c+
2cD)qcq program request sequences. For perfect security, the visible access sequence
should be able to satisfy all N t possible request sequences, i.e.,
N t ≤ (2c+ 2cD)qcq









Again, the bound is on the number of operations. Since each of the four
operations incurs at least 1 block of bandwidth, a bound on the number of operations
translates to a bound on amortized bandwidth blowup.
3.4.3 Discussion
Accounting for failure probability. The above lower bound assumes perfect
security, i.e., each visible physical access sequence should be able to satisfy all pos-
sible program request sequences. However, using an argument similar to Wang et
al. [143], the same lower bound can be extended to work for up to O(1) failure
probability (and hence, negligible failure probability).
PIR as a black box. Our lower bound is independent of the implementation details
of the PIR and PIR-write operations. The bound is applicable to any statistically
secure PIR construction that meets the interface in Definition 2, regardless of the
number of servers it uses. We also note that although the lower bound considers
PIR-WRITE as a possible operation, our construction does not use this primitive.
Our construction and the lower bound. Our construction matches this lower
bound for certain parameter ranges. We use c = O(1) registers and perform a PIR
operation on D = O(d·poly(logN)) blocks. Thus, our lower bound is asymptotically
tight for d = Ω(logN) when the data block size B = Ω(dλ logN).
C-ORAM, CHf-ORAM and the lower bound. C-ORAM and CHf-ORAM
introduced three new operations on top of the standard ORAM model: download a
block from a path of poly-logarithmic blocks using PIR-READ, upload a block to one
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hidden location in a bucket using PIR-WRITE, and an oblivious merge operation.
In an oblivious merge operation, the server applies plaintext permutations (chosen
by the client) to buckets before merging them. This operation creates only one
possible outcome to the system state, since no action is hidden from the server.
Thus oblivious merge does not affect the lower bound in Section 3.4.
CHf-ORAM achieves statistical security with negligible failure probability and
is thus subject to the lower bound in Theorem 3. The number of operations required
for t logical accesses is Ω( t logN
log(cD)
) where c = O(1) and D = polylog(N). Thus, its
bandwidth blowup is lower bounded by Ω( logN
log logN
). Instead, CHf-ORAM claims to
have achieved O(1) bandwidth, implying a flaw in its construction.
C-ORAM achieves computational security due to the use of single-server PIR-READ/
PIR-WRITE, and thus does not directly violate the lower bound. However, unless
carefully shown otherwise, it is extremely unlikely that any security flaw of CHf-
ORAM can be fixed by merely replacing information theoretically secure PIR with
computationally secure PIR.
Circumventing the lower bound. The lower bound on bandwidth only applies to
black-box usage of PIR. Onion ORAM [51] circumvents the lower bound and achieves
O(1) bandwidth blowup. The reason is that the homomorphic select operation
in Onion ORAM (a non-black-box usage of PIR) does not consume one unit of
bandwidth. Therefore, while the number of operations in Onion ORAM is still
subject to the bound, the bound does not translate to a bound on bandwidth blowup.




Before ending this chapter, we mention works that are closely related to the
techniques used in this chapter. The idea of using a d-ary tree was first used by
Kushilevitz et al. [95] who achieveed O(log2N/ log logN) bandwidth blowup using
Θ(logN) buffers for every large level. Gentry et al. [61] uses a Θ(logN)-ary tree and
a push-to-leaf procedure along a deterministic path to achieve O(log2N/ log logN)
blowup. A concurrent work [154] uses a Θ(logN)-ary tree, which we compare to in
detail later. In all cases, the idea is to balance the (sometimes implicit) bandwidth
mismatch between the retrieval phase and the eviction phase.
Many works deviated from the traditional ORAM model defined by Goldreich
and Ostrovsky by introducing multiple non-colluding servers and/or server-side com-
putation. Some of these papers refer to their work as oblivious outsourced storage,
but we still refer to them as ORAMs. We review these works below.
ORAMs using multiple non-colluding servers. Constructions in this cate-
gory so far have not been able to surpass the Ω(logN) bandwidth barrier (except
CHf-ORAM [114] which we discuss later in this section) [106,122,136]. Lu and Os-
trovsky [106] achieved a bandwidth blowup of O(logN). In their scheme, each non-
colluding server performs permutations that are hidden to the other server due to
which the Goldreich-Ostrovsky lower bound does not apply. Stefanov and Shi [136]
implemented a practical system using two servers and O(
√
N) client storage. Their
client storage can be reduced to O(1) using the standard recursion technique [134].
Their construction required O(1) client-to-server bandwidth blowup and O(logN)
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server-to-server bandwidth blowup.
ORAMs with server computation. There exist many ORAM schemes that al-
low the server to do computation on data blocks [12, 48, 51, 62, 110, 115, 126, 137,
138, 146, 147, 153]. Most of these works still require Ω(logN) bandwidth blowup,
except the following ones. Apon et al. [12] use fully homomorphic encryption to
achieve an O(1) bandwidth blowup. However, the large overhead of FHE makes
the scheme impractical. Onion ORAM [51] improves upon Apon et al. to achieve
an O(1) bandwidth blowup by using only additively homomorphic encryption or
somewhat homomorphic encryption. The amount of server computation is signif-
icantly reduced (compared to FHE) but is still quite large. In addition, the O(1)
bandwidth blowup of Onion ORAM can only be achieved for very large block sizes
of Ω(log5N). Both these schemes circumvent the Goldreich-Ostrovsky lower bound
by using homomorphic operations on the server side that require little client inter-
vention.
Independent and concurrent work. MSKT-ORAM [154] is an independent and
concurrent work that achieves comparable bandwidth blowup using similar tech-
niques, i.e., a d-ary tree and two-server PIR applied to a poly-logarithmic number
of blocks. Our construction has several advantages stemming from the following
major differences: While we extended the most recent tree-based ORAM, Onion
ORAM [51], to a d-ary tree, MSKT-ORAM builds on top of the very first tree-
based ORAM by Shi et al. [134] and extends it to a d-ary tree. Thus, MSKT-ORAM
does not take advantage of the new techniques invented afterwards, such as small
block recursion [139], reverse lexicographical order [61], higher bucket load [126],
54
reduced eviction frequency [126], and an empty bucket invariant [51]. As a result,
MSKT-ORAM requires a block size as large as Ω(N ε) for some constant ε, while
we only require blocks of size polylog(N) bits; MSKT-ORAM has a ω(logN) server
storage blowup, while our construction has a constant size server storage blowup
(Section 3.3); MSKT-ORAM needs a PIR, a physical read and a physical write op-
eration to evict each block, while we can eliminate the need for the physical read due
to the empty bucket/slice invariant (cf. Lemma 2 and Section 3.3.3); MSKT-ORAM
also spends at least 2× more bandwidth for both blocks and metadata during evic-
tion, since Shi et al. [134] requires two evictions after every access.
Oblivious RAM lower bound. As mentioned earlier, Goldreich and Ostrovsky
presented a lower bound of Ω(logcN) where c is the amount of client storage in
blocks. Their lower bound modeled the server as a simple storage device capable of
reading and writing blocks. Boyle and Naor revisit the ORAM lower bound to relate
it to the size of circuits for sorting [29]. In our work, we extend the lower bound
suggested by Goldreich and Ostrovsky to encompass private information retrieval
(PIR) as a possible operation performed by the client and obtain a lower bound of
Ω(logcD(N)) in Section 3.4. Here, c is the number of blocks stored by the client
and D is the number of blocks that a PIR is performed on. C-ORAM [115] and
CHf-ORAM [114] violate the lower bound and must have security flaws. Boyle and
Naor showed that an ORAM lower bound is difficult to obtain in a general model,
i.e., if the client is not restricted to a small set of operations.
Private information retrieval. A Private information retrieval (PIR) protocol
allows a user to retrieve some data block from a server without revealing the block
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that was retrieved. It was first introduced by Chor et al. [41]. In our work, we use a
simple two server O(N) scheme from [41] to reduce the bandwidth cost of accessing
a block.
3.6 Conclusion, Subsequent Work, and Open Problems
In this work, we design an Oblivious RAM with sub-logarithmic bandwidth
blowup where the servers only perform XOR operations. We achieve this by using
a novel eviction scheme over a d-ary tree to obtain a blowup of O(logdN) and using
two-server PIR to reduce the cost to retrieve a block. We show a lower bound of
Ω(logcDN) for bandwidth blowup for a client storing c blocks of data and performing
a PIR on D blocks of data at a time. Our construction matches our lower bound
under certain parameter ranges. C-ORAM [115] and CHf-ORAM [114] violate the
lower bound and thus have security flaws.
Subsequent to our work, Kushilevitz et al. [97] have shown a construction that
achieves a sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup for a smaller block size of Ω(d logN)
bits (instead of Ω(dλ logN) bits). However, their scheme is secure only against a
computationally-bounded adversary.
It is still an open question whether a sub-logarithmic bandwidth blowup can be
obtained in the original model defined by Goldreich and Ostrovsky. Also, all known
ORAM schemes that achieve O(logN) bandwidth blowup require a block size of
Ω(log2N). Whether this bound (or a sub-logarithmic bound) can be obtained for
smaller block sizes remains open.
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Chapter 4: Perfectly Secure Oblivious RAM
In this chapter, we present a perfectly-secure OPRAM and a perfectly-secure
ORAM scheme. As mentioned in Chapter 2, we consider ORAMs to be a special
case of OPRAMs, i.e., when both the original PRAM and the OPRAM have only
one CPU. Thus, our final scheme description only describes an OPRAM.
The original ORAM schemes, proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [65, 67],
achieved poly-logarithmic overheads but required the usage of pseudo-random func-
tions (PRFs); thus they defend only against computationally bounded adversaries.
Various subsequent works [11, 38, 43, 47, 134, 140, 143], starting from Ajtai [11] and
Damg̊ard et al. [47] investigated information-theoretically secure ORAM/OPRAM
schemes, i.e., schemes that do not rely on computational assumptions and defend
against even unbounded adversaries. As earlier works point out [11, 47], the exis-
tence of efficient ORAM schemes without computational assumptions is not only
theoretically intriguing, but also has various applications in cryptography. For
example, information-theoretically secure ORAM schemes can be applied to the
construction of efficient RAM-model, information-theoretically secure multi-party
computation (MPC) protocols [17]. Among known information-theoretically secure
ORAM/OPRAM schemes [11, 28, 38, 39, 43, 47, 134, 140, 143], almost all of them
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achieve only statistical security [11,28,38,39,43,134,140,143], i.e., there is still some
non-zero failure probability — either correctness or security failure — but the fail-
ure probability can be made negligibly small in N where N is the RAM/PRAM’s
memory size. To the best of our knowledge, the only known perfectly secure ORAM
construction is the elegant work by Damg̊ard et al. [47] — they achieve 0 failure
probability against computationally unbounded adversaries. Although recent works
have constructed statistically secure OPRAMs [28, 38, 39], there is no known (non-
trivial) perfectly secure OPRAM scheme to date.
Motivation for perfect security. Perfectly secure ORAMs/OPRAMs are theo-
retically intriguing for various reasons:
1. First, to achieve 2−κ failure probability (either in security or in correctness),
the best known statistically secure OPRAM scheme [35,38] incurs a O(κ logN)
total work blowup and O(log κ logN) depth blowup where N is the PRAM’s
memory size. Although for negligibly small inN failure probability the blowups
are only poly-logarithmic in N , they can be as large as N c for some constant
c < 1 if one desires (sub-)exponentially small failure probability in N .
2. Second, perfectly secure ORAM schemes have been used as a buildling block
in recent results in searchable encryption schemes [50]. Typically these al-
gorithmic constructions rely on divide-and-conquer to break down a problem
into smaller sizes and then apply ORAM to a small instance — since the
instance size N is small (e.g., logarithmic in the security parameter), negli-
gible in N failure probability is not sufficient and thus these works demand
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perfectly secure ORAMs/OPRAMs and existing statistically secure schemes
result in asymptotically poorer performance.
3. Third, understanding the boundary of perfect and statistical security has
been an important theoretical question in cryptography. For example, a long-
standing open problem in cryptography is to separate the classes of languages
that admit perfect ZK and statistical ZK proofs. For ORAMs/OPRAMs too,
it remains open whether there are any separations between statistical and
perfect security (and we believe that this is an exciting future direction).
Our Results and Contributions
In this chapter, we prove the following result which significantly advances
our theoretical understanding of perfectly secure ORAMs and OPRAMs in multiple
respects. We present the informal theorem statement below and then discuss its
theoretical significance.
Theorem 4 (Informal statement of main theorem). Any PRAM with m CPUs
that consumes N memory blocks each of which is at least logN-bits long1 can be
simulated by a perfectly oblivious PRAM, incurring O(log3N) total work blowup,
O(logN(logm+ log logN)) depth blowup, and O(1) space blowup.
The above theorem improves the theoretical state of the art on perfectly secure
ORAMs/OPRAMs in multiple dimensions:
1All existing ORAM and OPRAM works [65,67,70,96,134] make this assumption.
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1. First, our work gives rise to the first perfectly secure (non-trivial) OPRAM
construction. No such construction was known before and it is not clear how to
directly parallelize the perfectly secure ORAM scheme by Damg̊ard et al. [47].
2. Second, even for the sequential special case, we improve Damg̊ard et al. [47]
asymptotically by reducing a logN factor in the ORAM’s space consumption.
3. Finally, when (sub-)exponentially small (in N) failure probabilities are re-
quired, our perfectly secure OPRAM scheme asymptotically outperforms all
known statistically secure constructions in terms of total work blowup! For
example, suppose that we require 2−κ failure probability and N = poly(κ) —
then all known statistically secure OPRAM constructions [28, 38, 39] would
incur at least N c total work blowup and Ω(log2N) depth blowup and thus our
new perfectly secure OPRAM construction is asymptotically better for this
scenario.
The above Theorem 4 applies to general block sizes. We additionally show that
for sufficiently large block sizes, there exists a perfectly secure OPRAM construction
with O(log2N) total work blowup and O(logN(logm + log logN)) depth blowup
where m denotes the number of CPUs of the original PRAM. Finally, we point out
that this work focuses mostly on the theoretical understanding of perfect security
in ORAMs/OPRAMs, and we leave it as a future research direction to investigate
their practical performance (see also Section 4.5).
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4.1 Technical Roadmap
In this section, we present an informal roadmap of our technical approach to
aid understanding.
4.1.1 Simplified Perfectly Secure ORAM with Asymptotically Smaller
Space
First, we propose a new perfectly secure ORAM scheme that is conceptually
simpler than that of Damg̊ard et al. [47] and asymptotically gains a logarithmic
factor in space. Our construction is inspired by the hierarchical ORAM paradigm
originally proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [65, 67] — however, most exist-
ing hierarchical ORAMs achieve only computational security since they rely on a
pseudorandom function (PRF) for looking up hash tables in the hierarchical data
structure. Thus our focus is how to get rid of this PRF and achieve perfect security.
Background: hierarchical ORAM. The recent work by Chan et al. [36] gave a
clean and modular exposition of the hierarchical paradigm. A hierarchical ORAM
consists of O(logN) levels that are geometrically increasing in size. Specifically,
level i is capable of storing 2i memory blocks. One could think of this hierarchical
data structure as a hierarchy of stashes where smaller levels act as stashes for larger
levels. In existing schemes with computational security, each level is an oblivious
hash-table [36]. To access a block at logical address addr, the CPU sequentially
looks up every level of the hierarchy (from small to large) for the logical address
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addr. The physical location of a logical address addr within the oblivious hash-table
is determined using a PRF whose secret key is known only to the CPU but not to the
adversary. Once the block has already been found in some level, for all subsequent
levels the CPU would just look for a dummy element, denoted by ⊥. When a
requested block has been found, it is marked as deleted in the corresponding level
where it is found. Every 2i memory requests, we perform a rebuild operation and
merge all levels smaller than i (including the block just fetched and possibly updated
if this is a write request) into level i — at this moment, the oblivious hash-table in
level i is rebuilt, where every block’s location in the hash table is determined using
a PRF.
As Chan et al. [36] point out, the hierarchical ORAM paradigm effectively
reduces the problem of constructing ORAM to constructing an oblivious hash-table
supporting two operations: 1) rebuild takes in a set of blocks each tagged with its
logical address, and constructs a hash-table data structure that facilitates lookups
later; and 2) lookup takes a request that is either a logical address addr or dummy
(denoted ⊥), and returns the corresponding block requested. Obliviousness (defined
w.r.t. the joint access patterns of the rebuild and lookup phases) is guaranteed
as long as during the life-time of the oblivious hash-table, the sequence of lookup
requests never ask for the same real element twice — and this invariant is guaranteed
by the specific way the hierarchical ORAM framework uses the oblivious hash-table
as a building block (more specifically, the fact that once a block is found, it is moved
to a smaller level and a dummy block is requested from all subsequent levels).
Removing the PRF. As mentioned, an oblivious hash-table relies on a PRF to
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determine each block’s location within a hash-table instance; and both the rebuilding
phase and the lookup phase use the same PRF for placing and fetching blocks
respectively. Since we wish to achieve perfect security, we would like to remove the
PRF. One simple idea is to randomly permute all blocks within a level — this way,
each lookup of a real block would visit a random location and we could hope to
retain security as long as every real block is requested at most once for every level
(in between rebuilds)2. Using techniques from earlier works [35,38], it is possible to
obliviously perform such a random permutation without disclosing the permutation;
however, the difficulty arises when one wishes to perform a look up — if blocks are
randomly permuted within a level during rebuild, lookup must know where each
block resides to proceed successfully. Thus if the CPU could hold a position map for
free to remember where each block is in the hierarchical data structure, the problem
would have been resolved: during every lookup, the CPU could first look up the
physical location of the logical address requested, and then proceed accordingly.
Actually storing such a position map, however, would consume too much CPU
space. To avoid storing this position map, we are inspired by the recursion technique
that is commonly adopted by tree-based ORAM schemes [134] — however, as we
point out soon, making the recursion idea work for the hierarchical ORAM paradigm
is more difficult. The high-level idea is to recursively store the position map in a
smaller ORAM rather than storing it on the CPU side; we could then recurse and
store the position map of the position map in an even smaller ORAM, and so on
2As we point out later, randomly permuting real blocks is in fact not sufficient; we also need to
allow dummy lookups by introducing an oblivious dummy linked list.
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— until the ORAM’s size becomes O(1) at which point we would have the CPU
store the entire ORAM. Henceforth, we use the notation ORAMD to denote the
ORAM that stores the actual data blocks where D = O(logN); and we use ORAMd
to denote the ORAM at depth d of this recursion where d ∈ [0..D − 1]. Thus, the
larger d is, the larger the ORAM.
Although this recursion idea was very simple in the tree-based ORAM paradigm,
it is not immediately clear how to make the same recursion idea work in the hier-
archical ORAM paradigm. One trickiness arises since in a hierarchical ORAM,
every 2i requests, the ORAM would reshuffle and merge all levels smaller than i
into level i — this is called a rebuild of level i. When a level-i rebuild happens,
the position labels in the position-map ORAM must be updated as well to re-
flect the blocks’ new locations. In a similar fashion, the position labels in all of
ORAM0,ORAM1, . . . ,ORAMD−1 must be updated. We make the following crucial
observation that will enable a coordinated rebuild technique which we will shortly
explain:
(Invariant necessary for coordinated rebuild:) If a data block resides at level i
of ORAMD, then its position labels in all recursion depths must reside in level
i or smaller3.
This invariant enables a coordinated rebuild technique: when the data ORAM
(i.e., ORAMD) merges all levels smaller than i into level i, all smaller recursion
3A similar observation was adopted by Goodrich et al. [71] in their statistically secure ORAM
construction.
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depths would do the same (unless the recursion depth is too small and does not have
level i, in which case the entire ORAM would be rebuilt). During this coordinated
rebuild, ORAMD would first perform its rebuild, and propagate the position labels
of all blocks involved in the rebuild to recursion depth D−1; then ORAMD−1 would
perform its rebuild based on the position labels learned from ORAMD, and propagate
the new position labels involved to recursion depth D − 2, and so on. As we shall
discuss in the technical sections, rebuilding a level (in any recursion depth) can
be accomplished through the help of O(1) oblivious sorts and an oblivious random
permutation.
Handling dummy blocks with oblivious linked lists. The above idea almost
works, but not quite so. There is an additional technical subtlety regarding how
to handle and use dummy blocks. Recall that during a memory access, if a block
requested actually resides in a hierarchical level, we would read the memory location
that contains the block (and this memory location could be retrieved through a
special recursive position map technique). If a block does not reside in a level (or
has been found in a smaller level), we still need to read a dummy location within
the level to hide the fact that the block does not reside within the current level.
Recall that the i-th level must support up to 2i lookups before the level is
rebuilt. Thus, one idea is to introduce 2i dummy blocks, and obliviously and ran-
domly permute all blocks, real and dummy alike, during the rebuild. All dummy
blocks may be indexed by a dummy counter, and every time one needs to look up
a dummy block in a level, we will visit a new dummy block. In this way, we can
retain obliviousness by making sure that every real block and every dummy block
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is visited at most once before the level is rebuilt again.
To make this idea fully work, there must be a mechanism for finding out where
the next dummy block is every time a dummy lookup must be performed. One näıve
idea would be to use the same recursion technique to store position maps for dummy
blocks too — however, since each memory request might involve reading O(logN)
dummy blocks, one per level, doing so would incur extra blowup in runtime and
space. Instead, we use an oblivious dummy linked list to resolve this problem —
this oblivious dummy linked list is inspired by technical ideas in the Damg̊ard et
al. construction [47]. In essence, each dummy block stores the pointer to the next
dummy block, and the head pointer of the linked list is stored at a designated
memory location and updated upon each read of the linked list. In the subsequent
technical sections, we will describe how to rely on oblivious sorting to rebuild such
an oblivious dummy linked list to support dummy lookups.
Putting it altogether. Putting all the above ideas together, the formal presen-
tation of our perfectly secure ORAM scheme adopts a modular approach4. First,
we define and construct an abstraction called an “oblivious one-time memory”. An
oblivious one-time memory allows one to obliviously create a data structure given
a list of input blocks. Once created, one can look up real or dummy blocks in the
data structure, and to look up a real block one must provide a correct position label
indicating where the block resides (imagine for now that the position label comes
from an “oracle” but in the full ORAM scheme the position label comes from the
4In fact, later in this chapter, we omit the sequential version and directly present the parallel
version of all algorithms.
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recursion). An oblivious one-time memory retains obliviousness as long as every real
block is looked up at most once and moreover, dummy blocks are looked up at most
n times where n is a predetermined parameter (that the scheme is parametrized
with).
Once we have this “oblivious one-time memory” abstraction, we show how
to use it to construct an intermediate abstraction referred to as a “position-based
ORAM”. A position-based ORAM contains a hierarchy of oblivious one-time mem-
ory instances, of geometrically growing sizes. A position-based ORAM is almost a
fully functional ORAM except that we assume that upon every memory request, an
“oracle” will somehow provide a correct position label indicating where the requested
block resides in the hierarchy.
Finally, we go from such a “position-based ORAM” to a fully functional
ORAM using the special recursive position-map technique as explained.
At this point, we have constructed a perfectly secure ORAM scheme with
O(log3N) simulation overhead. Specifically, one logN factor arises from the logN
depths of recursion, the remaining log2N factor arises from the cost of the ORAM at
each recursion depth. Intuitively, our perfectly secure ORAM is a logarithmic factor
more expensive than existing computationally-secure counterparts in the hierarchi-
cal framework [36,70,96] since the computationally-secure schemes [36,70,96] avoid
the recursion by adopting a PRF to compute the pseudorandom position labels of
blocks.
Making our ORAM scheme parallel. Our next goal is to make our ORAM
scheme parallel. Instead of compiling a sequential RAM program to a sequential
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ORAM, we are now interested in compiling a PRAM program to an OPRAM.
Suppose that the original program is a PRAM that completes in T parallel steps
consuming m CPUs. First, using standard techniques, it would not be too difficult
to parallelize our earlier ORAM scheme and construct an OPRAM that completes
in T ·O(log3N) parallel steps consuming also exactly m CPUs. We stress that the
simplicity of our sequential ORAM construction makes it easy to parallelize — in
comparison, we are not aware how to parallelize Damg̊ard et al. [47]’s construction.
The main technique needed for this parallelization is oblivious routing: when the m
CPUs at recursion depth d have fetched the position labels for the next recursion
depth, the m CPUs at depth d must now obliviously route the position labels to the
correct fetch CPU at the next recursion depth. As shown in earlier works [28,35,38],
such oblivious routing can be accomplished with m CPUs in O(logm) parallel steps.
4.1.2 Building Blocks
We now introduce several useful oblivious algorithms building blocks. With the
exception of oblivious random permutation, we assume that all remaining building
blocks are deterministic: for a deterministic algorithm, obliviousness means that the
algorithm’s memory access pattern is independent of its input.
Oblivious sort. Ajtai, Komlós, and Szemerédi [10] show how to construct a circuit
with n log n comparators that can correctly sort any input sequence containing n
comparable elements. This immediately gives rise to a parallel oblivious sorting
algorithm with O(n log n) total work and O(log n) depth.
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Oblivious routing. Oblivious routing solves the following problem. Suppose n
source CPUs each holds a data block with a distinct key (or a dummy block).
Further, n destination CPUs each holds a key and requests a data block identified
by its key — multiple destination CPUs can possibly request the same key. An
oblivious routing algorithm routes the requested data block to the destination CPU
in an oblivious manner. We may assume that the destination CPUs are represented
by an ordered array X. Initially the payload of each entry of X is left empty. After
the routing, each entry of X receives a data block (the received data block is dummy
if no source CPUs hold the same key as requested). The ordering of elements in X
is preserved between the input and output.
Boyle et al. [28] showed that through a combination of oblivious sorts and
oblivious aggregation, oblivious routing can be achieved in O(log n) parallel runtime
with O(n) CPUs.
Obliviously computing the routing permutation. Suppose that we are given a
source array src of length n where each entry holds a distinct key, and a destination
array dst also of length n where each entry holds a distinct key. Further, it is
guaranteed that the set of keys in src is the same as the set of keys in dst. We
would like to write down a permutation π (henceforth referred to as the routing
permutation) such that applying π to src would result in the same order of keys as
dst. The recent work by Chan and Shi [38] showed how to implement the above
task obliviously using O(1) number of oblivious sorts. Thus, with O(n) CPUs the
routing permutation can be computed in O(log n) parallel runtime.
Oblivious select. Consider the following problem: given a set of n elements among
69
which at most one element is distinguishing, output the distinguishing element (and
if no element is distinguishing, output ⊥). It is not difficult to see that by building
an aggregation tree over the n elements, one can accomplish oblivious select with n
CPUs in log n parallel steps.
Oblivious prefix sum. Given an array X of length n, every i ∈ [n] wants to
compute the sum of the prefix X[1..i]. There exists a parallel oblivious algorithm
to achieve this in O(log n) steps consuming n CPUs [78].
Oblivious random permutation. Let ORP be an algorithm that upon receiving
an input array X, outputs a permutation of X. Let Fperm denote an ideal functional-
ity that upon receiving the input array X, outputs a perfectly random permutation
of X.
We say that ORP is a perfectly oblivious random permutation, iff there exists
a simulator Sim such that the joint distribution (Fperm(X), Sim(|X|)) is identically
distributed as the joint distribution of the output and the addresses incurred by
running ORP on X. Note that the simulator Sim is given only the input length |X|
but not the contents of X.
Chan, Chung, and Shi [35] recently describe a perfectly oblivious random
permutation algorithm, which, except with negligible in λ probability, completes
in O(log n + α(λ)) parallel steps consuming n CPUs assuming that the each block
is large enough to store log λ bits (where α is a suitable super-constant function).
We summarize their construction in the following theorem where we choose α(λ) :=
log log λ that will suffice for the purpose of this chapter.
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Theorem 5 (Perfectly oblivious random permutation [35]). Assume that each mem-
ory block is large enough to store at least log λ bits and that n ≤ λ ≤ 2O(n2). Then,
there exists a perfectly oblivious random permutation algorithm that consumes n
CPUs.
Except with λ probability, the algorithm completes in O(log n+log log λ) parallel
steps and O(n log n) work.
We note that the failure is in terms of the algorithm’s runtime — there is a
negligibly small probability that the algorithm will run for longer, but the algorithm
guarantees perfect security regardless.
4.2 Parallel One-Time Oblivious Memory
We define and construct an abstract datatype to process non-recurrent memory
lookup requests. Although the abstraction is similar to the oblivious hashing scheme
in Chan et al. [36], our one-time memory scheme needs to be perfectly secure and
does not use a hashing scheme. Furthermore, we assume that every real lookup
request is tagged with a correct position label that indicates where the requested
block is — in this section, we simply assume that the correct position labels are
simply provided during lookup; but later in our full OPRAM scheme, we will use a
recursive ORAM/OPRAM technique reminiscent of those used in binary-tree-based
ORAM/OPRAM schemes [38,43,134,140,143] such that we can obtain the position
label of a block first before fetching the block.
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4.2.1 Definition: One-Time Oblivious Memory
We describe the intuition using the sequential special case but our formal
presentation later will directly describe the parallel version. An oblivious one-time
memory supports three operations: 1) Build, 2) Lookup, and 3) Getall. Build is
called once upfront to create the data structure: it takes in a set of real blocks
(each tagged with its logical address) and creates a data structure that facilitates
lookup. After this data structure is created, a sequence of lookup operations can
be performed: each lookup can request a real block identified by its logical address
or a dummy block denoted ⊥ — if the requested block is a real block, we assume
that the correct position label is supplied to indicate where in the data structure the
requested block is. Finally, when the data structure is no longer needed, one may
call a Getall operation to obtain a list of blocks (tagged with their logical addresses)
that have not been looked up yet — in our OPRAM scheme later, this is the set of
blocks that need to be preserved during rebuilding.
We require that our oblivious one-time memory data structure retain obliv-
iousness as long as 1) the sequence of real blocks looked up all exist in the data
structure (i.e., it appeared as part of the input to Build), and moreover, each logical
address is looked up at most once; and 2) at most ñ number of dummy lookups may




Our formal presentation will directly describe the parallel case. In the parallel
version, lookup requests come in batches of size m > 1.
A (parallel) one-time memory scheme denoted OTM[n,m,t] is parametrized by
three parameters: n denotes the upper bound on the number of real elements; m
is the batch size for lookups; t is the upper bound on the number of batch lookups
supported.
The (parallel) one-time memory scheme OTM[n,m,t] is comprised of the follow-
ing possibly randomized, stateful algorithms to be executed on a Concurrent-Read,
Exclusive-Write PRAM — note that since the algorithms are stateful, every invo-
cation will update an implicit data structure in memory. Henceforth we use the
terminology key and value in the formal description but in our OPRAM scheme
later, a real key will be a logical memory address and its value is the block’s con-
tent.
• U ← Build({(ki, vi) : i ∈ [n]}): given a set of n key-value pairs (ki, vi), where
each pair is either real or of the form (⊥,⊥), the Build algorithm creates an
implicit data structure to facilitate subsequent lookup requests, and moreover
outputs a list U of exactly n key-position pairs where each pair is of the form
(k, pos). Further, every real key input to Build will appear exactly once in the
list U ; and the list U is padded with ⊥ to a length n. Note that U does not
include the values vi’s. Later in our scheme, this key-position list U will be
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propagated back to the parent recursion depth during a coordinated rebuild5.
• (vi : i ∈ [m])← Lookup({(ki, posi) : i ∈ [m]}): there are m concurrent Lookup
operations in a single batch, where we allow each key ki requested to be either
real or ⊥. Moreover, in each batch, at most n/t of the keys are real.
• R ← Getall: the Getall algorithm returns an array R of length n where each
entry is either ⊥ or real and of the form (k, pos). The array R should contain
all real entries that have been inserted during Build but have not been looked
up yet, padded with ⊥ to a length of n.
Valid request sequence. Our oblivious one-time memory ensures obliviousness
only if lookups are non-recurrent (i.e., never look for the same real key twice); and
moreover the number of lookups requests must be upper bounded by a predeter-
mined parameter. More formally, a sequence of operations is valid, iff the following
holds:
• The sequence begins with a single call to Build upfront; followed by a sequence
of at most t batch Lookup calls, each of which supplies a batch of m keys and
the corresponding position labels; and finally the sequence ends with a single
call to Getall.
5Note that we do not explicitly denote the implicit data structure in the output of Build, since
the implicit data structure is needed only internally by the current oblivious one-time memory
instance. In comparison, U is explicitly output since U will later on be (externally) needed by the
parent recursion depth in our OPRAM construction.
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• The Build call is supplied with an input array S := {(ki, vi)}i∈[n], such that
any two real entries in S must have distinct keys.
• For every Lookup({(ki, posi) : i ∈ [m]}) query in the sequence, if each ki is a
real key, then ki must be contained in S that was input to Build earlier. In
other words, Lookup requests are not supposed to ask for real keys that do not
exist in the data structure6; moreover, each (ki, posi) pair supplied to Lookup
must exist in the U array returned by the earlier invocation of Build, i.e., posi
must be a correct position label for ki; and
• Finally, in all Lookup requests in the sequence, no two keys requested (either
in the same or different batches) are the same.
Correctness. Correctness requires that
1. for any valid request sequence, with probability 1, for every Lookup({(ki, posi) :
i ∈ [m]}) request, the i-th answer returned must be ⊥ if ki = ⊥; else if ki 6= ⊥,
Lookup must return the correct value vi associated with ki that was input to
the earlier invocation of Build.
2. for any valid request sequence, with probability 1, Getall must return an array
R containing every (k, v) pair that was supplied to Build but has not been
looked up; moreover the remaining entries in R must all be ⊥.
6We emphasize this is a major difference between this one-time memory scheme and the obliv-
ious hashing abstraction of Chan et al. [36]); Chan et al.’s abstraction [36] allows lookup queries
to ask for keys that do not exist in the data structure.
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Perfect obliviousness. We say that two valid request sequences are length-
equivalent, if the input sets to Build have equal size, and the number of Lookup
requests (where each request asks for a batch of m keys) in the two sequences are
the same.
We say that a (parallel) one-time memory scheme is perfectly oblivious, iff
for any two length-equivalent request sequences that are valid, the distribution of
access patterns resulting from the algorithms are identically distributed.
4.2.2 Construction
We first explain the intuition for the sequential case, i.e., m = 1. The intu-
ition is simply to permute all elements received as input during Build. However,
since subsequent lookup requests may be dummy (also denoted ⊥), we also need
to pad the array with sufficiently many dummies to support these lookup requests.
The important invariant is that each real element as well as each dummy will be
accessed at most once during lookup requests. For reals, this is guaranteed since the
definition of a valid request sequence requires that each real key be requested no
more than once, and that each real key requested must exist in the data structure.
For dummies, every time a ⊥-request is received, we always look for an unvisited
dummy. To implement this idea, one tricky detail is that unlike real lookup requests,
dummy requests do not carry the position label of the next dummy to be read —
thus our data structure itself must maintain an oblivious linked list of dummies such
that we can easily find out where the next dummy is. Since all real and dummies are
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randomly permuted during Build, and due to the aforementioned invariant, every
lookup visits a completely random location of the data structure thus maintaining
perfect obliviousness.
It is not too difficult to make the above algorithm parallel (i.e., for the case
m > 1). To achieve this, one necessary modification is that instead of maintaining
a single dummy linked list, we now must maintain m dummy linked lists. These m
dummy linked lists are created during Build and consumed during Lookup.
4.2.2.1 Detailed Construction
At the end of Build, our algorithm creates an in-memory data structure con-
sisting of the following:
1. An array A of length n + ñ, where ñ := tm denotes the number of dummies
and n denotes the number of real elements. Each entry of the array A (real
or dummy alike) has four fields (key, val, next, pos) where
• key is a key that is either real or dummy; and val is a value that is either
real or dummy.
• the field next ∈ [0..n+ ñ) matters only for dummy entries, and at the end
of the Build algorithm, the next field stores the position of the next entry
in the dummy linked list (recall that all dummy entries form m linked
lists); and
• the field pos ∈ [0..n+ ñ) denotes where in the array an entry finally wants
to be — at the end of the Build algorithm it must be that A[i].pos = i.
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However, during the algorithm, entries of A will be permuted transiently;
but as soon as each element i has decided where it wants to be (i.e.,
A[i].pos), it will always carry its desired position around during the re-
mainder of the algorithm.
2. An array that stores the head pointers of allm dummy linked lists. Specifically,
we denote them head pointers as {dposi : i ∈ [m]} where each dposi ∈ [0..n+ñ)
is the head pointer of one dummy linked list.
These in-memory data structures, including A and the dummy pointers will
then be updated during Lookup.
Build. Our oblivious Build({(ki, vi)}i∈[n]) algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Initialize. Construct an array A of length n+ ñ whose entries are of the form
described above. Specifically, the keys and values for the first n entries of A
are copied from the input. Recall that the input may contain dummies too,
and we use ⊥ to denote a dummy key from the input.
The last ñ entries of A contain special dummy keys that are numbered. Specif-
ically, for each i ∈ [1..ñ], we denote An[i] := A[n− 1 + i], and the entry stored
at An[i] has key ⊥i and value ⊥.
2. Every element decides at random its desired final position. Specifically, per-
form a perfectly oblivious random permutation on the entries of A — this
random permutation decides where each element finally wants to be.
Now, for each i ∈ [0..n+ñ), let A[i].pos := i. At this moment, A[i].pos denotes
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where the element A[i] finally wants to be. Henceforth in the algorithm, the
entries of A will be moved around but each element always carries around its
desired final position.
3. Construct the key-position map U . Perform oblivious sorting on A using the
field key. We assume that real keys have the highest priority followed by
⊥ < ⊥1 < · · · < ⊥ñ (where smaller keys come earlier).
At this moment, we can construct the key-position map U from the first n
entries of A — recall that each entry of U is of the form (k, pos).
4. Construct m dummy linked lists. Observe that the last ñ entries of A contain
special dummy keys, on which we perform the following to build m disjoint
singly-linked lists (each of which has length t). For each i ∈ [1..ñ], if i mod t 6=
0 we update the entry An[i].next := An[i + 1].pos, i.e., each dummy entry
(except the last entry of each linked list) records its next pointer.
We next record the positions of the heads of the m lists. For each i ∈ [m], we
set dposi := An[t(i− 1)].pos.
5. Move entries to their desired positions. Perform an oblivious sort on A, using
the fourth field pos. (This restores the ordering according to the previous
random permutation.)
At this moment, the data structure (A, {dposi : i ∈ [m]}) is stored in memory.
The key-position map U is explicitly output and later in our OPRAM scheme it will
be passed to the parent recursion depth during coordinated rebuild.
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Fact 6. Consuming O(ñ + n) CPUs and setting (ñ + n)2 ≤ λ ≤ 2ñ+n, the Build
algorithm completes in O(log(ñ+n)+log log λ) parallel steps, except with probability
negligible in λ.
Proof. Observe that the algorithm’s cost is dominated by O(1) number of oblivious
sorts which can be realized with the AKS sorting network [10].
Moreover, the algorithm incurs one application of oblivious random permuta-
tion, whose performance is stated in Theorem 5.
Lookup. We implement a batch ofm concurrent lookup operations {Lookup({(ki, posi) :
i ∈ [m]}) as follows. For each i ∈ [m], we perform the following in parallel.
1. Decide position to fetch from. If ki 6= ⊥ is real, set pos := posi, i.e., we want to
use the position label supplied from the input. Else if ki = ⊥, set pos := dposi,
i.e., the position to fetch from is the next dummy in the i-th dummy linked
lists. (To ensure obliviousness, the algorithm can always pretend to execute
both branches of the if-statement.)
At this moment, pos is the position to fetch from (for the i-th request out of
m concurrent requests).
2. Read and remove. Read the value from A[pos] and mark A[pos] := ⊥.
3. Update dummy head pointer if necessary. If pos = dposi, update the dummy
head pointer dposi := next. (To ensure obliviousness, the algorithm can pre-
tend to modify dposi in any case.)
4. Return. Return the value read in the above Step 2.
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The following fact is straightforward from the description of the algorithm.
Fact 7. The Lookup algorithm completes in O(1) parallel steps with O(m) CPUs.
Getall. Getall is implemented by the following simple procedure: obliviously sort A
by the key such that all real entries are packed in front. Return the first n entries of
the resulting array (and removing the metadata entries next and pos in the result).
Fact 8. The Getall algorithm completes in log(ñ+n) parallel steps consuming O(ñ+
n) CPUs.
Proof. Straighforward by observing that the algorithm’s cost is dominated by O(1)
number of oblivious sorts which can be realized with the AKS sorting network [10].
Lemma 5 (Perfect obliviousness of the one-time memory scheme). The above (par-
allel) one-time memory scheme satisfies perfect obliviousness.
Proof. It suffices to prove that for any valid request sequence, the memory access
patterns are identically distributed as those output by the following simulator that
knows only n,m and the number of Lookup requests in the sequence.
First, almost all parts of Build are deterministic and data oblivious and thus
the algorithm’s access patterns can be simulated in the most straightforward fashion.
The only randomized part of access patterns for Build is due to the oblivious ran-
dom permutation. To simulate this part, the simulator calls the oblivious random
permutation’s simulator algorithm.
Second, to simulate the access patterns of Lookup, the simulator would read
the memory location storing dposi for every i ∈ [m]. Then, it reads a random unread
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index of the array A and writes to it once too. Finally, it writes to dposi for every
i ∈ [m].
Third, simulating the access patterns of Getall is done in the most natural
manner since Getall is deterministic.
It is not difficult to see that the real-world access patterns are identically dis-
tributed as the simulated ones due to the definition of oblivious random permutation
(see Section 4.1.2) Particularly, observe that the above way of simulating the access
patterns of Build is the same in nature as if we randomly permuted the data struc-
ture A upfront by a random permutation, (that is chosen independently from the
simulated access patterns), then every real element and ⊥i will be in a random loca-
tion. Note also that as long as no two real keys requested collide and every real key
requested exists in the data structure A, then the real-world algorithm accesses each
real or ⊥i element at most once, and thus every real-world access visits a random
position of the array A (besides reading and writing {dposi : i ∈ [m]}).
Summarizing the above, we conclude with the following theorem.
Theorem 9 (One-time oblivious memory). Let λ ∈ N be a parameter related to
the probability that the algorithm’s runtime exceeds a desired bound. Assume that
each memory block can store at least log n + log λ bits. There exists a perfectly
oblivious one-time scheme such that Build takes O(log n + log log λ) parallel steps
(except with negligible in λ probability) consuming n CPUs, Lookup for a batch of
m requests takes O(1) parallel steps consuming m CPUs, and Getall takes O(log n)
parallel steps consuming n CPUs.
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4.3 OPRAM with O(log3N) Simulation Overhead
We briefly explain the technical roadmap of this section:
• In Section 4.3.1, we will first describe a position-based OPRAM that supports
two operations: Lookup and Shuffle. A position-based OPRAM is an almost
fully functional OPRAM scheme except that every real lookup request must
supply a correct position label. In our OPRAM construction, these position
labels will have been fetched from small recursion depths and therefore will be
ready when looking up the position-based OPRAM.
Our position-based OPRAM relies on the hierarcial structure proposed by
Goldreich and Ostrovsky [65,67], as well as techniques by Chan et al. [36] that
showed how to parallelize such a hierarchical framework.
• In Section 4.3.2, we explain how to leverage “coordinated rebuild” and re-
cursion techniques to build a recursive OPRAM scheme that composes log-
arithmically many instances of our position-based OPRAM, of geometrically
decreasing sizes.
4.3.1 Position-Based OPRAM
Our OPRAM scheme (Section 4.3.2) will consist of logarithmically many position-
based OPRAMs of geometrically increasing sizes, henceforth denoted OPRAM0,
OPRAM1, OPRAM2, . . ., OPRAMD whereD := log2N−log2m. Specifically, OPRAMd
stores Θ(2d ·m) blocks where d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , D}. The last one OPRAMD stores the
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actual data blocks whereas every other OPRAMd where d < D recursively stores the
position labels for the next depth d+ 1.
4.3.1.1 Data Structure
As we shall see, the case OPRAM0 is trivial and is treated specially at the
end of this section (Section 4.3.1.1). Below we focus on describing OPRAMd for
some 1 ≤ d ≤ D = logN − logm. For d 6= 0, each OPRAMd consists of d + 1
levels geometrically growing in size, where each level is a one-time oblivious memory
scheme as defined and described in Section 4.2. We specify this data structure more
formally below.
Hierarchical levels. The position-based OPRAMd consists of d+1 levels henceforth




with at most n = 2j ·m real blocks and m concurrent lookups in each batch (which
can all be real). This means that for every OPRAMd, the smallest level is capable
of storing up to m real blocks. Every subsequent level can store twice as many real
blocks as the previous level. For the largest OPRAMD, its largest level is capable
of storing N real blocks given that D = logN − logm — this means that the total
space consumed is O(N).
Every level j is marked as either empty (when the corresponding OTMj has
not been rebuilt) or full (when OTMj is ready and in operation). Initially, all levels
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are marked as empty, i.e., the OPRAM initially is empty.
Position label. Henceforth we assume that a position label of a block specifies
1) which level the block resides in; and 2) the position within the level the block
resides at.
Additional assumption. We assume that each block is of the form (logical ad-
dress, payload), i.e., each block carries its own logical address.
4.3.1.2 Operations
Each position-based OPRAM supports two operations, Lookup and Shuffle.
For every OPRAMd consisting of d+ 1 levels, we rely on the following algorithms for
Lookup and Shuffle.
Lookup. Every batch lookup operation, denoted Lookup({(addri, posi) : i ∈ [m]})
receives as input the logical addresses of m blocks as well as a correct position label
for each requested block. To complete the batch lookup request, we perform the
following.
1. For each level j = 0, . . . , d in parallel, perform the following:
• For each i ∈ [m] in parallel, first check the supplied position label posi
to see if the requested block resides in the current level j: if so, let
addr′i := addri and let pos
′
i := posi (and specifically the part of the position
label denoting the offset within level j); else, set addr′i := ⊥ and pos′i := ⊥
to indicate that this should be a dummy request.
• (vij : i ∈ [m])← OTMj.Lookup({addr′i, pos′i : i ∈ [m]}).
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2. At this point, each of the m CPUs has d answers from the d levels respectively,
and only one of them is the valid answer. Now each of the m CPUs chooses
the correct answer as follows.
For each i ∈ [m] in parallel: set vali to be the only non-dummy element in
(vij : j = 0, . . . , d), if it exists; otherwise set vali := ⊥. This step can be
accomplished using an oblivious select operation (see Section 4.1.2) in log d
parallel steps consuming d CPUs.
3. Return (vali : i ∈ [m]).
We remark that in Goldreich and Ostrovsky’s original hierarchical ORAM [65,
67], the hierarchical levels must be visited sequentially — for obliviousness, if the
block is found in some smaller level, all subsequent levels must perform a dummy
lookup. Here we can visit all levels in parallel since the position label already tells
us which level it is in. Now the following fact is straightforward to observe:
Fact 10. For OPRAMd, Lookup consumes O(log d) parallel steps consuming m · d
CPUs where m is the batch size.
Shuffle. Similar to earlier hierarchical ORAMs [65,67] and OPRAMs [36], a shuffle
operation merges consecutively full levels into the next empty level (or the largest
level). However, in our Shuffle abstraction, there is an input U that contains some
logical addresses together with new values to be updated. Moreover, the shuffle
operation is associated with an update function that determines how the new values
in U should be incorporated into the OTM during the rebuild.
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In our full OPRAM scheme later, the update array U will be passed from
the immediate next depth OPRAMd+1, and contains the new position labels that
OPRAMd+1 has chosen for recently accessed logical addresses. These position labels
must then be recorded by OPRAMd appropriately.
More formally, each position-based OPRAMd supports a shuffle operation, de-
noted Shuffle(U, `; update), where the parameters are explained as follows:
1. An update array U in which each (non-dummy) entry contains a logical address
that needs to be updated, and a new value for this block. (Strictly speaking,
we allow a block to be partially updated.)
We will define additional constraints on U subsequently.
2. The level ` to be rebuilt during this shuffle.
3. An update function that specifies how the information in U is used to compute
the new value of a block in the OTM.
The reason we make this rule explicit in the notation is that a block whose
address that appears in U may only be partially modified; hence, we later
need to specify this update function carefully. However, to avoid cumbersome
notation, we may omit the parameter update, and just write Shuffle(U, `), when
the context is clear.
For each OPRAMd, when Shuffle(U, `; update) is called, it must be guaranteed
that ` ≤ d; and moreover, either level ` must either be empty or ` = d (i.e., this is




we shall see that OTM′0 contains the blocks that are freshly fetched.
The Shuffle algorithm then combines levels 0, 1, . . . , ` (of OPRAMd), together
with the extra OTM′0, into level `, updating some blocks’ contents as instructed
by the update array U and the update function update. At the end of the shuffle
operation, all levels 0, 1, . . . , `−1 are now marked as empty and level ` is now marked
as full.
We now explain the assumptions we make on the update array U and how we
want the update procedure to happen:
• We require that each logical address appears at most once in U .
• Let A be all logical addresses remaining in levels 0 to ` in OPRAMd: it must
hold that the set of logical addresses in U is a subset of those in A. In other
words, a subset of the logical addresses in A will be updated before rebuilding
level `.
• If some logical address addr exists only in A but not in U , after rebuilding level
`, the block’s value from the current OPRAMd should be preserved. If some
logical address addr exists in both A and in U , we use the update function to
modify its value: update takes a pair of blocks (addr, data) and (addr, data′)
with the same address but possibly different contents (the first of which coming
from the current OPRAMd and the second coming from U), and computes the
new block content data∗ appropriately.
We remark that the new value data∗ might depend on both data and data′.
Later, we will describe how the update rule is implemented.
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Upon receiving Shuffle(U, `; update), proceed with the following steps:
1. Let A := ∪`i=0OTMi.Getall ∪ OTM′0.Getall, where the operator ∪ denotes con-
catenation. Moreover, for an entry in A that comes from OTMi, then it also
carries a label i.
At this moment, the old OTM0, . . . ,OTM` instances may be destroyed.
2. We obliviously sort A∪U in increasing order of logical addresses, and moreover,
placing all dummy entries at the end. If two blocks have the same logical
address, place the entry coming from A in front of the one coming from U .
At this moment, in one linear scan, we can operate on every adjacent pair of
entries using the aforementioned update operation, such that if they share the
same logical address, the first entry is preserved and updated to a new value,
and the second entry is set to dummy.
At this moment, we obliviously sort the resulting array moving all dummies
to the end. We truncate the resulting array preserving only the first 2` · m
elements and let A′ denote the outcome (note that only dummies and no real
blocks will truncated in the above step).
3. Next, we call U ′ ← Build(A′) that builds a new OTM′ and U ′ contains the
positions of blocks in OTM′.
4. OTM′ is now the new level ` and henceforth it will be denoted OTM`. Mark
level ` as full and levels 0, 1, . . . , ` − 1 as empty. Finally, output U ′ (in our
full OPRAM construction later, U ′ will be passed to the next (i.e., immedi-
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ately smaller) position-based OPRAM as the update array for performing its
shuffle).
If we realize the oblivious sort with the AKS network [10] that sorts n items
in O(log n) parallel steps consuming n CPUs, we easily obtain the following fact —
note that there is a negligible in N probability that the algorithm runs longer than
the stated asymptotic time due to the oblivious random permutation building block
(see Section 4.1.2).
Fact 11. Suppose that the update function can be evaluated by a single CPU in
O(1) steps. For OPRAMd, let ` ≤ d, then except with negligible in N probability,
Shuffle(U, `) takes O(log(m · 2`) + log logN) parallel steps consuming m · 2` CPUs.
Observe that in the above fact, the randomness comes from the oblivious
random permutation subroutine used in building the one-time oblivious memory
data structure.
Trivial case: OPRAM0. In this case, OPRAM0 simply stores its entries in an array
A[0..m) of size m and we assume that the entries are indexed by a (log2m)-bit
string. Moreover, each address is also a (log2m)-bit string, whose block is stored at
the corresponding entry in A.
• Lookup. Upon receiving a batch of m depth-m truncated addresses where all
the real addresses are distinct, use oblivious routing to route A[0..m) to the
requested addresses. This can be accomplished in O(m logm) total work and
O(logm) depth. Note that OPRAM0’s lookup does not receive any position
labels.
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• Shuffle. Since there is only one array A (at level 0), Shuffle(U, 0) can be
implemented by oblivious sorting.
4.3.2 OPRAM Scheme from Position-Based OPRAM
Recursive OPRAMs. The OPRAM scheme consists of D + 1 position-based
OPRAMs henceforth denoted as OPRAM0,OPRAM1,OPRAM2, . . . ,OPRAMD. OPRAMD
stores the actual data blocks, whereas every other OPRAMd where d 6= D recursively
stores the position labels for the next data structure OPRAMd+1. Our construction
is in essence recursive although in presentation we shall spell out the recursion for
clarity. Henceforth we often say that OPRAMd is at recursion depth d or simply
depth d.
Although we are inspired by the recursion technique for tree-based ORAMs [134],
using this recursion technique in the context of hierarchical ORAMs/OPRAMs raises
new challenges. In particular, we cannot use the recursion in a blackbox fashion like
in tree-based constructions since all of our (position-based, hierarchical) OPRAMs
must reshuffle in sync with each other in a non-blackbox fashion as will become clear
later.
Format of depth-d block and address. Suppose that a block’s logical address is
a log2N -bit string denoted addr
〈D〉 := addr[1..(log2N)] (expressed in binary format),
where addr[1] is the most significant bit. In general, at depth d, an address addr〈d〉
is the length-(log2m + d) prefix of the full address addr
〈D〉. Henceforth, we refer to
addr〈d〉 as a depth-d address (or the depth-d truncation of addr).
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When we look up a data block, we would look up the full address addr〈D〉 in
recursion depth D; we look up addr〈D−1〉 at depth D− 1, addr〈D−2〉 at depth D− 2,
and so on. Finally at depth 0, the log2m-bit address uniquely determines one of the
m blocks stored at OPRAM0. Since each batch consists of m concurrent lookups,
one of them will be responsible for this block in OPRAM0.
A block with the address addr〈d〉 in OPRAMd stores the position labels for two
blocks in OPRAMd+1, at addresses addr
〈d〉||0 and addr〈d〉||1 respectively. Henceforth,
we say that the two addresses addr〈d〉||0 and addr〈d〉||1 are siblings to each other;
addr〈d〉||0 is called the left sibling and addr〈d〉||1 is called the right sibling. We say
that addr〈d〉||0 is the left child of addr〈d〉 and addr〈d〉||1 is the right child of addr〈d〉.
4.3.2.1 Operations
Each batch contains m requests denoted as ((opi, addri, datai) : i ∈ [m]), where
for opi = read, there is no datai. We perform the following steps.
1. Conflict resolution. For every depth d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , D} in parallel, perform
oblivious conflict resolution on the depth-d truncation of all m addresses re-
quested.
For d = D, we suppress duplicate addresses. If multiple requests collide on
addresses, we would prefer a write request over a read request (since write
requests also fetch the old memory value back before overwriting it with a new
value). In the case of concurrent write operations to the same address, we use
the properties of the underlying PRAM to determine which write operation
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prevails.
For 0 ≤ d < D, we perform the following:
(a) Consider the depth-(d+1) truncated address: A〈d+1〉 := (addr
〈d+1〉
1 , . . . , addr
〈d+1〉
m ),
and use oblivious sorting to suppress duplicates of depth-(d+1) addresses,
i.e., each repeated depth-(d + 1) address is replaced by a dummy. Let
Â〈d+1〉 be the resulting array (of size m) sorted by the (unique) depth-
(d+ 1) addresses.




i is a dummy, then addri := ⊥ is also dummy.
ii. If addr
〈d+1〉





then addri is set to be the length-d prefix of addr
〈d+1〉
i . Moreover, if
addr
〈d+1〉





i−1 share the same length-d prefix, then addri :=
⊥; otherwise, if addr〈d+1〉i and addr〈d+1〉i+1 share the same length-d prefix,
then addri is set to the shared length-d prefix of the address, and
flagsi := 11.
(c) Then, the batch access for OPRAMd is ((addri, flagsi) : i ∈ [m]) where
each non-dummy depth-d truncated address addr
〈d〉
i is distinct and has





i ||1) is requested in OPRAMd+1.
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2. Fetch. For d = 0 to D sequentially, perform the following:




• Call OPRAMd.Lookup to look up the depth-d addresses addr〈d〉i for all i ∈
[m]; observe that position labels for the lookups of non-dummy addresses
will be available from the lookup of the previous OPRAMd−1 for d ≥ 1,
which is described in the next step. Recall that for OPRAM0, no position
labels are needed.
• If d < D, each lookup from a non-dummy (addr〈d〉i , flagsi) will return two
positions for the addresses addr
〈d〉
i ||0 and addr〈d〉i ||1 in OPRAMd+1. The
two bits in flagsi will determine whether each of these two position labels
are needed in the lookup of OPRAMd+1.
We can imagine that there are m CPUs at recursion depth d+ 1 waiting
for the position labels corresponding to {addr〈d+1〉i : i ∈ [m]}. Now, using
oblivious routing (see Section 4.1.2), the position labels can be delivered
to the CPUs at recursion depth d+ 1.
• If d = D, the outcome of Lookup will contain the data blocks fetched.
Recall that conflict resolution was used to suppress duplicate addresses.
Hence, oblivious routing can be used to deliver each data block to the
corresponding CPUs that request it.
• In any case, the freshly fetched blocks are updated if needed in the case
of d = D, and are placed in OTM′0 in each OPRAMd.
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3. Maintain. We first consider depth D. Set depth-D’s update array U 〈D〉 := ∅.
Suppose that `〈D〉 is the smallest empty level in OPRAMD.
We have the invariant that for all 0 ≤ d < D, if `〈D〉 < d, then `〈D〉 is also the
smallest empty level in OPRAMd.
For d := D downto 0, do the following:
• If d < `〈D〉, set ` := d; otherwise, set ` := `〈D〉.
• Call U ← OPRAMd.Shuffle(U 〈d〉, `; update) where update is the following
natural function: recall that in U 〈d〉 and OPRAMd−1, each depth-(d− 1)
logical address stores the position labels for both children addresses. For
each of the child addresses, if U 〈d〉 contains a new position label, choose
the new one; otherwise, choose the old label previously in OPRAMd−1.
• If d ≥ 1, we need to send the updated positions involved in U to depth
d− 1.
Now, set U 〈d−1〉 ← Convert(U, d), which will be used in the next iteration
for recursion depth d− 1 to perform its shuffle.
The Convert subroutine takes an array that stores the position labels
within OPRAMd for depth-d addresses, and converts the array to one
that contains depth-(d − 1) addresses where each entry may pack up to
two position labels for its child addresses at depth-d.
The subroutine Convert(U, d) proceeds as follows. First, perform oblivious
sort on the depth-d addresses to produce an array denoted as {(addr〈d〉i , posi) :
i ∈ [|U |]}.
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i = addr||0 and addr〈d〉i+1 = addr||1 for some addr, i.e., if my
right neighbor is my sibling, then write down u′i = (addr, (posi, posi+1)),
i.e., both siblings’ positions need to be updated.
– If addr
〈d〉
i−1 = addr||0 and addr〈d〉i = addr||1 for some addr, i.e., if my
left neighbor is my sibling, then write down u′i = ⊥.
– Else if i does not have a neighboring sibling, parse addr
〈d〉
i = addr||b
for some b ∈ {0, 1}, then write down u′i = (addr, (posi, ∗)) if b = 0
or write down u′i = (addr, (∗, posi)) if b = 1. In these cases, only the
position of one of the siblings needs to be updated in OPRAMd−1.
– Let U 〈d−1〉 := {u′i : i ∈ [|U |]}. Note here that each entry of U 〈d−1〉
contains a depth-(d − 1) address of the form addr, as well as the
update instructions for two position labels of the depth-d addresses
addr||0 and addr||1 respectively.
We emphasize that when ∗ appears, this means that the position of
the corresponding depth-d address does not need to be updated in
OPRAMd−1.
– Output U 〈d−1〉.
4.3.3 Analysis and Extensions
We now give detailed analysis and proofs for our OPRAM scheme.
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4.3.3.1 Correctness and Obliviousness
Fact 12. The above construction maintains correctness. More specifically, at every
recursion depth d, the correct position labels will be input to the Lookup operations
of OPRAMd; and every batch of requests will return the correct answers.
Proof. Straightforward by construction.
In our OPRAM construction, for every OPRAMd at recursion depth d, the
following invariants are respected by construction as stated in the following facts.
Fact 13. For every OPRAMd, every OTMi instance at level i ≤ d that is created
needs to answer at most 2i batches of m requests before OTMi instance is destroyed.
Proof. For every OPRAMd, the following is true: imagine that there is a (d+ 1)-bit
binary counter initialized to 0 that increments whenever a batch of m requests come
in. Now, for 0 ≤ ` < d, whenever the `-th bit flips from 1 to 0, the `-th level
of OPRAMd is destroyed; whenever the `-th bit flips from 0 to 1, the `-th level of
OPRAMd is reconstructed. For the largest level d of OPRAMd, whenever the d-th
(most significant) bit of this binary counter flips from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0, the
(d+1)-th level is destroyed and reconstructed. The fact follows in a straightforward
manner by observing this binary-counter argument.
Fact 14. For every OPRAMd and every OTM` instance at level ` ≤ d, during the
lifetime of the OTM` instance: (a) no two real requests will ask for the same depth-d
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address; and (b) for every request that asks for a real depth-d address, the address
must exist in OTMi.
Proof. We first prove claim (a). Observe that for any OPRAMd, if some depth-d
address addr〈d〉 is fetched from some level ` ≤ d, at this moment, addr〈d〉 will either
enter a smaller level `′ < `; or some level `′′ ≥ ` will be rebuilt and addr〈d〉 will go
into level `′′ — in the latter case, level ` will be destroyed prior to the rebuilding
of level `′′. In either of the above cases, due to correctness of the construction, if
addr〈d〉 is needed again from OPRAMd, a correct position label will be provided for
addr〈d〉 such that the request will not go to level ` (until the level is reconstructed).
Moreover, two real requests will not appear in the same request due to the conflict
resolution procedure. Finally, claim (b) follows from correctness of the position
labels.
Given the above facts, our construction maintains perfect obliviousness.
Lemma 6 (Obliviousness). The above OPRAM construction satisfies perfect obliv-
iousness.
Proof. For every parallel one-time memory instance constructed during the lifetime
of the OPRAM, Facts 13 and 14 are satisfied, and thus every one-time memory
instance receives a valid request sequence. The lemma then follows in a straightfor-
ward fashion by the perfect obliviousness of the parallel one-time memory scheme,
and by observing that all other access patterns of the OPRAM construction are
deterministic and independent of the input requests.
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4.3.3.2 Asymptotical Complexity
We now analyze the asymptotical efficiency of our OPRAM construction.
First, observe that the asymptotical performance of the fetch phase as stated in
the following fact.
Fact 15. The fetch phase can be completed in O(m log2N) total work, and in
O((logm + log logN) · logN) depth (assuming an unbounded number of CPUs).
Proof. For total work, it is not difficult to see that one logN factor arises from the
recursion depths, and within each recursion depth it takes O(m logN + m logm)
work to perform the fetch. where m logm is the total work incurred by the oblivious
routing in between recursion depths and m logN is the work incurred within a single
position-based OPRAM.
For depth, one logN factor comes from the logN recursion depths, the other
(logm + log logN) factor is due to the depth incurred by each recursion depth as
well as due to the routing in between depths: 1) Within each recursion depth, it
takes O(1) depth to look up each of the up to O(logN) hierarchical levels, and then
select the correct result in another O(log logN) depth; and 2) the routing between
adjacent depths can be implemented with the AKS sorting network [10] that takes
O(logm) depth.
We now proceed to analyze the efficiency of the maintain phase.
Fact 16. Averaging over a sequence of batch accesses, the maintain phase costs
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O(m log3N) amortized total work (except with negligible in N probability). Further,
for each batch of accesses, the maintain phase can always be completed in O(log2N)
depth assuming an unbounded number of CPUs.
Proof. For each OPRAMd, every level ` ≤ d+1 must be rebuilt after every 2` batch of
m requests. Due to Fact 11, each rebuilding operation will take O(2` ·m log(2` ·m))
total work, and has depth O(log(2` · m)), which is at most O(logN). After the
rebuilding, the Convert algorithm also has the same asymptotic performance. Thus,
for each recursion depth, the amortized total work is O(m log2N). Counting all
O(logN) recursion depths, we have the desired result for total work.
For depth, observe that for each recursion depth, the depth incurred by the
rebuilding is dominated by the depth of the AKS sorting network which is O(logN).
We then have the depth result by observing that the maintain phase is performed
sequentially over O(logN) recursion depths.
Lemma 7. In the above OPRAM construction, the total work blowup is O(log3N),
and the depth blowup is O((logm+ log logN) logN).
Proof. Straightforward from Facts 15 and 16.
Lemma 8. The above OPRAM construction has an O(1) space blowup.
Proof. Our position-based OPRAMd consists of d+ 1 levels – (OTMj : j = 0, . . . , d)
where OTMj is a one-time oblivious memory of size O(m ·2j). Thus, the total space
consumed by OPRAMd is given by
∑d
j=0(m · 2j) = m · 2d+1 blocks.
Our OPRAM construction consists of D + 1 OPRAMs – (OPRAMd : d =
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0, . . . , logN − logm). Thus, the total space consumed our OPRAM scheme is given
by
∑logN−logm
d=0 (m · 2d+1) = m · 2logN−logm+2 = O(N) blocks.
Corollary 17. The above OPRAM construction incurs O(log3N) simulation over-
head when consuming the same number of CPUs as the original PRAM.
Proof. This corollary is implied directly by Lemma 7. The difference is that Lemma 7
would require more than m CPUs such that the depth of the algorithm may be
smaller than the total work blowup, but if we are constrained to exactly m CPUs,
the amortized parallel runtime per batch of accesses would be exactly O(log3N).
Theorem 18. The above construction is a perfectly secure OPRAM scheme satis-
fying the following performance overhead:
• When consuming the same number of CPUs as the original PRAM, the scheme
incurs O(log3N) simulation overhead;
• When the OPRAM is allowed to consume an unbounded number of CPUs, the
scheme incurs O(log3N) total work blowup and O((logm + log logN) logN)
depth blowup.
In either case, the space blowup is O(1).
Proof. Straightforward from Lemmas 7, 8, and Corollary 17.
Note that at this moment, even for the sequential special case, we already
achieve asymptotic savings over Damg̊ard et al. [47] in terms of space consumption.
Furthermore, Damg̊ard et al. [47]’s construction is sequential in nature and does not
immediately give rise to an OPRAM scheme.
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4.3.4 Extension: Results for Large Block Sizes
Observe that if the block size is large, then each block in OPRAMd can store
more position identifiers for blocks in OPRAMd+1. Hence, the number D of recursive
OPRAMs can be reduced. This can lead to the following improvement.
Corollary 19 (Large Block Size). Suppose the block size is Θ(N ε) bits. Then, the
above OPRAM construction can be modified to have O(1
ε
log2N) total work blowup
and simulation overhead, and O(1
ε
(logm+ log logN)) depth blowup.
Proof. When the block size is B := Θ(N ε) bits, the number of depths of recursive






Hence, in every performance metric stated in Lemma 7 and Corollary 17, one




Before we conclude this chapter, we describe the work that is closely related to
the result presented. Goldreich and Ostrovsky first showed a computationally secure
ORAM scheme with poly-logarithmic simulation overhead. Therefore, one interest-
ing question is whether ORAMs can be constructed without relying on computa-
tional assumptions. Ajtai [11] answered this question and showed that statistically
secure ORAMs with poly-logarithmic simulation overhead exist. Although Ajtai re-
moved computational assumptions from ORAMs, his construction has a (negligibly
small) statistical failure probability, i.e., with some negligibly small probability, the
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ORAM construction can leak information. Subsequently, Shi et al. [134] proposed
the tree-based paradigm for constructing statistically-secure ORAMs. Tree-based
constructions were later improved further in several works [38, 43, 61, 140, 143], and
this line of works improve the practical performance of ORAM by several orders
of magnitude in comparison with earlier constructions. It was also later under-
stood that the tree-based paradigm can be used to construct computationally se-
cure ORAMs saving yet another log log factor in cost in comparison with statistical
security [38,56].
Perfectly secure ORAM [47] was first studied by Damg̊ard et al. Perfect secu-
rity requires that the (oblivious) program’s memory access patterns be identically
distributed regardless of the inputs to the program; and thus with probability 1,
no information can be leaked about the secret inputs to the program. To date,
Damg̊ard et al.’s construction [47] remains the only known non-trivial, perfectly
secure ORAM scheme. Their scheme achieves O(log3N) simulation overhead and
O(logN) space blowup relative to the original RAM program. As mentioned, even
for the sequential special case, our work asymptotically improves Damg̊ard et al.’s
result [47] by avoiding the O(logN) blowup in space; and moreover, our ORAM
construction is conceptually simpler than that of Damg̊ard et al.’s.
Oblivious Parallel ORAM (OPRAM) was first proposed in an elegant work
by Boyle, Chung, and Pass [28], and subsequently improved in several followup
works [35, 36, 38, 39, 117]. All known results on OPRAM focus on the statistically
secure or the computationally secure setting. To the best of our knowledge, until
this work, we know of no efficient OPRAM scheme that is perfectly secure. Chen,
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Lin and Tessaro [39] introduced a generic method to transform any ORAM into an
OPRAM at the cost of a logN blowup — their techniques achieve only statistical
security too since security (or correctness) is only guaranteed with high probability
(specifically, when some queue does not become overloaded in their scheme).
4.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we showed a construction for a perfectly secure OPRAM
scheme withO(log3N) total work blowup, O(logN(logm+log logN)) depth blowup,
and O(1) space blowup. To the best of our knowledge our scheme is the first per-
fectly secure (non-trivial) OPRAM scheme, and even for the sequential special case
we asymptotically improve the space overhead relative to Damg̊ard et al. [47]. Prior
to our work, the only known perfectly secure ORAM scheme is that by Damg̊ard
et al. [47], where they achieve O(log3N) simulation overhead and O(logN) space
blowup. No (non-trivial) OPRAM scheme was known prior to our work, and in
particular the scheme by Damg̊ard et al. [47] does not appear amenable to paral-
lelization. Finally, in comparison with known statistically secure OPRAMs [38,143],
our work removes the dependence (in performance) on the security parameter; thus
we in fact asymptotically outperform known statistically secure ORAMs [143] and
OPRAMs [38] when (sub-)exponentially small failure probabilities are required.
Exciting questions remain open for future research:
• Can we construct perfectly secure ORAMs/OPRAMs whose total work blowup
matches the best known statistically secure ORAMs/OPRAMs assuming neg-
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ligible security failures?
• Can we construct perfectly secure ORAM/OPRAM schemes whose concrete
performance lends to deployment in real-world systems?
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Chapter 5: HOP: Hardware Makes Obfuscation Practical
Program obfuscation [14, 76] is a powerful cryptographic primitive, enabling
numerous applications that rely on intellectually-protected programs and the safe
distribution of such programs. For example, program obfuscation enables a software
company to release software patches without disclosing the vulnerability to an at-
tacker. It could also enable a pharmaceutical company to outsource its proprietary
genomic testing algorithms, to an untrusted cloud provider, without compromising
its intellectual properties. Here, the pharmaceutical company is referred to as the
“sender” whereas the cloud provider is referred to as the “receiver” of the program.
Recently, the cryptography community has had new breakthrough results in
understanding and constructing program obfuscation using multilinear maps [58].
However, cryptographic approaches towards program obfuscation have limitations.
First, it is well-understood that strong (simulation secure) notions of program ob-
fuscation cannot be realized in general [14] — although they are desired in many
applications such as the aforementioned ones. Second, existing cryptographic con-
structions of obfuscation (that achieve imperfect notions of security, such as in-
distinguishability obfuscation [59]) incur prohibitive practical overheads, and are
infeasible for most interesting application scenarios. For example, it takes ∼ 3.3
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hours to obfuscate even a very simple program such as an 80-bit point function (a
function that is 0 everywhere except at one point) and ∼ 3 minutes to evaluate
it [98]. Moreover, these cryptographic constructions of program obfuscation rely
on new cryptographic assumptions whose security is still being investigated by the
community through a build-and-break iterative cycle [40]. Thus, to realize a prac-
tical scheme capable of running general programs, it seems necessary to introduce
additional assumptions.
In this direction, there has been work by both the cryptography and archi-
tecture communities in assuming trusted hardware storing a secret key. However,
proposals from the cryptography community to realize obfuscation (and a closely re-
lated primitive called functional encryption) have been largely theoretical, focusing
on what minimal trusted hardware allows one to circumvent theoretical impossibil-
ity and realize simulation-secure obfuscation [42, 52, 74]. Consequently these works
have not focused on practical efficiency, and they often require running the program
as circuits (instead of as RAM programs) and also utilize expensive cryptographic
primitives such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and non-interactive zero
knowledge proofs (NIZKs). On the other hand, proposals from the architecture
community such as Intel SGX [111], AEGIS [141], XOM [99], Bastion [34], As-
cend [55] and GhostRider [102] are more practical, but their designs do not achieve
cryptographic definition of obfuscation. In this work, we close this gap by design-
ing and implementing a practical construction of program obfuscation for RAM
programs using trusted hardware.









Sender can obfuscate different programs




runs obfuscate runs execute
(on multiple inputs)
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Figure 5.1: Obfuscation Scenario. The sender obfuscates programs using the
obfuscate procedure. It sends (possibly multiple) obfuscated program(s) to the
receiver. The receiver can execute any obfuscated program with any input of its
choice.
sender, who owns a program, uses an obfuscate procedure to create an obfuscated
program. It then sends this obfuscated program to a receiver who can execute the
program on inputs of her choice. The obfuscated program should be functionally
identical to the original program. For any given input, the obfuscated program runs
for time T (fixed for the program) and returns an output.1 The receiver only has a
black box-like access to the program, i.e., it learns only the program’s input/output
behavior and the bound on the runtime T . In obfuscation, the inputs/outputs are
public (not encrypted).
To make use of a trusted secure processor (which we call a HOP processor),
our obfuscation model is modified as follows (cf. Figure 5.1). HOP processors are
manufactured with a hardwired secret key. The HOP processor (which is trusted) is
given to the receiver, and the secret key is given to the sender. Using the secret key,
the sender can create multiple obfuscated programs using the obfuscate procedure
and send them to the receiver. The receiver then runs the execute procedure (possi-
1T is analogous to a bound on circuit size in the cryptographic literature.
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bly multiple times) to execute the program with (cleartext) inputs of her choice. As
mentioned, the receiver (adversary) learns only the final outputs and nothing else.
In other words, we offer virtual blackbox simulation security, where the receiver
learns only as much information as if she were interacting with an oracle that com-
putes the obfuscated program. In particular, the receiver should not learn anything
from the HOP processor’s intermediate behavior such as timing or memory access
patterns, or the program’s total runtime (since each program always runs for a fixed
amount of time set by the sender).
Key distribution with public/private keys. We assume symmetric keys for sim-
plicity. HOP may also use a private/public key distribution scheme common in to-
day’s trusted execution technology. The obfuscate and execute operations can be de-
coupled from the exact setup and key distribution system used to get public/private
keys into the HOP processor. A standard setup for key distribution [75, 111] is as
follows: First, a trusted manufacturer (e.g., Intel) creates a HOP processor with a
unique secret key. Its public key is endorsed/signed by the manufacturer. Second,
the HOP processors are distributed to receivers and the certified public keys are
distributed to senders (software developers). Note that the key goal of obfuscation
is to secure the sender’s program and this relies on the secrecy of the private key
stored in the processor. Thus, it is imperative that the sender and the manufacturer
are either the same entity or the sender trusts the manufacturer to not reveal the
secret key to another party.
Non-goals. We do not defend against analog side channels such as measuring
power analysis or heat dissipation, we also do not defend against hardware fault
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injection [9,25,89]. We assume that the program to be obfuscated is trustworthy and
will not leak sensitive information on its own, including through possible software
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows [22]. There exist techniques to mitigate these
attacks, and we consider them to be complementary to our work.
Challenges. It may seem that relying on secure hardware as described above
easily ‘solves’ the program obfuscation problem. This is not the case: even with
secure hardware, it is still not easy to develop a secure and practical obfusca-
tion scheme. The crux of the problem is that many performance optimizations
in real systems (and related work in secure processors [55, 102, 124]) hinge on ex-
ploiting program-dependent behavior. Yet, obfuscation calls for completely hiding
all program-dependent behavior. Indeed, we started this project with a strawman
processor that gives off the impression of executing any (or every) instruction during
each time step – so as to hide the actual instructions being executed. Not surpris-
ingly, this incurs huge (∼ 10, 000×; c.f. Section 5.2.2) overheads over an insecure
scheme, even after employing a state-of-the-art Oblivious RAM [56, 67] to improve
the efficiency of accessing main memory. Moreover, in an obfuscation setting, the
receiver can run the same program multiple times for different inputs and outputs.
Introducing practical features such as context switching — where the receiver can
obtain intermediate program state — enables this level of flexibility but also enables
new attacks such as rewinding and mix-and-match execution. Oblivious RAMs, in
particular, are not secure against rewinding and mix-and-match attacks and an im-
portant challenge in this work is to protect them against said attacks in the context
of the HOP system.
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Our Contributions
Given the above challenges, a primary goal of this work is to develop and imple-
ment an optimized architecture that is still provably secure by the VBB obfuscation
definition. In more detail, we make the following contributions:
1. Theoretical contributions: We provide the first theoretic framework to effi-
ciently obfuscate RAM programs directly on secure hardware. One goal here is to
avoid implicitly transforming the obfuscated program to its circuit representation
(e.g., [52]), as the RAM to circuit transformation can incur a polynomial blowup in
runtime [63]. We also wish for our analysis to capture important performance opti-
mizations that matter in an implementation; such as the use of an Oblivious RAM,
on-chip memory, instruction scheduling, and context switching. As a byproduct,
part of our analysis achieves a new theoretical result (extending [74]): namely, how
to provide program obfuscation for RAM programs directly assuming only ‘state-
less’ secure hardware.2 We also show interesting technical subtleties that arise in
constructing efficient RAM-model program obfuscation from stateless hardware. In
particular, we highlight the different techniques used to overcome all possible forms
of rewinding and mix-and-match attacks (which may be of independent interest).
Putting it all together, we provide a formal proof of security under the universally
composable (UC) simulation framework [31].
2Roughly speaking, a HOP processor which allows the host to arbitrary context switch programs
on/off the hardware is equivalent to ‘stateless’ hardware in the language of prior work [42,74]. This
is explained further in Section 5.2.
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2. Implementation with trusted hardware: We design and implement a hard-
ware prototype system (called HOP) that attains the definition of program obfus-
cation and corresponds to our theoretic analysis. To the best of our knowledge,
this effort represents the first prototype implementation of a provably secure VBB
obfuscation scheme in any model under any assumptions. For performance, our
HOP prototype uses a hardware-optimized Oblivious RAM, on-chip memory and
instruction scheduling (our implementation does not support context switching).
As mentioned earlier, our key differentiator from prior secure processor work is that
our performance optimizations maintain program privacy and exhibit no program-
dependent behavior. With these optimizations, HOP performs 5× ∼ 238× better
than the baseline HOP design across simple to sophisticated programs while the
overhead over an insecure system is 8× ∼ 76×. The program code size overhead
for HOP is only an additive constant. Our final design will require 72% area when
synthesized on a commodity FPGA device. Of independent interest, we prove that
our optimized scheme always achieves to within 2× the performance of a scheme
that does not protect the main memory timing channel (Section 5.2.3).
5.1 Related Work
We now describe work that is closely related to HOP.
Obfuscation and Oblivious RAMs. To enable running RAM programs directly
on secure hardware, we use a hardware implementation of an ORAM [56,57] to hide
access patterns to external memory. Using this, we describe a protocol to achieve the
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definition of VBB obfuscation. Specifically, under VBB obfuscation, an adversary
can execute a program multiple times with inputs of his choice and still not be able to
learn the program. Interestingly, ORAMs were also originally introduced to prevent
software piracy. Compared to an ORAM, we consider a setting weaker than the one
considered by Goldreich and Ostrovsky. We assume a stateless trusted hardware
token instead of a stateful token. We improve the resulting protocol while taking
into consideration other side channels such as the timing channel attacks. Finally,
we implement a prototype hardware that is capable of executing an obfuscated
program.
Secure processors. Secure processors such as AEGIS [141], XOM [99], Bastion [34]
and Intel SGX [111] encrypt and verify the integrity of main memory. Applications
such as VC3 [131] that are built atop Intel SGX can run MapReduce computa-
tions [49] in a distributed cloud setting while keeping code and data encrypted.
However, these secure processors do not hide memory access patterns. An adver-
sary observing communication patterns between a processor and its memory can
still infer significant information about the data [121,156].
There have been some recent secure processor proposals that do hide memory
access patterns [55,102,107,124]. Ascend [55] is a secure processor architecture that
protects privacy of data against physical attacks when running arbitrary programs.
Phantom [107] similarly achieves memory obliviousness, and has been integrated
with GhostRider [102] to perform program analysis and decide whether to use an
encrypted RAM or Oblivious RAM for different memory regions. They also employ
a scratchpad wherever applicable. Raccoon [124] hides data access patterns on
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commodity processors by evaluating all program paths and using an Oblivious RAM
in software.
The primary difference between the above schemes and HOP is the following.
All of the above schemes focused on protecting input data, while the program is
assumed to be public and known to the adversary. GhostRider [102] even utilizes
public knowledge of program behavior to improve performance through static anal-
ysis. Conversely, obfuscation and HOP protect the program and the input data is
controlled by the adversary. We remark, however, that HOP can be extended to
additionally achieve data privacy simply by adding routines to decrypt the (now
private) inputs and encrypt the final outputs before they are sent to the client (now
different from the HOP processor owner). Naturally, the enhanced security comes
with additional cost. We evaluate this overhead of additionally providing program-
privacy by comparing to GhostRider in Section 5.5.5.
Obfuscation. The formal study of virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation was initi-
ated by Hada [76] and Barak et al. [14]. Unfortunately, Barak et al. showed that it
is impossible to achieve program obfuscation for general programs. Barak et al. also
defined a weaker notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), which avoids their
impossibility results. Garg et al. [59] proposed a construction of iO for all circuits
based on assumptions related to multilinear maps. However, these constructions are
not efficient from a practical standpoint. There are constructions for iO for RAM
programs proposed where the size of the obfuscated program is independent of the
running time [21,32,90]. However, by definition, these constructions do not achieve
VBB obfuscation.
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In order to circumvent the impossibility of VBB obfuscation, Goyal et al. [74]
considered virtual black-box obfuscators on minimal secure hardware tokens. Goyal
et al. show how to achieve VBB obfuscation for all polynomial time computable
functions using stateless secure hardware tokens that only perform authenticated
encryption/decryption and a single NAND operation. In a related line of work,
Döttling et al. [52] show a construction for program obfuscation using a single state-
less hardware token in universally input-oblivious models of computation. Bitansky
et al. [20] show a construction for program obfuscation from “leaky” hardware. Sim-
ilarly, Chung et al. [42] considered basing the closely related primitive of functional
encryption on hardware tokens. Unfortunately, all the above works require the ob-
fuscated program run using a universal circuit (or similar model) to achieve function
privacy. They do not support running RAM programs directly. This severely limits
the practicality of the above schemes, as we demonstrate in Section 5.5.5.
Heuristic approaches to obfuscation. There are heuristic approaches to code
obfuscation for resistance to reverse engineering [85,130,156]. These works provide
low overheads, but do not offer any cryptographic security.
Terminology: Hardware Tokens. Trusted hardware is widely referred to as
hardware tokens in the theoretical literature [42, 52, 74, 86]. Secure tokens are typi-
cally assumed to be minimal trusted hardware that support limited operations (e.g.,
a NAND gate in [74]). However, running programs in practice requires full-fledged
processors. In this work, we refer to HOP as “secure hardware” or a “secure proces-
sor”. As a processor, HOP will store a lot more internal state (e.g., a register file,
etc.). We note that from a theoretic perspective, both HOP and ‘simple’ hardware
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tokens require a number of gates which is polylogarithmic in memory size.
Terminology: Stateful vs. Stateless tokens. The literature further classifies
secure tokens as either stateful tokens or stateless. A stateful token maintains state
across invocations. On the other hand, a stateless token, except for a secret key, does
not maintain any state across invocations. While HOP maintains state across most
invocations for better performance, we will augment HOP to support on-demand
context switching — giving the receiver the ability to swap out an obfuscated pro-
gram for another at any time (Section 5.2.5), which is common in today’s systems.
In an extreme scenario, the adversary can context switch after every processor cy-
cle. In this case, HOP becomes equivalent to a “stateless” token from a theoretical
perspective [42, 74], and our security proof will assume stateless tokens.
5.2 Obfuscation from Trusted Hardware
In this section, we will intuitively describe the HOP architecture. We will
start with an overview of a simple (not practical) HOP processor to introduce some
key points. Each subsection after that introduces additional optimizations (some
expose security issues, which we address) to make the scheme more practical. We
give security intuition where applicable, and formally prove security for the fully
optimized scheme in Section 5.3.
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5.2.1 Execution On-Chip
Let us start with the simplest case where the whole obfuscated program and
its data (working set) fit in a processor’s on-chip storage. Then, we may architect
a HOP processor to be able to run programs whose working sets don’t exceed a
given size. In the setup phase, first, the sender correctly determines a value T –
the amount of time (in processor cycles) that the program, given any input, runs
on HOP. Then, the sender encrypts (obfuscates) the program together using an
authenticated encryption scheme. T is authenticated along and included with the
program but is public. The obfuscated program is sent to the receiver. The receiver
then sends the obfuscated program and her own input to the HOP processor. The
HOP processor decrypts and runs the program, and returns a result after T processor
cycles. The HOP processor makes no external memory requests during its execution
since the program and data fit on chip. Security follows trivially.
5.2.2 Adding External Memory
Unfortunately, since on-chip storage is scarce (commercial processors have a
few MegaBytes of on-chip storage), the above solution can only run programs with
small working sets. To handle this, like any other modern processor, the HOP
processor needs to access an external memory, which is possibly controlled by the
malicious receiver.
When the HOP processor needs to make an access to this receiver memory,
it needs to hide its access patterns. For the purposes of this discussion, the access
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pattern indicates the processor’s memory operations (reads vs. writes), the memory
addresses for each access and the data read/written in each access. We hide ac-
cess pattern by using an Oblivious RAM (ORAM), which makes a polylogarithmic
number of physical memory accesses to serve each logical memory request from the
processor [140]. The ORAM appears to HOP as an on-chip memory controller that
intercepts memory requests from the HOP processor to the external memory. That
is, the ORAM is a hardware block on the processor and is trusted. (More formal
definitions for ORAM are given in Section 5.3.1.)
Each ORAM access can take thousands of processor cycles [56]. Executing
instructions – once data is present on-chip – is still as fast as an insecure machine
(e.g., several cycles). To hide when ORAM accesses are actually needed, HOP must
make accesses at a static program-independent frequency (more detail below). As
before, HOP runs for T time on all inputs and hence achieves the same privacy as
the scheme in Section 5.2.1.
Generating T and security requirements. When accessing receiver-controlled
memory, we must change T to represent some amount of work that is independent
of the external memory’s latency. That is, if T is given in processor cycles, the
adversary can learn the true program termination time by running the program
multiple times and varying the ORAM access latency each time (causing a different
number of logical instructions to complete each time). To prevent this, we change
T to mean ‘the number of external memory read/writes made with the receiver.’
Integrity. To ensure authenticity of the encrypted program instructions and data
during the execution, HOP uses a standard Merkle tree (or one that is integrated
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with the ORAM [127]) and stores the root of a Merkle tree internally. The re-
ceiver cannot tamper with or rewind the memory without breaking the Merkle tree
authentication scheme.
Efficiency. While the above scheme can handle programs with large working sets, it
is very inefficient. The problem is that each instruction may trigger multiple ORAM
accesses. To give off the impression of running any program, we must provision
for this worst case: running each instruction must incur the cost of the worst-case
number of ORAM accesses. This can result in ∼ 10, 000× slowdown over an insecure
processor.3 The next two subsections discuss two techniques to securely reduce this
overhead by over two orders of magnitude. These ideas are based on well-known
observations that many programs have more arithmetic instructions than memory
instructions, and exhibit locality in memory accesses.
5.2.3 Adding Instruction Scheduling
The key intuition behind our first technique is that many programs execute
multiple arithmetic instructions for every memory access. For example, an instruc-
tion trace may be the following: ‘A A A A M A A M’, where A, M refer to arithmetic
and memory instructions respectively.
Our optimization is to let the HOP processor follow a fixed and pre-defined
schedule: N arithmetic instructions followed by one memory access. In the above
3Our ORAM latency from Section 5.5 is 3000 cycles. The RISC-V ISA [33] we adopt can trigger
3 ORAM accesses, one to fetch the instruction, 1 or 2 more to fetch the operand, depending on
whether the operand straddles an ORAM block boundary.
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example, given a schedule of A4M , the processor would insert two dummy arithmetic
instructions to adhere to the schedule. A dummy arithmetic instruction can be
implemented by executing a nop instruction. The access trace observable to the
adversary would then be:
A A A A M A A A A M
The bold face A letters refer to dummy arithmetic instructions introduced by
the processor.
Likewise, if another part of the program trace contains a long sequence of
arithmetic instructions, the processor will insert dummy ORAM accesses to adhere
to the schedule.
Gains. For most programs in practice, there exists a schedule with N > 1 that
would perform better than our baseline scheme from Section 5.2.2. For (N + 1)
instructions, the baseline scheme performs (N+1) arithmetic and memory accesses.
With an ANM schedule, our optimized scheme performs only one memory access
which translates to a speedup of N× in the best case, when the cost of the memory
access is much higher than an arithmetic instruction. To translate this into perfor-
mance on HOP - given that HOP must run for T time - consider the following: If
N > 1 does improve performance for the given program on all inputs, it means the
sender can specify a smaller T for that program, while still having the guarantee that
the program will complete given any input. A smaller T means better performance.
Setting N and security intuition. We design all HOP processors to use the same
value of N for all programs and all inputs (i.e., N is set at HOP manufacturing time
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In other words, the number of processor cycles spent on arithmetic instructions
and memory instructions are the same. For typical parameter settings, N > 1000
is expected. While this may sound like it will severely hurt performance given
pathological programs, we show that this simple strategy does “well” on arbitrary
programs and data, formalized below.
Claim: For any program and input, the above N results in ≤ 50% of processor
cycles performing dummy work.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we break up a program into a sequence of instruc-
tion epochs, where each epoch consists of a continuous run of arithmetic instructions
followed by a continuous run of memory instructions. Denote the i-th epoch as
AniMpi . For example, the program
A A A A M A A M M M
has 2 epochs, with n1 = 4, p1 = 1, n2 = 2, p2 = 3.
Without loss of generality, we align the start of each epoch with the beginning
of an ANM schedule. Given our choice of N , we examine the number of processor
cycles spent doing dummy operations in each epoch. For the rest of the analysis,
we abbreviate |M | = ORAM latency and |A| = Arithmetic latency.
Consider the start of epoch i (i.e., the first A instruction). To progress from
the start of the epoch to the first M instruction (excluded) in the epoch, we perform
|A|∗N ∗bni
N
c+ |A|∗(ni mod N) real cycles and |M |∗bniN c+ |A|∗(N−(ni mod N))
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dummy cycles worth of work. To progress from the first M instruction (including)
to the end of the epoch, we perform |M | ∗pi real cycles and |A| ∗N ∗ (pi−1) dummy
cycles worth of work. Note that by our definitions of epochs, we have that pi ≥ 1.
Also note that |M | = |A| ∗N by our choice of N . Combining these two time
periods, we spend |M | ∗ (bni
N
c+ pi) + |A| ∗ (ni mod N) real cycles and |M | ∗ (bniN c+
pi − 1) + |A| ∗ (N − (ni mod N)) dummy cycles worth of work.
The claim implies that in comparison to a solution that does not protect the
main memory timing channel, our fixed schedule introduces a maximum overhead of
2× given any program – whether they are memory or computation intensive. Said
another way, even when more sophisticated heuristics than a fixed schedule are used
for different applications, the performance gain from those techniques is a factor of
2 at most.
Security. We note that our instruction scheduling scheme does not impact security
because we use a fixed, public N for all programs.
5.2.4 Adding on-chip Scratchpad Memory
Our second optimization adds a scratchpad: a small unit of trusted memory
(RAM) inside the processor, accesses to which are not observable by the adversary.4
It is used to temporarily store a portion of the working set for programs that exhibit
locality in their access patterns.
Running programs with a scratchpad. We briefly cover how to run programs
4We remark that we use a software-managed scratchpad (as opposed to a conventional processor
cache) as it is easier to determine T when using a scratchpad.
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using a scratchpad here. More (implementation-specific) detail is given in Sec-
tion 5.4.1. At a high level, data is loaded into the scratchpad from ORAM/unloaded
to ORAM using special (new) CPU instructions that are added to the obfuscated
program. These instructions statically determine when to load which data to speci-
fied offsets in the scratchpad. Now, the scratchpad load/unload instructions are the
only instructions that access ORAM (i.e., are the only ‘M’ instructions). Memory
instructions in the original program (e.g., normal loads and stores) merely lookup
the scratchpad inside the processor (these are now considered ‘A’ instructions). We
will assume the program is correctly compiled so that whenever a program mem-
ory instruction looks up the scratchpad, the data in question has been put there
sometime prior by a scratchpad load/unload instruction.
Security intuition. When the program accesses the scratchpad, it is hidden from
the adversary since this is done on-chip. As before, the only adversary-visible behav-
ior is when ORAM is accessed and this will be governed by the program-independent
schedule from Section 5.2.3.
Program independence. We note that HOP with a scratchpad is still program
independent. Multiple programs can be written (and obfuscated) for the same HOP
processor. One minor limitation, however, is that once an obfuscated program is
compiled, it must be compiled with ‘minimum scratchpad size’ specified as a new
parameter and cannot be run on HOP processors that have a smaller scratchpad.
This is necessary because having a smaller scratchpad will increase T by some un-
known amount. If the program is run on a HOP processor with a larger scratchpad,
it will still function but some scratchpad space won’t be used.
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Gains. In the absence of a scratchpad, the ratio of arithmetic to memory instruc-
tions is on average 5:1 for our workloads. When using a scratchpad, a larger amount
of data is stored by the processor, thus decreasing memory accesses. This effectively
decreases the execution time T of the program and substantially improves perfor-
mance for programs with high locality (evaluated in Section 5.5.3).
5.2.5 Adding context switching and stateless tokens
For the solutions discussed until now, once a program is started, it cannot be
stopped until it returns a response. But a user may wish to concurrently run multiple
obfuscated programs for a practical deployment model. Therefore, we design the
HOP processor to support on-demand context switch, i.e., the receiver can invoke
a context switch at any point during execution. This, however, introduces security
problems that we need to address.
A context switch means that the current program state should be swapped
out from the HOP processor and replaced with another program’s state. Since such
a context switch can potentially happen at every invocation, one can potentially
think of the HOP processor as storing no state, i.e., it is a stateless token. In
such a scenario, we design it to encrypt all its internal state, and send this en-
crypted/authenticated state (denoted state) to the receiver (i.e., the adversary) on
a context switch. Whenever the receiver passes control back to the token, it will
pass back the encrypted state as well, such that the token can “recover” its state
upon every invocation.
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Challenges. Although on the surface, this idea sounds easy to implement, in reality
it introduces avenues for new attacks that we now need to defend against. For the
rest of the chapter, and in-line with real processors, we assume the only data that
remains in HOP is the per-chip secret key. A notable attack is the rewinding attack.
In this attack, instead of passing to the token the correct and fresh encrypted state
as well as fresh values of memory reads, a malicious receiver can pass old values.5
The receiver can also mix-and-match values from entirely different executions of
the same program or different programs. The rest of the section outlines how to
prevent the above attacks. We remark that while the below have simple fixes, the
problems themselves are easy to overlook and underscore the need for a careful
formal analysis. Indeed, we discovered several of these issues while working through
the security proof itself.
Preventing mix-and-match. To prevent this attack, we enforce that the receiver
must submit an encrypted state state, corresponding to an execution at some point
t, along with a matching read from time t for the same execution. To achieve this,
observe that state is encrypted with a IND-CPA + INT-CTXT-secure authenticated
5 Here is a possible attack by which the adversary can distinguish between two access patterns.
Consider the access pattern {a, a} i.e., accessing the same block consecutively. If a tree-based
ORAM [134] is used, after the first access, the block is remapped to a new path l′ and the new
path l′ would be subsequently accessed. If the adversary rewinds and executes again, the block
may be mapped to a different path l′′. Thus, for two different executions, two different paths (l′
and l′′) are accessed for the second access. Note that for another access pattern {a, b} for a 6= b,
the same paths would be accessed even after rewinding, thus enabling the adversary to distinguish
between access patterns.
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encryption scheme, and that the state carries all necessary information to authen-
ticate the next memory read. The state contains information unique to the specific
program, the specific program execution, and to the specific instruction that the
token expects.
Preventing rewinding during program execution. An adversary may try
to gain more information by rewinding an execution to a previous time step, and
replaying it from that point on. To prevent an adversary from learning more in-
formation in this way, we make sure that the token simply replays an old answer
should rewinding happen — this way, the adversary gains no more information by
rewinding. To achieve this, we make sure that any execution for a (program, inp)
pair is entirely deterministic no matter how many times you replay it. All random-
ness required by the token (e.g., those required by the ORAM or memory checker)
are generated pseudorandomly based on the tuple (K, HS, HR) where K is a se-
cret key hardwired in the token, HR is a commitment to the receiver’s input and
HS := digest(mem0) is a Merkle root of the program.
Preventing rewinding during input insertion. In our setting, the obfuscated
program’s inputs inp are chosen by the receiver. Since inputs can be long, it may
not be possible to submit the entire input in one shot. As a result, the receiver has
to submit the input word by word. Therefore the malicious receiver may rewind to
a point in the middle of the input submission, and change parts of the input in the
second execution. Such a rewinding causes two inputs to use the same randomness
for some part of the execution.
To prevent such an input rewinding attack, we require that the adversary sub-
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mit a Merkle tree commitment HR := digest(inp) of its input inp upfront, before
submitting a long input word by word. HR uniquely determines the rest of the exe-
cution, such that any rewinding will effectively cause the token to play old answers
(as mentioned above), and the adversary learns nothing new through rewinding.
5.3 Formal Scheme
We now give a formal model for the fully optimized HOP processor (i.e., in-
cluding all subsections in Section 5.2) and prove its security in UC framework.
Section 5.3.1 describes the preliminaries. Section 5.3.2 describes the ideal function-
ality for obfuscation of RAM programs. Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 describe our formal
scheme and proof in the UC framework.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
The notations used in this section are summarized in Table 5.1. We denote the
assignment-operator with :=, while we use = to denote equality. For succinctness,
encryption of data is denoted by an overline, e.g., state = EncK(state), where Enc
denotes a IND-CPA + INT-CTXT-secure authenticated encryption scheme and K
is the key used for encryption.
Universal Composability framework. The Universal Composability frame-
work [31] considers two worlds – 1. real world where the parties execute a protocol
π. An adversary A controls the corrupted parties. 2. ideal world where we assume
the presence of a trusted third party. The parties interact with a trusted third party
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(also called ideal functionality F) with a protocol φ. A simulator S tries to mimic
the actions of A. Intuitively, the amount of information revealed by π in the real
world should not be more than what is revealed by interacting with the trusted third
party in the ideal world. In other words, we have the following: an environment
E observes one of the two worlds and guesses the world. Protocol π UC-realizes
ideal functionality F if for any adversary A there exists a simulator S, such that an
environment E cannot distinguish (except with negligible probability) whether it is
interacting with S and φ or with A and π.
Remark: ORAM initialization. In this chapter, we assume an ORAM starts
out with a memory array where the first N words are non-zero (reflecting the ini-
tial unshuffled memory), followed by all zeros. Most ORAM schemes require an
initialization procedure to shuffle the initial memory contents. We assume that the
ORAM algorithm performs a linear scan of first N memory locations and inserts
them into ORAM. This is used by the simulator in our proof to extract the input
used for execution of the program. We use the convention that such initialization
is performed by the ORAM algorithm upon the first read or write operation —
therefore our notation does not make such initialization explicit. This also means
that the first ORAM operation will incur a higher overhead than others.
5.3.2 FRAMobf : Modeling Obfuscation in UC
The ideal functionality for obfuscation FRAMobf is described in Figure 5.2. The
sender sends the description of a RAM program, RAM ∈ RAM and a program
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Table 5.1: Notations
K Hardwired secret key stored by the token
meminit A program as a list of instructions
inp Input to the program
mem Memory required for program execution
outp Program output
`in, `out, B Bit-lengths of input, output, and memory word
N Number of words in memory
T Time for program execution
RAM.params {T,N, `in, `out, B}
oramstate State stored by ORAM
sstorestate State stored by sstore
HR Digest of receiver’s input, i.e., digest(inp)
HS Digest of sender’s program, i.e., digest(meminit)
H ′ Merkle root of the main memory
ID pid, using the “create” query. The functionality stores this program, pid, the
sender and receiver. When the receiver invokes “execute” query on an input inp, it
evaluates the program on inp, and returns output outp.
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FRAMobf [sender, receiver ]
On receive (“create”, RAM) from sender for the first time:
Create a unique nonce denoted pid
Store (pid,RAM), send (“create”, pid) to receiver
On receive (“execute”, pid, inp) from receiver:
assert (pid,RAM) is stored for some RAM
outp := RAM(inp), send outp to receiver
Figure 5.2: Ideal Functionality FRAMobf . Although there can be multiple instances
of this ideal functionality, we omit writing the session identifier explicity without
risk of ambiguity.
5.3.3 Scheme Description
We now provide the complete description of our scheme. We model the se-
cure hardware token through the Ftoken functionality (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). Our
construction realizes FRAMobf in the Ftoken-hybrid model [74] and is described in Fig-
ure 5.5.
In order to account for all possible token queries that may be required for an
ORAM scheme, Ftoken relies on an internal, transient instance of Finternal to execute
each step of the program evaluation. Each time Ftoken yields control to the receiver,
the entire state of Finternal is destroyed. Whenever the receiver calls back Ftoken
with state, Ftoken once again creates a new, transient instance of Finternal, sets its
state to the decrypted state, and invokes Finternal to execute next step.
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The sender. Let the program to be obfuscated be RAM with an initial CPU state
cpustateinit and a list of program instructions meminit. The sender first creates the
token containing a hardwired secret key K where K := (K1, K2, K3). K1 is used as
the encryption key for encrypting state, K2 is used as the key to a pseudorandom
function used by the ORAM and K3 is used as the key for a pseudorandom function
used by sstore (described later). This is modeled by our functionality using the
“store key” query (Figure 5.5 line 1). The sender then encrypts mem0 (one instruc-
tion at a time) to obtain meminit. It creates a Merkle root HS := digest(meminit),
which is used by Ftoken during execution to verify integrity of the program. The
sender creates an encrypted header header := EncK1(cpustateinit, HS,RAM.params)
where RAM.params = {T,N, `in, `out, B}. The sender sends header, meminit, and
RAM.params as the obfuscated program to the receiver. As the obfuscated program
consists of only the encrypted program and metadata, for a program of size P bits,
the obfuscated program has size P +O(1) bits. In the real world, the sender sends
the hardware token with the functionality Ftoken to the receiver. The receiver can
use the same stateless token to execute multiple obfuscated programs sent by the
sender.
The receiver. On the receiver’s side, the token functionality makes use of an ORAM
and a secure store sstore. The token functionality (trusted hardware functionality)
is modeled by an augmented RAM machine.
1. ORAM. ORAM takes in [κ := PRFK2(ssid), oramstate] (where ssid :=
(HS, HR)) as internal secret state of the algorithm. κ is a session-specific seed
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Ftoken [sender, receiver ]
// Store the secret key K in the token
On receive (“store key”, K) from sender:
Store the secret key K, ignore future “store key” inputs
Send “done” to sender
// This step commits the receiver to his input through HR
On receive (“initialize”, header, HR) from receiver:
Parse K := (K1, K2, K3)
(cpustate0, HS,RAM.params) := DecK1(header); abort if fail
state := {ssid := (HS, HR), time := 0, rdata := 0, cpustate := cpustateinit,
sstorestate := (“init”, HS, HR, H
′ := 0),
oramstate := “init”, params := RAM.params}
send state := EncK1(state) to receiver
On receive ( ) from Finternal: // ORAM queries
state := EncK1(Finternal.state), Send ( , state) to receiver
On receive ( , state) from receiver: // ORAM queries
state := DecK1(state), abort if fail
Instantiate Finternal, set Finternal.state := state, and Finternal.K := K
Send to Finternal
Figure 5.3: Functionality Ftoken. For succinctness, encryption of some data is
represented using an overline on it, e.g., state = EncK1(state), where Enc denotes
a IND-CPA + INT-CTXT-secure authenticated encryption scheme. “ ” denotes a





:= (ssid, time, rdata, cpustate, sstorestate, oramstate, params)
// execute program
On receive (“execute one step”) from Ftoken:
1: assert time ≤ params.T
2: (cpustate, op)← Π′(cpustate, rdata)
3: Send op to ORAM[PRFK2(ssid), oramstate]⇔ sstore[PRFK3(ssid), sstorestate]⇔
Ftoken, wait for output from ORAM, abort if sstore aborts; /* instantiate ORAM
with state oramstate, instantiate sstore with state sstorestate, connect ORAM’s
communication tape to sstore’s input tape, connect sstore’s communication
tape to caller Ftoken. This represents a multi-round protocol. */
4: If op = (read, . . .), let rdata := output
5: time := time+ 1
6: If time = params.T : send (“okay”, rdata) to Ftoken ; else send (“okay”, ⊥) to
Ftoken
Figure 5.4: Functionality Finternal.
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Protobf [sender, receiver ]
Sender:
On receive (“create”, RAM = 〈cpustateinit,meminit〉) from env:
1: If not initialized: K := (K1, K2, K3)
$← {0, 1}3λ, send (“store key”, K) to
Ftoken, await “done”
2: meminit := {EncK1(meminit[i], rand())}i∈|meminit|
3: HS := digest(meminit) // HS: program Merkle root
4: header := EncK1(cpustateinit||HS||RAM.params, rand())
5: Send (header,meminit,RAM.params) to receiver
Receiver:
On receive (“execute”, pid, inp) from env:
1: Await (header,meminit,RAM.params) from sender s.t. RAM.params.HS = pid if
not received already
2: Initialize mem := meminit||inp||~0
3: Send (“initialize”, header, HR := digest(inp)) to Ftoken, await state from Ftoken
4: for t in {1, . . . , T}:
5: Send (“execute one step”, state) to Ftoken
6: Await (oper, state) from Ftoken; // state overwritten with the received value
7: Until oper = (“okay”, ), repeat: //multiple requests due to ORAM
8: perform the operation oper on mem and let the response be res
9: forward (res, state) to Ftoken, and await (oper, state) from Ftoken;
10: Parse oper := (“okay”, outp), output outp
Figure 5.5: Protocol Protobf . Realizes FRAMobf in the Ftoken-hybrid model.
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used to generate all pseudorandom numbers needed by the ORAM algorithm
— recall that all randomness needed by ORAM is replaced by pseudorandom-
ness to avoid rewinding attacks. As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, we assume
that the ORAM initialization is performed during the first read/write oper-
ation. At this point, the ORAM reads the first N memory locations to read
the program and the input, and inserts them into the ORAM data structure
within mem.
2. Secure store module sstore. sstore is a stateful deterministic secure storage
module that sits in between the ORAM module and the untrusted memory
implemented by the receiver. Its job is to provide appropriate memory en-
cryption and authentication. sstore’s internal state includes κ := PRFK3(ssid)
and sstorestate. sstorestate contains a succinct digest of program, input and
memory to perform memory authentication. κ is a session-specific seed used
to generate all pseudorandom numbers for memory encryption.
At the beginning of an execution, sstorestate is initialized to sstorestate :=
(HS, HR, H
′ := 0), whereHS denotes the Merkle root of the encrypted program
provided by the sender, HR denotes the Merkle root of the (cleartext) input
and H ′ denotes the Merkle root of the memory mem. By convention, we
assume that if a Merkle tree or any subtree’s hash is 0, then the entire subtree
must be 0. The operational semantics of sstore is as follows: upon every data
access request (read, addr) or (write, addr,wdata):
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Figure 5.6: Augmented Random Access Machine. In this figure, cpustatei is
denoted by csi and rdatai is denoted by rdi.
crypted program), interact with mem and use HS to verify responses.
Update HS appropriately if the request type is write.
• If addr is in the inp part of the memory (the receiver-provided input),
interact with mem and use HR to verify responses.
• Otherwise, interact with mem and use H ′ to verify responses. Update H ′
appropriately.
Upon successful completion, sstore outputs the data fetched for read requests,
and outputs 0 or 1 for write requests. Note that the sstore algorithm simply
aborts if any of the responses fail verification.
3. Augmented Random Access Machines. We now extend the RAM model
to support instruction scheduling and a scratchpad (Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4).
RAM can be augmented to use a next instruction circuit Π′ := ΠN for a fixed
N , with the following modifications:
(a) Π′ is a combinational circuit, which consists of N next-instruction circuits
Πi cascaded as shown in Figure 5.6.
(b) The Πi’s use an additional shared memory, referred to as scratchpad. Each
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Πi (except Π1) operates on the output of Πi−1 and an operand rdatai−1
read from scratchpad. The next instruction circuit Π′ outputs opN to
retrieve rdata from mem, which is subsequently used by Π1.
On input inp, the execution of RAM[T,N, `in, `out, B] with parameters Π
′, cpustate,mem〉
is similar to what was defined in Section 2.1 but uses Π′ as the next instruction
circuit. The augmented random access machine RAM′ models a RAM that
performs N instructions followed by an ORAM access. If some opi cannot be
served by the scratchpad, subsequent Πj for i + 1 ≤ j ≤ N do not update
cpustatej and output opN = opi to load the required data in scratchpad.
Remark. For augmented random access machines that uses a scratchpad,
rdata would typically be larger than a memory word (e.g. 512 bits).
We now explain how the receiver executes the program using the token de-
scribed in Figure 5.3 and protocol in Figure 5.5.
Program execution. For ease of explanation, let us first assume that the ORAM
is initialized and contains the program and input. The execution for any input
proceeds in T time steps (Figure 5.5 line 4). At each time step, the receiver interacts
with the token with two types of queries. For each type of query, Ftoken decrypts
state (aborts if decryption fails), instantiates Finternal with state and forwards the
request to Finternal. At the end of query, the state is sent to the receiver along with
the query response.
• Execute one step: This is shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.5 line 5. When
this query is invoked, Finternal executes the next instruction circuit Π′ of the
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RAM machine to obtain an updated cpustate and an op ∈ {read, write}.
Once operation op is performed by the ORAM algorithm, Finternal updates
state.time to reflect the execution of the instruction (Figure 5.3 line 5). The
message “okay” is then sent to the receiver. At time = T , Finternal returns the
program output to the receiver (Figure 5.3 line 6).
• ORAM queries: ORAMs can use a multi-round protocol (with possibly
different types of queries) to read/write (Figure 5.3 line 3). It interacts with
mem stored at the receiver through Ftoken (Figure 5.5 lines 7-9). To account
for instantiation of any ORAM, Ftoken is shown to receive any query from
receiver (indicated by wildcard ( ) in Figures 5.3 and 5.5). These queries are
sent to Finternal and vice-versa.
For each interaction with mem, sstore encrypts (resp. decrypts) data sent
to (resp. from) the receiver. Moreover, sstore authenticates the data sent by the
receiver. This completes the description of execution of the program.
Initialization. To initialize the execution, the receiver first starts by storing the
program and input inp in its memory mem := meminit||inp||~0. It commits to its
input by invoking “initialize” (Figure 5.5 line 3) and sending a Merkle root of its
input (HR = digest(inp)) along with header := EncK1(cpustateinit||HS||RAM.params).
Ftoken initializes the parameters, creates state and sends it to the receiver.
The ORAM and sstore are initialized during the first invocation to “execute one step”,
i.e., t = 1 in Figure 5.5, line 4. The required randomness is generated pseudoran-
domly based on (K2, HS, HR) for ORAM and (K3, HS, HR) for sstore. As mentioned
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in Section 5.3.1, during initialization, ORAM in Ftoken reads mem0 word by word
(not shown in figure). For each word read, sstore performs Merkle tree verification
with Hs := digest(meminit). Similarly, when the input is read, sstore verifies it with
HR := digest(inp). sstorestate and oramstate uniquely determine the initialization
state. Hence, if the receiver rewinds, the execution trace remains the same. The
commitment HR ensures that the receiver cannot change his input after invoking
“initialize”. This completes the formal scheme description of the UC functionality
Ftoken.
5.3.4 Proof of Security
Theorem 20. Assuming that Enc is an INT-CTXT + IND-CPA authenticated
encryption scheme, ORAM satisfies obliviousness (Section 5.3.1), sstore adopts a
semantically secure encryption scheme and a collision resistant Merkle hash tree
scheme and the security of PRF, the protocol described in Figures 5.3 and 5.5 UC
realizes FRAMobf (Figure 5.2) in the Ftoken-hybrid model.
Description of the simulator. The ideal world simulator simulates the honest
sender and Ftoken.
• The simulator can receive the following three types of valid queries: “create”
queries, “initialize” queries, and execution queries. An execution query is
either of the format (“execute one step”, state) or a response to a memory
request. Henceforth we assume that all responses to memory requests are of
the form (“mem”, , state).
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• At the beginning, the simulator generates a random key K1.
• Whenever the simulator receives (“create”, pid) from FRAMobf , it sends meminit :=
{EncK1(~0)}i∈|meminit|. header := EncK1(~0||HS := digest(meminit)||RAM.params),
and RAM.params to the receiver.
• Whenever the adversary (i.e., receiver) sends (“initialize”, header, HR): if the
simulator has not sent the adversary header before as a result of a “create”
query, abort. At this time, a new subsession identified by ssid := (HS, HR) is
created where HS is contained in header, and sstorestate and oramstate for this
subsession are initialized honestly.
The simulator sends state := EncK1(~0) to the adversary.
• For each subsession identified by ssid, the simulator maintains the following:
– If state was sent to the adversary during a subsession ssid, then the sim-
ulator remembers a tuple
(sstorestate, oramstate)
which denotes the state of the execution when state was sent to the ad-
versary.
– The simulator forks a new ORAM simulator upon the creation of every
new subsession, the term oramstate is the state of the (stateful) ORAM
simulator.
– The simulator forks an honest instance of sstore upon the creation of
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every new subsession. The sstore instance is initialized with a randomly
generated key, and the term sstorestate is its internal state.
• Whenever the simulator receives any execution query from the adversary, it
checks if the state received has been sent to the adversary before. If not, the
simulator aborts. Else, continue with the following.
– If the adversary has sent the same execution query before, the simula-
tor replays the old answer from before with the following exception: for
the state contained in the answer, the simulator will re-encrypt state :=
EncK1(~0).
– Otherwise, if state was sent to the adversary earlier as part of a memory
request, then the simulator must check the correctness of the response
returned by the adversary. To achieve this, the simulator retrieves the
sstorestate at the time state was sent to the adversary. Now, using this
sstorestate, the simulator runs the honest sstore instance corresponding
to the current subsession to check the correctness of memory request. If
the check fails, the simulator simply aborts.
– If the simulator has not aborted, the simulator retrieves the oramstate at
the time state was sent to the adversary. Now, the simulator calls the
ORAM simulator to obtain the next memory request — we assume that
the ORAM simulator will return the same answer when invoked with the
same oramstate.
If the next memory request is a write request, then the data for the write
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is set to a dummy message ~0, and then this message is passed along to
the sstore instance (which internally performs memory encryption). The
outcome of sstore along with a fresh encryption state := EncK1(~0) is sent
to the adversary.
Remark 1. Notice that in the simulation, multiple ciphertexts state can correspond
to the same point of execution in a subsession. However, if the adversary rewinds
the execution of a subsession, all other parts of the response it obtains will be deter-
ministic (i.e., same as the last time) if the simulation does not abort.
We now show that the view of the adversary in a real execution is indis-
tinguishable from that in the above described simulated execution. We show this
indistinguishability between the real and ideal world by using the following sequence
of hybrids:
Hybrid H0: This is the real world execution. The simulator simulates the honest
sender and hence, has access to the sender’s program. It uses the token Ftoken to
respond to queries by the adversary (receiver).
Hybrid H1: This hybrid is identical to hybrid H0 except for the following. For
integrity verification, instead of using the Merkle tree scheme, the simulator performs
an honest memory check. Merkle tree checks are performed for the memory with
Merkle root H ′, program meminit with Merkle root HS and input with Merkle root
HR.
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For each subsession ssid, the simulator maintains a table storing the requests
sent by the adversary and the responses sent by the simulator. Specifically, it stores
a table consisting of decrypted request state (oramstate and sstorestate, denoting the
execution state), decrypted response state and the snapshot of memory mem′. When
state is sent as a part of memory request in an execution query, instead of using
Merkle root H ′, the simulator verifies the correctness by running an honest sstore
instance for the subsession. Specifically, the simulator looks up the table by response
state and compares the response sent by adversary with mem′. The simulator aborts
if the comparison fails. Otherwise, it runs a simulated execution of the token and
responds to the adversary.
Recall that as mentioned in the scheme, during an initial linear scan for initial-
izing ORAM, both the program and the input are loaded. When program is loaded
during this initialization, the simulator looks up the table based on the decrypted
request state and authenticates the program by comparing it to meminit instead of
using the Merkle root HS. When the adversary initializes execution, the simulator
saves the commitment HR of the adversary’s input in ssid. When the adversary
sends a (state, input value), the simulator looks up the table by decrypted response
state to find the request state sent by the adversary. If it finds an entry, the simu-
lator verifies the correctness of the input value using the Merkle root HR. This is
where the simulator extracts input from the adversary. It should be noted that HR
is generated by the adversary. By the collision resistance of hash functions used by
Merkle trees, the adversary cannot generate two inputs with the same Merkle root
HR.
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Thus, the only event in which this hybrid differs from H0 is if the adversary
breaks the collision resistance of hash functions used by Merkle trees. In this case,
the simulator aborts. The probability of this bad event is negligible; this can be
shown by reducing the security to a Merkle tree game between a challenger and an
adversary. In the absence of this bad event, this hybrid is identical to H0.
Hybrid H2: This hybrid is identical to the previous one except for the following.
The pseudorandom functions (PRF) are replaced with truly random functions, i.e.,
whenever PRF function (i) with key K2 is invoked by the ORAM algorithm and
(ii) key K3 is invoked by sstore in hybrid H2, the simulator samples a random
number instead. In the protocol, the use of a PRF while initializing ORAM ensures
that the ORAM accesses memory locations in a deterministic manner. Hence, if the
adversary rewinds execution, the same memory locations are accessed by the ORAM
algorithm. In this hybrid, we replace PRF with truly random function. Based on
the decrypted request state, the simulator determines if the adversary has sent the
same query before. If yes, the simulator replays the old answer by using the same
randomness in the ORAM algorithm. Otherwise, the simulator looks up the table
by response state to determine if this state was sent to the adversary as part of a
memory request. If yes, the simulator generates new random numbers to be used
by the ORAM algorithm and stores the request and response states along with the
random numbers in the table. Except for these changes, the simulator computes the
query response as in hybrid H1. The simulator sends the updated response state to
the adversary.
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This hybrid is computationally indistinguishable from hybrid H1 by the se-
curity of pseudorandom functions. If the adversary can distinguish between this
hybrid and hybrid H1, we can show a reduction to a game where the adversary can
distinguish between a pseudorandom function and a truly random function with
non-negligible probability.
Hybrid H3: This hybrid is identical to the previous one except for the follow-
ing. The simulator replaces the authentication scheme used to verify state with an
honest check. In order to do so, along with the other information stored in the
table in hybrid H2, the simulator also stores the encrypted request and response
state. Note that this is when the simulator starts storing multiple ciphertexts state
corresponding to the same point of execution in a subsession.
Instead of using an authentication scheme to verify state, it compares the
state sent by the adversary with any of the state values that was previously sent
by the simulator. If the simulator does not find an entry in the table, it aborts.
If the check succeeds, the simulator can determine the exact execution state based
on oramstate and sstorestate. The simulator knows the program mem0 from the
honest sender, extracts the input inp from the adversary (as described in hybrid H1)
and has stored a snapshot of all random numbers that were generated for ORAM.
Hence, by simulating an instance of the token, the simulator can compute the exact
response state that needs to be returned without decrypting the request sent by the
adversary. The simulator encrypts this response state and sends the encrypted state
to the adversary. If the execution proceeds without aborting until time T , then at
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T -th step, the simulator calls the ideal functionality FRAMobf on input inp and sends
the output outp to the adversary.
The computational indistinguishability of this hybrid from hybrid H2 follows
from the INT-CTXT security of the authenticated encryption scheme Enc. If the
adversary can distinguish between hybrid H2 and this hybrid with non-negligible
probability, we can show a reduction where the adversary can break the security of
an INT-CTXT secure authenticated encryption game with non-negligible probabil-
ity.
Hybrid H4: This hybrid is identical to the previous one except for the fol-
lowing. The simulator generates a random key K1. For all state and mem-
ory writes by sstore sent to the adversary, the simulator instead sends EncK1(~0).
Also, the simulator begins execution by sending meminit := {EncK1(~0}i∈|meminit|,
header := EncK1(~0||Hs := digest(meminit||RAM.params) and RAM.params to the ad-
versary.
Given the security of an IND-CPA secure authenticated encryption scheme
Enc, this hybrid is identically distributed as the previous hybrid. If the adversary
can distinguish between this hybrid and hybrid H3, we can show a reduction where
the adversary can break the security of an IND-CPA secure authenticated encryp-
tion scheme.
Hybrid H5: This hybrid is identical to the previous one except for the following.
Instead of the execution of an ORAM algorithm, the simulator invokes an ORAM
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simulator. For an execution query, after checking the correctness of the response
sent by the adversary, the simulator retrieves the oramstate and invokes the ORAM
simulator with this state. We assume that the ORAM simulator will return the same
answer when invoked with the same oramstate. The output of the ORAM simulator
is sent to the adversary. Assuming that the ORAM scheme is statistically secure,
this hybrid is statistically indistinguishable from hybrid H4.
In this hybrid, the simulator uses an ORAM simulator for ORAM requests,
performs ideal checks for the memory that needs to be stored by the adversary and
for the token state sent to the adversary, uses truly random functions, and sends
EncK1(~0) to the adversary. The simulator knows the program meminit from the
sender, extracts the program input inp from the adversary as described in hybrid
H1. If the execution proceeds until T steps without aborting, the simulator internally
simulates an instance of the ideal functionality FRAMobf to obtain the output outp.
The simulator in this hybrid behaves exactly as the ideal world simulator described
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Figure 5.7: HOP Architecture
The final architecture of HOP (with the optimizations from Section 5.2) is
shown in Figure 5.7. We now describe implementation-specific details for each major
component.
5.4.1 Modified RISC-V Processor and Scratchpad
We built HOP with a RISC-V processor which implements a single stage
32bit integer base user-level ISA developed at UC Berkeley [33]. A RISC-V C
cross-compiler is used to compile C programs to be run on the processor. The
RISC-V processor is modified to include a 16 KB instruction scratchpad and a 512
KB data scratchpad (Section 5.2.4). The RISC-V processor and the compiler are
modified accordingly to accommodate the new scratchpad load/unload instructions
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(described below). While HOP uses a single stage RISC-V processor, our system
does not preclude additional hardware optimizations in commodity processors such
as multi-issue, branch predictor, etc. Our only requirement to support such proces-
sor structures is the ability to calculate, for that program over all inputs, a suitably
conservative maximum runtime T .
New scratchpad instructions. For our prototype, we load the scratchpad using
a new instruction called spld, which is specified as follows:
spld addr,#mem, spaddr
In particular, addr is used to specify the starting address of the memory that needs
to be loaded in scratchpad. #mem is the number of memory locations to be loaded
on the scratchpad starting at addr and spaddr is the location in scratchpad to store
the loaded data. When the processor intercepts an spld instruction, it performs
two operations: 1. It writes back the data stored in this scratchpad location to
the appropriate address in main memory (ORAM). 2. It reads #mem memory
locations starting at main memory address addr into scratchpad locations starting
at spaddr. Of course, spld’s precise design is not fundamental: we need a way to
load an on-chip memory such that it is still feasible to statically determine T .
Example scratchpad use.
Figure 5.8 shows an example scenario where spld is used. The program shows a
part of the code used for decompressing data using the bzip2 compression algorithm.
The algorithm decompresses blocks of compressed data and outputs data of size
CSIZE independently. Each block of data may be read and processed multiple
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1: int decompress(char *chunk) {
2: int compLen = 0;
3: // initial processing
4: burrowsWheeler(chunk, compLen);




9: void main() {
10: char *inp = readInput();
11: for (i = 0; i < len(inp); i += len) {
12: spld(inp + i, CSIZE, 0);
13: len = decompress(inp + i);
14: }
15: }
Figure 5.8: Example program using spld: bzip2
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times during different steps of compression (run-length encoding, Burrows-Wheeler
transform, etc.). Hence, each such block is loaded into the scratchpad (line 12)
before processing. This ensures that every subsequent access to this data is served
by the scratchpad instead of memory (thereby reducing expensive ORAM accesses).
After decompressing the block, spld is executed for the next block of compressed
data.
5.4.2 ORAM Controller
We use a hardware ORAM controller called ‘Tiny ORAM’ from [56, 57]. The
ORAM controller implements an ORAM tree with 25 levels, having 4 blocks per
bucket. Each block is 512 bits (64 Bytes) to match modern processor cache line
size. This corresponds to a total memory of 4 GB. The ORAM controller uses a
stash of size 128 blocks and an on-chip position map of 256 KB. For integrity and
freshness, Tiny ORAM uses the PosMap MAC (PMMAC) scheme [56]. We note
that PMMAC protects data integrity but does not achieve malicious security. We
estimate the cost of malicious security using a hardware Merkle-tree on ORAM in
Table 5.2. We disable the PosMap Lookaside Buffer (PLB) in Freecursive ORAM
to avoid leakage through the total number of ORAM accesses.
5.4.3 Encryption Units
For all encryption units, we can use tinyaes from OpenCores [5]. The encryp-
tion units can communicate with the external DRAM (bandwidth of 64 Bytes/cycle)
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Table 5.2: Resource allocation and utilization of HOP on Xilinx Virtex
V7485t FPGA. For each row, first line indicates the estimate. % utilization is
mentioned in parentheses. LUT: Slice LookUp Table, FFs: Flip-flops or slice regis-
ters, BRAM: Block RAM.
LUT FFs LUT-Mem BRAM
Total Estimate 169472 51870 81112 566.5
(% Utilization) (55.8%) (8.5%) (62.0%) (55.0%)
HOP Estimate 103462 39803 38725 437
(% Utilization) (34.0%) (6.6%) (47.7%) (42.4%)
(HOP− ORAM) Estimate 21626 6579 1 83
(% Utilization) (7.1%) (1.1%) (∼0%) (8.1%)
Estimate with Merkle tree 221041 81410 81126 566.5
(% Utilization) (72.8%) (13.4%) (62.0%) (55.0%)
as well as the host processor. Data is encrypted before writing to the DRAM. Simi-
larly, all data read from the DRAM is decrypted first before processed by the ORAM
controller. Another encryption unit can be used to decrypt the obfuscated program
before loading it into the instruction scratchpad.
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5.5 Evaluation
We now present a detailed evaluation of HOP for some commonly used pro-
grams, and compare HOP to prior work.
5.5.1 Methodology
We measure program execution time in processor cycles, and compare with our
own baseline scheme (to show the effectiveness of our optimizations), an insecure
processor as well as related prior work. For each program, we choose parameters
so that our baseline scheme requires about 100 million cycles to execute. We also
report processor idle time, the time spent on dummy arithmetic instructions and
dummy memory accesses to adhere to an ANM schedule (Section 5.2.3).
For the programs we evaluate (except bzip2 ; c.f., Section 5.5.4), we calculate
T manually. We remark that the average input completion time and worst case
time are very similar for these programs. To find T for larger programs, one may
use established techniques in determining worst case execution time (e.g., a tool
from [142]).
In our prototype, evaluating an arithmetic instruction takes 1 cycle while
reading/writing a word from the scratchpad takes 3 cycles. Given the parameters in
Section 5.4.2, an ORAM access takes 3000 cycles. For our HOP configurations with
a scratchpad, we require both scratchpad read/writes and arithmetic instructions
to take 3 cycles in order to hide which is occurring. Following Section 5.2.3, we set
N = 3000 when not using a scratchpad; with a scratchpad, we use N = 1000. For
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our evaluation, we consider programs ranging from those with high locality (e.g.,
bwt-rle) to those that show no locality (e.g., binsearch).
5.5.2 Area Results
We synthesized, placed and routed (a slightly modified version of) HOP on a
Xilinx Virtex V7485t FPGA for parameters described in Section 5.4. HOP operates
at 79.3 MHz on this FPGA. The resource allocation and utilization figures are
mentioned in Table 5.2. The first three rows represent the total estimate, estimate
for HOP (i.e. excluding RISC-Vprocessor, and the scratchpad) and an estimate
for HOP that does not account for ORAM. The last row shows the total overhead
including an estimate for a Merkle tree scheme. Excluding the processor, scratchpad
and ORAM, HOP consumes < 9% of the FPGA resources. We see that the total
area overhead of HOP is small and can be built on a single FPGA chip.
5.5.3 Main Results
Figure 5.9 shows the execution time of HOP variants relative to an insecure
processor. For each program, there are three bars shown. The first bar is for the
baseline HOP scheme (i.e., Section 5.2.2 only); the second bar only uses an ANM
schedule without a scratchpad (adds Section 5.2.3); and the third bar is our final
scheme that uses a scratchpad and the ANM schedule (adds Section 5.2.4). All
schemes are relative to an insecure processor that does not use ORAM or hide what
instruction it is executing. We assume this processor uses a scratchpad that has the
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Baseline ANM Scratchpad with ANM
Figure 5.9: Execution time for HOP for different programs with (i) baseline scheme,
(ii) ANM schedule and (iii) Scratchpad + ANM .
same capacity as HOP in Section 5.4.1. The time required to insert the program
and data is not shown.
Comparison of HOP variants. As can been seen in the figure, the ANM schedule
without a scratchpad gives a 1.5× ∼ 18× improvement. Adhering to an ANM
schedule requires some dummy arithmetic or memory instructions during which
the processor is essentially idle. We observe that for our programs, the idle time
ranges between 43% and 49.9% of the execution time, consistent with the claim in
Section 5.2.3.
Effect of a scratchpad. The effect of a scratchpad largely depends on program
locality. We thus classify programs in our evaluation into four classes:
1. Programs such as binsearch, heappop do not show locality. Thus, a scratch-
pad does not improve performance.
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2. Programs such as sum, findmax stream (linear scan) over the input data.
Given that an ORAM block is larger than a word size (512 bits vs 32 bits in
our case), a scratchpad in these streaming applications can serve the next few
(7 with our parameters) memory accesses after spld. A larger ORAM block
size can slightly benefit these applications while severely penalize programs
with no locality, and therefore is not a good trade-off.
3. Programs that maintain a small working set at all times will greatly benefit
from a scratchpad. We evaluate one such program bwt-rle, which performs
Burrows-Wheeler transform and run length encoding, and is used in compres-
sion algorithms.
4. Lastly, some programs are a mix of the above cases — some data structures
can be entirely loaded into the scratchpad whereas some cannot (e.g. a Radix
sort program).
Comparison to insecure processor. The remaining performance overhead of the
optimized HOP (the third bar) comes from several sources. First, the performance
of ORAM: The number of cycles to perform a memory access using ORAM is much
higher than a regular DRAM. In HOP, an ORAM access is 40× more expensive than
an insecure access. Second, dummy accesses to adhere to a schedule: As shown in
Section 5.2.3, the performance overhead due to dummy accesses≤ 2×. For programs
such as bwt-rle, HOP has a slowdown as low as 8×. This is primarily due to the
reduction in ORAM accesses by maintaining a small working set in the scratchpad.
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5.5.4 Case Study: bzip2
To show readers how our system performs on a realistic and complex bench-
mark, we evaluate HOP on the open-source algorithm bzip2 (re-written for a
scratchpad, cf. Figure 5.8). We evaluate the decompression algorithm only, as
the decompression algorithm’s performance does not heavily depend on the input
if one fixes the input size [1]. This allows us to run an average case input and use
its performance to approximate the effect of running other inputs. To give a better
sense for how the optimizations are impacted by different inputs, we don’t terminate
at a worst-case time T but rather terminate as soon as the program completes.
We run tests on two inputs, both highly compressible strings. For the first
input, HOP achieves 106× speedup over the baseline scheme and 17× slowdown over
the insecure version. For the second input, HOP achieves 234× speedup over the
baseline and 8× slowdown over the insecure version. Thus, the gains and slowdowns
we see from the prior studies extend to this more sophisticated benchmark.
5.5.5 Comparison with GhostRider [102]
Recall from Section 5.1 that GhostRider protects input data to the program
but not the program. Since our privacy guarantee is strictly greater than GhostRider,
we now compare to that work to show the cost of extra security. Note: we com-
pare to the GhostRider compiler and not the implementation in [102] which uses
a different parameterization for the ORAM scheme. This comparison shows the
additional cost that is incurred by HOP to hide the program. We don’t show the
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full comparison for lack of space, but point out the following extreme points: For
programs with unpredictable access patterns (binsearch, heappop), GhostRider
outperforms HOP by ∼ 2×. HOP’s additional overhead is from executing dummy
instructions to adhere to a particular schedule. For programs with predictable ac-
cess patterns (sum, findmax, hist), GhostRider’s performance is similar to that
of an insecure processor.
5.5.6 Time for Context Switch
Since it was not required for our performance evaluation, we have not yet
implemented context switching (Section 5.2.5) in our prototype. Recall, context
switching means the receiver interrupts the processor, which encrypts and writes out
all the processor state (including CPU state, instruction scratchpad, data scratch-
pad, ORAM position map and stash) to DRAM. We estimate the time of a context
switch as follows. The total amount of data stored by our token is ∼ 800 KB
(Section 5.4). Assuming a DRAM bandwidth of 10 GB/s and a matching encryp-
tion bandwidth, it would take ∼ 160µs to perform a context switch to run another
program. Note that this assumes all data for a swapped-out context is stored in
DRAM (i.e., the ORAM data already in the DRAM need not be moved). If it must
be swapped out to disk because the DRAM must make room for the new context,
the context switch time grows proportional to the ORAM size.
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter makes two main contributions. First, we construct an optimized
hardware architecture - called HOP - for running obfuscated RAM programs. We
give a matching theoretic model for our optimized architecture and prove it secure.
A by-product of our analysis shows the first obfuscation scheme for RAM programs
using ‘stateless’ tokens. Second, we present a complete implementation of our op-
timized architecture and evaluate it on real-world programs. The complete design
would require an estimated 72% the area of a V7485t Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) chip. Run on a variety of benchmarks, HOP achieves an average
overhead of 8× ∼ 76× relative to an insecure system. To the best of our knowledge,
this effort represents the first implementation of a provably secure VBB obfuscation
scheme in any model under any assumptions.
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Chapter 6: GraphSC: Parallel Secure Computation Made Easy
Through their interactions with many web services, and numerous apps, users
leave behind a dizzying array of data across the web ecosystem. The privacy threats
due to the creation and spread of personal data are by now well known. The
proliferation of data across the ecosystem is so complex and daunting to users,
that encrypting data at all times appears as an attractive approach to privacy.
However, this hinders all benefits derived from mining user data, both by online
companies and the society at large (e.g., through opinion statistics, ad campaigns,
road traffic and disease monitoring, etc). Secure computation allows two or more
parties to evaluate any desirable polynomial-time function over their private data,
while revealing only the answer and nothing else about each party’s data. Although
it was first proposed about three decades ago [150], it is only in the last few years
that the research community has made enormous progress at improving the efficiency
of secure computation [82, 93, 103, 119, 120]. As such, secure computation offers a
better alternative, as it enables data mining while simultaneously protecting user
privacy.
The need to analyze data on a massive scale has led to modern architec-
tures that support parallelism, as well as higher level programming abstractions to
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take advantage of the underlying architecture. Examples include MapReduce [49],
Pregel [108], GraphLab [105], and Spark [151]. These provide software developers
interfaces handling inputs and parallel data-flow in a relatively intuitive and expres-
sive way. These programming paradigms are also extremely powerful, encompassing
a broad class of machine learning, data mining and graph algorithms. While these
paradigms enable developers to efficiently write and execute complex parallel tasks
on very large datasets, securely computing on private data is not an objective for any
of these frameworks. Our goal is to bring secure computation to such frameworks
in a way that does not require programmers to have cryptographic expertise.
The benefits of integrating secure computation into such frameworks are nu-
merous. The potential to carry out data-analysis tasks while simultaneously not
leaking private data could change the privacy landscape. Consider a few exam-
ples. A very common use of MapReduce is to compute histograms that summarize
data. This has been done for all kinds of data, such as counting word frequencies in
documents, or summarizing online browsing behavior, or YouTube viewing behav-
ior to name just a few. Another common use of the graph parallelization models
(e.g., GraphLab) is to compute influence in a social graph through, for example, the
PageRank algorithm. Today, joint influence over multiple social graphs belonging to
different companies (such as Facebook and LinkedIn), cannot be computed because
companies do not share such data. For this to be feasible, the companies need to
be able to perform an oblivious secure computation on their joint graph in a highly
efficient way that supports their massive datasets and completes in a reasonable
time. A privacy requirement for such an application is to ensure that the graph
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structure, and any associated data, is not leaked; the performance requirements
for scalability and efficiency demand the application to be highly parallelizable. A
third example application is recommender systems based on the matrix factorization
(MF) algorithm. It was shown that it is possible to carry out secure MF, enabling
users to receive recommendations without ever revealing records of past behavior
(e.g., movies watched or rated) in the clear to the recommender system [119]. But
this previous work did not gracefully incorporate parallelism to scale to millions of
records.
This chapter addresses the following key question: can we build an efficient se-
cure computation framework that uses familiar parallelization programming paradigms?
By creating such a framework, we can bring secure computation to the practical
realm for modern massive datasets. Furthermore, we can make it accessible to a
wide audience of developers that are already familiar with modern parallel program-
ming paradigms, and are not necessarily cryptography experts.
One näıve approach to obtain high parallelization is the following: (a) pro-
grammers write programs using a programming language specifically designed for
(sequential) secure computation such as the SCVM source language [103] or the
ObliVM source language [104]; (b) apply an existing program-to-circuits compiler1;
and (c) exploit parallelism that occurs at the circuit level – in particular, all the
gates within the same layer (circuit depth) can be evaluated in parallel. Henceforth,
1RAM-model compilers such as SCVM [103] and ObliVM [104] effectively compile a program
to a sequence of circuits as well. In particular, dynamic memory accesses are compiled into ORAM
circuits.
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we use the term circuit-level parallelism to refer to this baseline approach.
While intuitive, this baseline approach is far from ideal. The circuit derived
by a sequential program-to-circuits compiler can also be sequential in nature, and
many opportunities to extract parallelism may remain undiscovered. We know from
experience, in the insecure environment, that generally trying to produce parallel
algorithms requires careful attention. Two approaches have been intensely pursued
(for the case of non-secure computation): (a) Design of parallel algorithms: an en-
tire field of research has focused on designing parallel versions of specific algorithms
that seek to express computation tasks with shallow depth and without significantly
increasing the total amount of work in comparison with the sequential setting; and
(b) Programming abstractions for parallel computation: the alternative to finding
point solutions for particular problems, is to develop programming frameworks that
help programmers to easily extract and express parallelism. The frameworks men-
tioned above fall into this category. These two approaches can also be followed for
solutions in secure computation; examples of point solutions include [119, 120]. In
this work, we follow the second approach to enable parallel oblivious versions for a
range of data mining algorithms.
There are two fundamental challenges to solve our problem. The first is the
need to provide a solution that is data oblivious, in order to prevent any information
leakage and to prevent unnecessary circuit explosion. The second is that of migrating
secure computation models to the parallel environment in an efficient way. Because
our solution focuses on graph-based parallel algorithms, we need to ensure that the
graph structure itself is not revealed.
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In this chapter, we focus on 2-party computation in the semi-honest model.
Our two parties could be two non-colluding cloud providers (such as Google and
Amazon) where both parties have parallel computing architectures (multiple ma-
chines with multiple cores). In this case, the data is outsourced to the cloud
providers, and within each cloud the secret data could be distributed across mul-
tiple machines. In a second scenario, a single cloud provider splits up the data to
achieve resilience against insider attacks or compromise. To realize these, we make
the following novel contributions.
Our Contributions
We design and implement a parallel secure computation framework called
GraphSC. With GraphSC, developers can write programs using programming ab-
stractions similar to Pregel and GraphLab [68, 105, 108]. GraphSC executes the
program with a parallel secure computation backend. Adopting this programming
abstraction allows GraphSC to naturally support a broad class of data mining algo-
rithms.
New parallel oblivious algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, our work is
the first to design non-trivial parallel oblivious algorithms that outperform generic
Oblivious Parallel RAM [28,35,38]. The OPRAM constructions are of a theoretical
nature, with computational costs that would be prohibitive in a practical implemen-
tation. Analogously, in the sequential literature, a line of research focuses on de-
signing efficient oblivious algorithms that outperform generic ORAM [23,54,72,152].
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Many of these works focus on specific functionalities of interest. However, such a
one-at-a-time approach is unlikely to gain traction in practice, since real-life pro-
grammers likely do not possess the expertise to design customized oblivious algo-
rithms for each task at hand; moreover, they should not be entrusted to carry out
cryptographic design tasks.
While we focus on designing efficient parallel oblivious algorithms, we take a
departure from such a one-at-a-time design approach. Specifically, we design par-
allel oblivious algorithms for GraphSC’s programming abstractions, which in turn
captures a broad class of interesting data mining and machine learning tasks. We
will demonstrate this capability for four such algorithms. Moreover, our parallel
oblivious algorithms can also be made accessible to non-expert programmers. Our
parallel oblivious algorithms achieve logarithmic total-work and depth blowup in
comparison with the poly-logarithmic blowup of generic OPRAM [28]. In particu-
lar, for a graph containing |E| edges and |V| vertices, GraphSC just has an overhead
of O(log |V|) when compared with the parallel insecure version.
System implementation. ObliVM-GC (http://www.oblivm.com) is a program-
ming language that allows a programmer to write a program that can be compiled
into a garbled circuit, so that the programmer need not worry about the underlying
cryptographic framework. In this chapter, we architect and implement GraphSC, a
parallel secure computation framework that supports graph-parallel programming
abstractions resembling GraphLab [105]. Such graph-parallel abstractions are ex-
pressive and easy-to-program, and have been a popular approach for developing
parallel data mining and machine learning algorithms. GraphSC is suitable for both
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multi-core and cluster-based computing architectures. The source code of GraphSC
is available at http://www.oblivm.com.
Evaluation. To evaluate the performance of our design, we implement four classic
data analysis algorithms: (1) a histogram function assuming an underlying MapRe-
duce paradigm; (2) PageRank for large graphs; and two versions of matrix factor-
ization (MF), namely, (3) MF using gradient descent, and (4) MF using alternating
least squares (ALS). We study numerous metrics, such as the effect of parallelism,
i.e., the change in execution time with increasing number of processors, as well as
the amount of communication between processors. We deploy our experiments in a
realistic setting, both on a controlled testbed and on Amazon Web Services (AWS).
We show that we can achieve practical speeds for our 4 example algorithms, and
that the performance scales gracefully with input size and the number of processors.
We achieve these gains with minimal communication overhead, and an insignifi-
cant impact on accuracy. For example, we were able to run matrix factorization on
MovieLens dataset (6000 users, 4000 movies) consisting of 1 million ratings in less
than 13 hours on a small 7-machine cluster. As far as we know, this is the first
application of a complicated secure computation algorithm on a large real-world
dataset; previous work [119] managed to complete a similar task on only 17K rat-
ings, with no ability to scale beyond a single machine. This demonstrates that our
work can bring secure computation into the realm of practical large-scale parallel
applications.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Following the related work,
in Section 6.2 we present GraphSC, our framework for parallel computation on
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large-scale graphs. In Section 6.3 we detail how GraphSC can support parallel data
oblivious algorithms. Then, in Section 6.4, we discuss how such parallel oblivious
algorithms can be converted into parallel secure algorithms. Section 6.5 discusses the
implementation of GraphSC and detailed evaluation of its performance on several
real-world applications. We conclude the chapter in Section 6.6.
Model and Terminology
Our main deployment scenario is the following parallel secure two-party com-
putation setting. The two parties are two non-colluding, semi-honest cloud providers
(potentially executing some outsourced computation). Since we adopt Yao’s Gar-
bled Circuits [149], one cloud provider acts as the garbler, and the other acts as
the evaluator. Each cloud provider can have multiple processors performing the
garbling or evaluation.
In this chapter, we focus on a specific class of graph computations. For a
graph with V vertices and E edges, we assume that the size information |V|+ |E| is
public. To keep terminology simple, our main algorithms in Section 6.3.3 refer to
parallel oblivious algorithms – assuming a model where multiple processors have a
shared random-access memory. It turns out that once we derive parallel oblivious
algorithms, it is easy to translate them into parallel secure computation protocols.




Secure computation has been studied for decades, starting from theory [73,87,
132,133,149] to implementations [24,79,81,82,92,93,103,109,119,125,155].
Parallel secure computation frameworks. Most existing implementations are
sequential. However, parallel secure computation has naturally attracted attention
due to the wide adoption of multi-core processors and cloud-based compute clusters.
Note that in Yao’s Garbled Circuits [149], the garbler’s garbling operations are
trivially parallelizable. However, evaluation of the garbled circuit must be done
layer by layer, and therefore, the depth of the circuit(s) determine the degree to
which evaluation can be parallelized.
Most research on parallel secure computation just exploits the natural paral-
lelism within each circuit or between circuits (e.g., for performing cut-and-choose
in the malicious model). For example, Husted et al. [83] propose using a GPU-
based backend for parallelizing garbled circuit generation and evaluation. Their
work exploits the natural circuit-level parallelism – however, in cases where the pro-
gram is inherently sequential (e.g., a narrow and deep circuit), their technique will
not be able to exploit massive degrees of parallelism for evaluation. Assuming the
computation on a single vertex/edge is a low-depth circuit, our design ensures that
GraphSC primitives are implemented as low-depth circuits. Though our design cur-
rently works on a multi-core processor architecture or a compute cluster, the same
programming abstraction and parallel oblivious algorithms can be directly ported
to a GPU-based backend; our work thus is complementary to Husted et al. [83].
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Kreuter et al. [93] exploit parallelism to parallelize cut-and-choose in malicious-
model secure computation. In particular, cut-and-choose techniques require the
garbled evaluation of multiple circuits, such that one can assign each circuit to a
different processor. In comparison, we focus on parallelization in the semi-honest
model. If we were to move to the malicious model, we would also benefit from the
additional parallelism natural in cut-and-choose. Our approach is closest to, and
inspired by, the privacy-preserving matrix factorization (MF) framework by Niko-
laenko et al. [119] that implements gradient-descent MF as a garbled circuit. As in
our design, the authors rely on oblivious sorting that, as they note, is parallelizable.
Though Nikolaenko et al. exploit this to parallelize parts of their MF computation,
their overall design is not parallelizable: it results in a Ω(|V | + |E|)-depth circuit,
containing serial passes over the data. In fact, the algorithm in [119] is equivalent to
the serial algorithm presented in Algorithm 2, restricted to MF. Crucially, beyond
extending our implementation to any algorithm expressed by GraphSC (not just
gradient-descent MF), our design also parallelizes these serial passes (cf. Figure 6.3),
leading to a circuit of logarithmic depth. Finally, as discussed in Section 6.5, the
garbled circuit implementation in [119] can only be run on a single machine, contrary
to GraphSC.
Automated frameworks for sequential secure computation. In the sequen-
tial setting, numerous automated frameworks for secure computation have been
explored, some of which [81, 155] build on (a subset of) a standard language such
as C; others define customized languages [24, 79,92, 103]. As mentioned earlier, the
circuits generated by these sequential compilers may not necessarily have low depth.
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For general-purpose secure computation backends, several protocols have been in-
vestigated and implemented, including those based on garbled circuits [149, 150],
GMW [66], somewhat or fully homomorphic encryption [60], and others [17,46]. In
this chapter, we focus on a garbled circuits backend for the semi-honest setting,
but our framework and programming abstractions can readily be extended to other
backends as well.
ORAM and oblivious algorithms. While ORAMs obliviously simulate any
RAM program, oblivious algorithms have also been studied to obliviously simu-
late specific algorithms [23, 54, 72, 113, 145, 152]. These solutions provide point so-
lutions that outperform ORAMs. As recent works point out [103], ORAM and
oblivious algorithms are key to transforming programs into compact circuits2 – and
circuits represent the computation model for almost all known secure computation
protocols. Broadly speaking, any data oblivious algorithm admits an efficient cir-
cuit implementation whose size is proportional to the algorithm’s runtime. Generic
RAM programs can be compiled into an oblivious counterpart with polylogarithmic
blowup [67,70,96,134,143].
In a similar manner, Oblivious Parallel RAMs (OPRAM) [28,35,38], essentially
transform PRAM programs into low-depth circuits, also incurring a polylogarithmic
blowup. As mentioned earlier, these works are more of a theoretical nature and ex-
pensive in practice. In comparison, our work proposes efficient oblivious algorithms
2For secure computation, a program is translated into a sequence of circuits whose inputs can
be oblivious memory accesses. Note that this is different from transforming a program into a single
circuit – for the latter, the best known asymptotical result incurs quadratic overhead [129].
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for a restricted (but sufficiently broad) class of PRAM algorithms, as captured by
our GraphSC programming abstractions.
Parallel programming paradigms. The past decade has given rise to paralleliza-
tion techniques that are suitable to cheap modern hardware architecture. MapRe-
duce [49] is a seminal work that presented a simple programming model for process-
ing massive datasets on large cluster of commodity computers. This model resulted
on a plethora of system-level implementations [135] and improvements [151]. A
second advancement was made with Pregel [108], a simple programming model for
developing efficient parallel algorithms on large-scale graphs. This also resulted in
several implementations, including GraphLab [68, 105] and Giraph [13]. The sim-
plicity of interfaces exposed by these paradigms (like the scatter, gather, and apply
operations of Pregel) led to their widespread adoption, as well as to the proliferation
of algorithms implemented in these frameworks. We introduce similar programming
paradigms to secure computation, in the hope that it can revolutionize the field like
it did to non-secure parallel programming models, thus making secure computation
easily accessible to non-experts, and easily deployable over large, cheap clusters.
6.2 GraphSC
In this section, we formally describe GraphSC, our framework for parallel
computation. GraphSC is inspired by the scatter-gather operations in GraphLab
and Pregel. Several important parallel data mining and machine learning algorithms
can be cast in this framework (some of these are discussed in Section 6.5.1); a brief
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example (namely, the PageRank algorithm) can also be found below. We conclude
this section by highlighting the challenges behind implementing GraphSC in a secure
fashion.
6.2.1 Programming Abstraction
Data-augmented graphs. The GraphSC framework operates on data-augmented
directed graphs. A data-augmented directed graph G(V,E,D) consists of a directed
graph G(V,E), as well as user-defined data on each vertex and each edge denoted
D ∈ ({0, 1}∗)|V|+|E|. We use the notation v.data ∈ {0, 1}∗ and e.data ∈ {0, 1}∗ to
denote the data associated with a vertex v ∈ V and an edge e ∈ E respectively.
Programming abstractions. GraphSC follows the Pregel/GraphLab program-
ming paradigm, allowing computations that are “graph-parallel” in nature, i.e.,
each vertex performs computations on its own data as well as data collected from
its neighbors. In broad terms, this is achieved through the following three primitives,
which can be thought of as interfaces exposed by the GraphSC abstraction:
1. Scatter: A vertex propagates data to its adjacent edges and updates the edge’s
data. More specifically, Scatter takes a user-defined function fS : {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, and a bit b ∈ {“in”, “out”}, and updates each directed edge
e = (u, v) as follows:
e.data :=

fS(e.data, v.data) if b = “in”,
fS(e.data, u.data) if b = “out”.
Note that the bit b indicates whether the update operation is to occur over
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incoming or outgoing edges of each vertex.
2. Gather: Through this operation, a vertex aggregates the data from adjacent
edges and updates its own data. More specifically, Gather takes as input a
binary aggregation operator ⊕ : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and a bit b ∈ { “in”,





e.data if b = “in”,
v.data || ⊕
∀e∈neigh(v,out),
e.data if b = “out”,
where || indicates concatenation, and⊕ is the iterated binary operation defined
by ⊕, and neigh(v, in) and neigh(v, out) represent the incoming and outgoing
edges of v respectively. Hence, at the conclusion of the operation, the vertex
stores both its previous value, as well as the output of the aggregation through
⊕.
3. Apply: Vertices perform some local computation on their data. More specifi-
cally, Apply takes a user-defined function fA : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, and
updates every vertex’s data as follows:
v.data := fA(v.data).
A program abiding by the GraphSC abstraction can thus make arbitrary calls
to such Scatter, Gather and Apply operations. Beyond determining this sequence,
each invocation of Scatter, Gather, and Apply must also supply the corresponding
user-defined functions fS, fA, and aggregation operator ⊕. Note that the graph
structure G does not change during the execution of any of the three GraphSC
primitives.
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Throughout our analysis, we assume the time complexity of fS, fA, and the
binary operator ⊕ (applied to only 2 arguments) is constant, i.e., it does not depend
on the size of G. This is true when, e.g., both vertex and edge data take values in
a finite subset of {0, 1}∗, which is the case for all applications we consider3.
Requirements for the aggregation operator ⊕. During the Gather operation,
a vertex aggregates data from multiple adjacent edges through a binary aggregation
operator ⊕. GraphSC requires that this aggregation operator is commutative and
associative, i.e.,
• Commutative: For any a, b ∈ D, a⊕ b = b⊕ a.
• Associative: For any a, b, c ∈ D, (a⊕ b)⊕ c = a⊕ (b⊕ c).
Here, D represents the set of values that can be assumed by vertex and edge data in
the graph. Roughly speaking, commutativity and associativity guarantee that the
result of the aggregation is insensitive to the ordering of the edges.
6.2.2 Expressiveness
At a high level, GraphSC borrows its structure from Pregel/GraphLab [68,105,
108], which is also defined by the three conceptual primitives called Gather, Apply
and Scatter. There are however a few differences that are not included in GraphSC,
3Note that, due to the concatenation operation ||, the memory size of the data at a vertex can in
theory increase after repeated consecutive Gather operations. However, in the Pregel/GraphLab
paradigm, a Gather is always followed by an Apply, that merges the aggregated edge data with the
vertex data through an appropriate user-defined merge operation fA. Thus, after each iteration
completes the size of vertex data remains constant.
174
as they break obliviousness. For instance, Pregel allows arbitrary message exchanges
between vertices, which is not supported by GraphSC. Pregel also supports modifi-
cation of the graph structure during computation, whereas GraphSC does not allow
such modifications. Finally, GraphLab supports asynchronous parallel computa-
tion of the primitives, whereas GraphSC, and its data oblivious implementation we
describe in Section 6.3, are both synchronous.
Except for these differences that are necessary to maintain obliviousness,
all other programs that can be expressed in Pregel/GraphLab can be expressed
in GraphSC. GraphSC encompasses classic graph algorithms like Bellman-Ford,
bipartite matching, connected component identification, graph coloring, etc., as
well as several important data mining and machine learning operations including
PageRank [123], matrix factorization using gradient descent and alternating least
squares [91], training neural networks through back propagation [128] or parallel
empirical risk minimization through the alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) [27]. We review some of these examples in more detail in Section 6.5.1.
6.2.3 Example: PageRank
Let us try to understand these primitives using the PageRank algorithm [123]
as an example. Recall that PageRank computes a ranking score PR for each vertex
u of a graph G through a repeated iteration of the following assignment:







Algorithm 1 PageRank example
1: function computePageRank(G(V,E,D))
2: fS(e.data, u.data) : e.data :=
u.data.PR
u.data.L
3: ⊕(e1.data, e2.data) : e1.data + e2.data
4: fA(v.data) : v.data.PR :=
0.15
|V| + 0.85× v.data.agg
5: for i := 1 to K do // K: number of iterations until convergence
6: Scatter(G, fS, “out”)
7: Gather(G,⊕, “in”)
8: Apply(G, fA)
9: // Every vertex v stores its PageRank PR
where L(v) is the number of outgoing edges. Initially, all vertices are assigned a
PageRank of 1|V| .
PageRank can be expressed in GraphSC as shown in Algorithm 1. The data
of every vertex v comprises two real values, one for the PageRank (PR) of the vertex
and the other for the number of its outgoing edges (L(v)). The data of every edge
e = (u, v) comprises a single real value corresponding to the weighted contribution
of PageRank of the outgoing vertex u.
For simplicity, we assume that each vertex v has pre-computed and stored
L(v) at the beginning of the algorithm’s execution. The algorithm then consists
of several iterations, each evoking a Scatter, Gather and Apply operation. The
Scatter operation updates the edge data e = (u, v) by the weighted PageRank of the
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outgoing vertex u, i.e., b = “out” and




In the Gather operation, every vertex v adds up the weighted PageRank over
incoming edges e(u, v) and concatenates the result with the existing vertex data, by
storing it in the variable v.data.agg. That is, b = “in”, and ⊕ is given by
































Figure 6.1: One iteration of PageRank computation. 1. Every page starts
with PR = 0.25. 2. During Scatter, outgoing edges are updated with the weighted
PageRank of vertices. 3. Vertices then aggregate the data on incoming edges in a
Gather operation and store it along with their own data. 4. Finally, vertices update
their PageRank in an Apply operation.
The Apply operation computes the new PageRank of vertex v using v.data.agg.
fA(v.data) : v.data.PR :=
0.15
|V| + 0.85× v.data.agg.
An example iteration is shown in Figure 6.1.
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6.2.4 Parallelization and Challenges in Secure Implementation
Under our standing assumption that fS, fA, and ⊕ have O(1) time complexity,
all three primitives are linear in the input, i.e., can be computed in O(|V| + |E|)
time. Moreover, like Pregel/GraphLab operations, Scatter, Gather and Apply can
be easily parallelized, by assigning each vertex in graph G to a different processor.
Each vertex also maintains a list of all incoming edges and outgoing edges, along
with their associated data. Scatter operations involve transmissions: e.g., in a
Scatter “out” operation, a vertex sends its data to all its outgoing neighbors, who
update their corresponding incoming edges. Gather operations on the other hand
are local: e.g., in a Gather “in” operation, a vertex simply aggregates the data in its
incoming edges and appends it to its own data. Both Scatter and Gather operations
can thus be executed in parallel across different processors storing the vertices.
Finally, in such a configuration, Apply operations are also trivially parallelizable
across vertices. Note that, in the presence of P < |V| processors, to avoid a single
overloaded processor becoming a bottleneck, the partitioning of the graph should
balance computation and communication across processors.
In this chapter, we wish to design a secure computation framework imple-
menting GraphSC operations in a privacy-preserving fashion, while maintaining its
parallelizability. In particular, our design should be such that, only the final out-
put of the program is revealed; the input, i.e., the directed data-augmented graph
G(V,E,D) should not be leaked during the execution of the program. We note that
there are several applications in which hiding the data as well as the graph structure
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of G is important. For example, in PageRank, the entire input is described by the
graph structure G. As noted in [119], in the case of matrix factorization, the graph
structure leaks which items a user has rated, which can again be very revealing. To
highlight the difficulties that arise in implementing GraphSC in a secure fashion,
we note that näıve parallelization, as described above, leaks a lot of information. In
particular:
1. The amount of data stored by vertices, based on the above partitioning of the
graph, reveals information about its neighborhood.
2. The number of times a vertex is accessed during a scatter phase reveals the
number of outgoing neighbors.
3. Finally, the neighbors with which each vertex communicates during a Scatter
phase reveals the entire graph G.
6.3 GraphSC Primitives as Efficient Parallel Oblivious Algorithms
In this section, we discuss how the three primitives exposed by the GraphSC
abstraction can be expressed as parallel data oblivious algorithms. A parallel obliv-
ious algorithm can be converted to a parallel secure algorithm using standard tech-
niques; we describe such a conversion in more detail in Section 6.4, focusing here on
data-obliviousness and parallelizability.
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6.3.1 Parallel Oblivious Algorithms: Definitions and Metrics
A parallel algorithm ALG ∈ ALG is said to be perfectly oblivious, iff for any
two inputs inp0 and inp1 to the algorithm such that |inp0| = |inp1| and such that
ALG is known to the adversary, it holds that
Addresses[ALG](inp0) ≡ Addresses[ALG](inp0)
In this chapter, our parallel oblivious algorithms are all deterministic and thus,
the traces are identical. Also, our inputs are data-augmented graphs. Thus, for any
two graphs, G = (V,E,D) and G′ = (V′,E′,D′) such that |V|+ |E| = |V′|+ |E′| and
|d| = |d′| for d ∈ D and d′ ∈ D′, we require that,
Addresses[ALG](G) ≡ Addresses[ALG](G′)
Note that, by the above definition, a parallel oblivious algorithm hides both
the graph structure and the data on the graph’s vertices and edges. Only the “size”
of the graph |V| + |E| is revealed. Moreover, if such an algorithm is represented
as a circuit of depth Θ(T ), then it comprises of Θ(T ) layers and each such layer
represents the state of the shared memory at time t.
For our parallel oblivious algorithms, we are interested in the total work
blowup and the depth blowup. The total work of a parallel oblivious algorithm
may increase due to two reasons – First, due to the cost of parallelism: the most
efficient (insecure) parallel algorithm may incur a blowup in terms of total work.
Second, due to the cost of obliviousness: requiring that the algorithm is oblivious
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fS(D1, D1,3) fS(D1, D1,2) fS(D1, D1,4) fS(D2, D2,3) fS(D4, D4,3) 
1, D1 2, D2 3, D3 4, D4 (1,2), D’1,2 (1,3), D’2,3 (1,4), D’1,4 (2,3), D’1,3 (4,3), D’4,3 
O-Sort 




































(b) Transformations of list representing graph G.
Figure 6.2: Oblivious Scatter and Gather on a single processor. We apply
a Scatter followed by a Gather. Scatter : Graph tuples are sorted so that edges
are grouped together after the outgoing vertex. e.g. D1,2, D1,3, D1,4 are grouped
after D1. Then, in a single pass, all edges are updated. e.g. D1,3 is updated as
fS(D1, D1,3). Gather : Graph tuples are sorted so that edges are grouped together




4,3 are grouped before D3. Then, in a
single pass, all vertices compute the aggregate. e.g. D′3 = D3||D′1,3 ⊕D′2,3 ⊕D′4,3.
in Chapter 2 for the specific definitions of total work blowup and depth blowup.
6.3.2 Single-Processor Oblivious Algorithm
Before presenting our fully-parallel solution, we describe how to implement
each of the three primitives in a data-oblivious way on a single processor (i.e., when
P = 1). One key challenge is how to hide the graph structure G during computation.
Alternative graph representation: Our oblivious algorithms require an alterna-
tive representation of graphs, that does not differentiate between edges and vertices.
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Both vertices and edges are represented as tuples of the form 〈u, v, isVertex, data〉.
In particular, each vertex u is represented by the tuple: 〈u, u, 1, data〉; and each edge
(u, v) is represented by the tuple: 〈u, v, 0, data〉. We represent a graph as a list of
tuples, i.e., G := (ti)i∈[|V|+|E|] where each ti is of the form 〈u, v, isVertex, data〉.
Algorithm description. We now describe the single-processor oblivious imple-
mentation of GraphSC primitives. The formal description of the implementation is
provided in Algorithm 2. We also provide an example of the Scatter and Gather
operations in Figure 6.2b, for a very simple graph shown in Figure 6.2a.
Apply. The Apply operation is straightforward to make oblivious under our
new graph representation. Essentially, we make a linear scan over the list G. During
this scan, we apply the function fA to each vertex tuple in the list, and a dummy
operation to each edge tuple.
Scatter. Without loss of generality, we use b = “out” as an example. The
algorithm for b = “in” is similar. The Scatter operation then proceeds in two steps,
illustrated in the first three lines of Figure 6.2b.
Step 1: Oblivious sort: First, perform an oblivious sort on G, so that tuples with
the same source vertex are grouped together. Moreover, each vertex should appear
before all the edges originating from that vertex.
Step 2: Propagate: Next, in a single linear scan, update the value of each edge with
the nearest preceding vertex by applying the fS function.
Gather. Again, without loss of generality, we will use b = “in” as an example.
The algorithm for b = “out” is similar. Gather proceeds in a fashion similar to
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Algorithm 2 Oblivious GraphSC on a Single Processor
G: list of tuples 〈u, v, isVertex, data〉, N = |V|+ |E|
1: function Scatter(G, fS, b = “out”)
/* b = “in” is similar and omitted */
2: sort G by (u,−isVertex)
3: for i := 1 to N do /* Propagate */
4: if G[i].isVertex then
5: val := G[i].data
6: else
7: G[i].data := fS(G[i].data, val)
1: function Gather(G, ⊕, b = “in”)
/* b = “out” is similar and omitted */
2: sort G by (v, isVertex)
3: var agg := 1⊕ // identity w.r.t. ⊕
4: for i := 1 to N do /* Aggregate */
5: if G[i].isVertex then
6: G[i].data := G[i].data||agg
7: agg := 1⊕
8: else
9: agg := agg ⊕ G[i].data
1: function Apply(G, fA)
2: for i := 1 to N do
3: G[i].data := fA(G[i].data)
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Scatter in two steps, illustrated in the last three lines of Figure 6.2b.
Step 1: Oblivious sort: First, perform an oblivious sort on G, so that tuples with the
same destination vertex appear adjacent to each other. Further, each vertex should
appear after the list of edges ending at that vertex.
Step 2: Aggregate: Next, in a single linear scan, update the value of each vertex
with the ⊕-sum of the longest preceding sequence of edges. In other words, values
on all edges ending at some vertex v are now aggregated into the vertex v.
Efficiency. Let N := |V| + |E| denote the total number of tuples. Assume that
the data on each vertex and edge is O(1) length, and hence each fS, fA, and ⊕
operator is ofO(1) cost. Clearly, an Apply operation can be performed inO(N) time.
Oblivious sort can be performed in O(N logN) time using [44, 88] while propagate
and aggregate take O(N) time. Therefore, a Scatter and a Gather operation each
runs in time O(N logN).
6.3.3 Parallel Oblivious Algorithms for GraphSC
We now describe how to parallelize the sequential oblivious primitives Scat-
ter, Gather, and Apply described in Section 6.3.2. We will describe our parallel
algorithms assuming there are a sufficient number of processors, namely |V| + |E|
processors. Later in Section 6.3.4, we describe some practical optimizations when
the number of processors is smaller than |V|+ |E|.
First, observe that the Apply operation can be parallelized trivially. We now
demonstrate how to parallelize the Scatter and Gather operations. Recall that both
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Scatter and Gather start with an oblivious sort, followed by either an aggregate or a
propagate operation as described in Section 6.3.2. The oblivious sort is, in principle,
a log(|V| + |E|)-depth circuit [10]. In practice, this sorting circuit is inefficient and
thus, we can use a Bitonic sort [15] which has a log2(|V|+|E|)-depth circuit. However,
both these circuits are trivially parallelizable at the circuit level.
It thus suffices to show how to execute the aggregate and propagate operations
in parallel. To highlight the difficulty behind the parallelization of these operations,
recall that in a data-oblivious execution, a processor needs to, e.g., aggregate values
by accessing the list representing the graph at fixed locations, which do not depend
on the data. However, as seen in Figure 6.2b, the positions of edges (i.e., black cells)
whose values are to be aggregated and stored in vertices (i.e., white cells) clearly
depend on the input (namely, the graph G).
Parallelizing the aggregate operation. Recall that an aggregate operation up-
dates the value of each vertex with values of the longest sequence of edges preceding
it. For ease of exposition, we first present a few definitions before presenting our
parallel aggregate algorithm.
Definition 1. Longest Edge Prefix: For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |V|+|E|}, the longest edge
prefix before j, denoted LEP[1, j), is defined to be the longest consecutive sequence
of edges before j, not including j.
Similarly, let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |V|+ |E|, we use the notation LEP[i, j) to denote the
longest consecutive sequence of edges before j, constrained to the subarray G[i . . . j)
(index i being inclusive, and index j being exclusive).
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Definition 2. Longest Prefix Sum: Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |V|+|E|, we use the notation
LPS[i, j) to denote the “sum” (with respect to the ⊕ operator), of LEP[i, j).
Abusing notation, we treat LPS[i, j) as an alias for LPS[1, j) if i < 1. The
parallel aggregate algorithm is described in Figure 6.3. The algorithm proceeds
in a total of log(|V| + |E|) steps. In each intermediate step τ , a processor j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , |V|+ |E|} computes LPS[j − 2τ , j). As a result, at the conclusion of these
log(|V|+ |E|) steps, each processor j has computed LPS[1, j).
This way, by time τ , all processors compute the LPS values for all segments
of length 2τ . Now, observe that LPS[j − 2τ , j) can be computed by combining
LPS[j − 2τ , j − 2τ−1) and LPS[j − 2τ−1, j) in a slightly subtle (but natural) manner
as described in Figure 6.3. Intuitively, at each τ , a segment is aggregated with the
immediately preceding segment of equal size only if a vertex has not be encountered
so far.
At the end of log(|V|+|E|) steps, each processor j working on a vertex, appends
its data to the aggregation result LPS[1, j) – this part is omitted from Figure 6.3
for simplicity.
Parallelizing the propagate operation. Recall that, in a propagate operation,
each edge updates its data with the data of the nearest preceding vertex. The
propagate operation can be parallelized in a manner similar to aggregate. In fact, we
can even express a propagate operation as a special aggregate operation as follows:
Initially, every edge stores (i) the value of the preceding vertex if a vertex precedes;
and (ii) −∞ otherwise. Next, we perform an aggregate operation where the ⊕
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Parallel Aggregate:
/* For convenience, assume that for i ≤ 0, G[i] is a vertex; and similarly for i ≤ 0,
LPS[i, j) as an alias for LPS[1, j) */.
Initialize: Every processor j computes:
• LPS[j − 1, j) :=

G[j − 1].data if G[j − 1] is an edge
1⊕ o.w.
• existsvert[j − 1, j) :=

False if G[j − 1] is an edge
True o.w.
Main algorithm: For each time step τ := 1 to log(|V|+ |E|)− 1: each processor
j computes
• if existsvert[j − 2τ−1, j) = False
LPS[j − 2τ , j) := LPS[j − 2τ , j − 2τ−1) ⊕ LPS[j − 2τ−1, j)
else LPS[j − 2τ , j) := LPS[j − 2τ−1, j)
• existsvert[j − 2τ , j) := existsvert[j − 2τ , j − 2τ−1) or existsvert[j − 2τ−1)
Figure 6.3: Performing the aggregate operation (Step 2 of Gather) in parallel, as-
suming sufficient number of processors with a shared memory to store the variables.
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operator is defined to be the max operator. At the end of log |V| + |E| time steps,
each processor has computed LPS[1, j), i.e., the value of the nearest vertex preceding
j. Now if cell G[j] is an edge, we can overwrite its data entry with LPS[1, j).
Cost analysis. Recall our standing assumption that the maximum data length
on each tuple is O(1). It is not hard to see that the parallel runtime of both the
aggregate and propagate operations is O(log(|V| + |E|)). The total amount of work
for both aggregate and propagate is O((|V|+ |E|) · log(|V|+ |E|)).
Based on this, we can see that Scatter and Gather each takes O(log(|V|+ |E|))
parallel time and O((|V| + |E|) · log(|V| + |E|)) total amount of work. Obviously,
Apply takes O(1) parallel time and O(|V|+ |E|) total work.
Table 6.1 illustrates the performance of our parallel oblivious algorithms for
the common case when |E| = Ω(|V|), and the blowup in comparison with a paral-
lel insecure version. Notice that in the insecure world, there exists a trivial O(1)
parallel-time algorithm to evaluate Scatter and Apply operations. However, in the
insecure world, Gather would take O(log(|E| + |V|)) parallel time to evaluate the
⊕-sum over |E| + |V| variables. Notice also that the |V| term in the asymptotic
bound is absorbed by the |E| term when |E| = Ω(|V|). The above performance
characterization is summarized by the following theorem:
Theorem 21 (Parallel oblivious algorithm for GraphSC). Let M := |V| + |E| de-
note the graph size. There exists a parallel oblivious algorithm for programs in the
GraphSC model, where each Scatter or Gather operation requires O(logM) parallel
time and O(M logM) total work; and each Apply operation requires O(1) parallel
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Op
Total work Parallel time/Depth
Par. insec. Par. obliv. Blowup Par. insec. Par. obliv. Blowup
Scatter O(|E|) O(|E| log |V|) O(log |V|) O(1) O(log |V|) O(log |V|)
Gather O(|E| log d) O(|E| log |V|) O(logd |V|) O(log d) O(log |V|) O(logd |V|)
Apply O(|V|) O(|E|) O(|E|/|V|) O(1) O(1) O(1)
Table 6.1: Complexity of our parallel oblivious algorithms assuming |E| =
Ω(|V|). |V | denotes the number of vertices, and |E| denotes the number of edges. d
denotes the maximum degree of a vertex in the graph. Blowup is defined as the ratio
of the parallel oblivious algorithm with respect to the best known parallel insecure
algorithm. We assume that the data length on each vertex/edge is upper-bounded
by a known bound D, and for simplicity we omit a multiplicative factor of D from
our asymptotical bounds. In comparison with Theorem 21, in this table, some |V|
















Oblivious accesses, G-G comm.
… … …
(b) Architecture for parallel secure computa-
tion.
Figure 6.4: From parallel oblivious algorithms to parallel secure computation.
time and O(M) total amount of work.
6.3.4 Practical Optimizations for Fixed Number of Processors
The parallel algorithm described in Figure 6.3 requires M = |V|+ |E| proces-
sors. In practice, however, for large datasets, the number of processors P may be
smaller than M . Without loss of generality, suppose that M is a multiple of P . In





parallel time, and M logM total amount of work. We propose the follow-
ing practical optimization that can reduce the total parallel time to O(M
P
+ logP ),
and reduce the total amount of work to O(P logP +M).
We assign to each processor a consecutive range of cells. Suppose that proces-
sor j gets range [sj, tj] where sj = (j − 1) · MP + 1 and tj = j · MP . In our algorithm,
190
each processor will compute LPS[1, sj), and afterwards, in O(M/P ) time-steps, it
can (sequentially) compute LPS[1, i) for every sj ≤ i ≤ tj. Every processor then
computes LPS[1, sj) as follows
• First, every processor sequentially computes LPS[sj, tj+1) and existswhite[sj, tj+
1).
• Now, assume that every processor started with a single value LPS[sj, tj +1) and
a single value existswhite[sj, tj + 1). Perform the parallel aggregate algorithm
on this array of length P .
Sparsity of communication. In a distributed memory setting where memory is
split across the processors, the conceptual shared memory is in reality implemented
by inter-process communication. An additional advantage of our algorithm is that
each processor needs to communicate with at most O(logP ) other processors – this
applies to both the oblivious sort step, and the aggregate or propagate steps. In fact,
it is not hard to see that the communication graph forms a hypercube [112].
Let M := |V|+|E| and recall that the maximum amount of data on each vertex
or edge is O(1). The following corollary summarizes the above observations:
Corollary 22 (Bounded processors, distributed memory.). When P < M , there
exists a parallel oblivious algorithm for programs in the GraphSC model, where (a)
each processor stores O(M/P ) amount of data; (b) each Scatter or Gather operation
requires O(M/P+logP ) parallel time and O(P logP+M) total work; (c) each Apply
operation requires O(1) parallel time and O(|E|+ |V|) total amount of work; and (d)
each processor sends messages to only O(logP ) other processors.
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Security analysis. The oblivious nature of our algorithms is not hard to see: in
every time step, the shared memory locations accessed by each processor is fixed
and independent of the sensitive input. This can be seen from Figure 6.3, and the
description of practical optimizations in this section.
6.4 From Parallel Oblivious Algorithms to Parallel Secure Compu-
tation
So far, we have discussed how GraphSC primitives can be implemented as
efficient parallel oblivious algorithms, we now turn our attention to how the latter
translate to parallel secure computation. In this section, we outline the reduction
between the two, focusing on a garbled-circuit backend [150] for secure computation.
System Setting. Recall that our focus in this chapter is on secure 2-party compu-
tation. As an example, Figure 6.4b depicts two non-colluding cloud service providers
(e.g., Facebook and Amazon) – henceforth referred to as the two parties. The sen-
sitive data (e.g., user preference data, sensitive social graphs) can be secret-shared
between these two parties. Each party has P processors in total – thus there are
in total P pairs of processors. The two parties wish to run a parallel secure com-
putation protocol computing a function (e.g., matrix factorization), over the secret-
shared data.
While in general, other secure 2-party computation protocols can also be em-
ployed, this chapter focuses on a garbled circuit backend [150]. Our focus is on the
semi-honest model, although this can be extended with existing techniques [93,100].
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Using this secure model, the oblivious algorithm is represented as a binary circuit.
One party then acts as the garbler and the other acts as the evaluator, as illus-
trated in Figure 6.4b. To exploit parallelization, each of the two parties parallelize
the computational task (garbling and evaluating the circuit, respectively) across its
processors. There is a one-to-one mapping between garbler and evaluator processors:
each garbler processor sends the tables it garbles to the corresponding correspond-
ing evaluator processor, that evaluates them. We refer to such communication as
garbler-to-evaluator (GE) communication.
Note that there is a natural correspondence between a parallel oblivious al-
gorithm and a parallel secure computation protocol: First, each processor in the
former becomes a (garbler, evaluator) pair in the latter. Second, memory in the
former becomes secret-shared memory amongst the two parties. Finally, in each
time step, each processor’s computation in the former becomes a secure evaluation
protocol between a (garbler, evaluator) pair in the latter.
Architectural choices for realizing parallelism. There are various choices for
instantiating the parallel computing architecture of each party in Figure 6.4b.
• Multi-core processor architecture. At each party, each processor can be imple-
mented by a core in a multi-core processor architecture. These processors share
a common memory array.
• Compute cluster. At each party, each processor can be a machine in a compute
cluster. In this case, accesses to the “shared memory” are actually imple-
mented with garbler-to-garbler communication or evaluator-to-evaluator com-
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munication. In other words, the memory is conceptually shared but physically
distributed.
• Hybrid. The architecture can be a hybrid of the above, with a compute cluster
where each machine is a multi-core architecture.
While our design applies to all three architectures, we used a hybrid architecture
in our implementation, exploiting both multi-core and multi-machine parallelism.
Note that, in the case of a hybrid or cluster architecture with P machines, Corol-
lary 22 implies that each garbler (evaluator) communicates with only O(logP ) other
garblers (evaluators) throughout the entire execution. In particular, both garblers
and evaluators connect through a hypercube topology. This is another desirable
property of GraphSC.
Metrics. Using the above natural correspondence between a parallel oblivious
algorithm and a parallel secure computation protocol, there is also a natural cor-
respondence between the primary performance metrics in these two settings: First,
the total work of the former directly characterizes (a) the total work and (b) the
total garbler-to-evaluator (GE) communication in the latter. Second, the parallel
runtime of the former directly characterizes the parallel runtime of the latter. We
note that, in theory, the garbler is infinitely parallelizable, as each gate can be
garbled independently. However, the parallelization of the evaluator (and, thus, of
the entire system) is confined by the sequential order defined by the circuit. Thus,
parallel runtime is determined by the circuit depth.
In the cluster and hybrid cases, where memory is conceptually shared but
194
physically distributed, two additional metrics may be of interest, namely, the garbler-
to-garbler (GG) communication and evaluator-to-evaluator (EE) communication.
These directly relate to the parallel runtime, since in each parallel time step, each
processor makes only one memory access; hence, each processor communicates with
at most one other processor at each time-step.
6.5 Evaluation
In this section we present a detailed evaluation of our systems for a few
well-known applications that are commonly used for evaluating highly-parallelizable
frameworks.
6.5.1 Application Scenarios
In all scenarios, we assume that the data is secret-shared across two non-
colluding cloud providers, as motivated in Section 6.4. In all cases, we refer to the
total number of vertices and edges in the corresponding GraphSC graph as input
size.
Histogram. A canonical use case of MapReduce is a word-count (or histogram)
of words across multiple documents. Assuming a (large) corpus of documents, each
comprising a set of words, the algorithm counts word occurrences across all docu-
ments. The MapReduce algorithm maps each word as a key with the value of 1, and
the reducer sums up the values of all keys, resulting in the count of appearances of
each word. In the secure version, we want to compute the word frequency histogram
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while hiding the text in each document. In GraphSC, this is a simple instance of
edge counting over a bipartite graph G, where edges connect keys to words. We rep-
resent keys and words as 16-bit integers, while accumulators (i.e., key vertex data)
are stored using 20-bit integers.
Simplified PageRank. A canonical use case of graph parallelization models is
the PageRank algorithm. We consider a scenario in which multiple social network
companies, e.g., Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn, would like to compute the “real”
social influence of users on a social graph that is the aggregate of each company’s
graph (assume users are uniquely identified across networks by their email address).
In the secure version, each company is not willing to reveal user data and their social
graph with the other network. Vertices are identified using 16-bit integers, and 1bit
for isVertex (see Section 6.3.2). The PageRank value of each vertex is stored using
a 40-bit fixed-point representation, with 20-bit for the fractional part.
Matrix Factorization (MF). Matrix Factorization [91] splits a large sparse low-
rank matrix into two dense low-dimension matrices that, when multiplied, closely
approximate the original matrix. Following the Netflix prize competition [18], matrix
factorization is widely used in recommender systems. In the secure version, we want
to factorize the matrix and learn the user or item feature vectors (learning both
can reveal the original input), while hiding both the ratings and items each user
has rated. MF can be expressed in GraphSC using a bi-partite graph with vertices
representing users and items, and edges connecting each user to the items they rated,
carrying the ratings as data. In addition, data at each vertex also contains a feature
vector, corresponding to its respective row in the user/item factor matrix. We study
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two methods for matrix factorization – gradient descent and alternative least-squares
(ALS) (see, e.g., [91]). In gradient descent, the gradient is computed for each rating
separately, and then accumulated for each user and each item feature vectors, thus it
is highly parallelizable. In ALS we alternate the computation between user feature
vectors (assuming fixed item feature vectors) and item feature vectors (assuming
fixed user feature vectors). For each step, each vector solves (in parallel) a linear
regression using the data from its neighbors. Similar to PageRank, we use 16-bit
for vertex id and 1-bit for isVertex. The user and item feature vectors are with
dimension 10, with each element stored as a 40-bit fixed-point real.
The secure implementation of matrix factorization using gradient descent has
been studied by Nikolaenko et al. [119] who, as discussed in Section 6.1, constructed
circuits of linear depth. The authors used a multi-core machine to exploit paral-
lelization during sorting, and relied on shared memory across threads. This limits
the ability to scale beyond a single machine, both in terms of the number of parallel
processors (32 processors) as well as, crucially, input size (they considered no more
than 17K ratings, over a 128 GB RAM server).
6.5.2 Implementation
We implemented GraphSC atop ObliVM-GC, the Java-based garbled circuit
implementation that comprises the back end of the GraphSC secure computation
framework [7,104]. ObliVM-GC provides easy-to-use Java classes for composing cir-










(a) Evaluation setup, all machines
are connected in a star topology
with 1Gbps links.
Machine #Proc Memory CPU Freq
1 24 128 GB 1.9 GHz
2 24 128 GB 1.9 GHz
3 24 64 GB 1.9 GHz
4 24 64 GB 1.9 GHz
5 24 64 GB 1.9 GHz
6 32 128 GB 2.1 GHz
7 32 256 GB 2.6 GHz
(b) Servers’ hardware used for our evaluation.
The processor used for machine 6 is AMD
Opteron 6272. For all other machines, AMD
Opteron 6282 SE is used.
Figure 6.5: Experimental setup for our evaluation.
cesses can additionally call non-blocking send and blocking receive operations.
Processes in ObliVM-GC are identified by their unique identifiers.
Finally, we implement oblivious sorting using the bitonic sort protocol [88]
which sorts in O(N log2N) time. Asymptotically faster protocols such as the
O(N logN) AKS sort [10] and the recent ZigZag sort [69] are much slower in practice
for practical ranges of data sizes.
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6.5.3 Setup
We conduct experiments on both a testbed that uses a LAN, and on a realistic
Amazon AWS deployment. We first describe our main experiments conducted using
a compute cluster connected by a Local Area Network. Later, in Section 6.5.8, we
will describe results from the AWS deployment.
Testbed Setup on Local Area Network: Our experimental testbed consists of
7 servers with the configurations detailed in Table 6.5b. These servers are inter-
connected using a star topology with 1Gbps Ethernet links as shown in Figure 6.5a.
All experiments (except the large-scale experiment reported in Section 6.5.6 that
uses all of them) are performed using a pair of servers from the seven machines.
These servers were dedicated to the experiments during our measurements, not
running processes by other users.
To verify that our results are robust, we repeated the experiments several
times, and made sure that the standard deviation is small. For example, we ran
PageRank 10 times using 16 processors for an input length of 32K. The resulting
mean execution time was 390 seconds, with a standard deviation of 14.8 seconds;
we therefore report evaluations from single runs.
6.5.4 Evaluation Metrics
We study the gains and overheads that result from our parallelization tech-
niques and implementation. Specifically, we study the following key metrics:
Total Work. We measure the total work using the overall number of AND gates
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for each application. As mentioned earlier in Section 6.3.4, the total work grows log-
arithmically with respect to the number of processors P in theory – and in practice,
since we employ bitonic sort, the actual growth is log-squared.
Actual runtimes. We report our actual runtimes and compare the overhead with
a cleartext baseline running over GraphLab [2, 68, 105]. We stress that while our
circuit size metrics are platform independent, actual runtime is a platform dependent
metric. For example, we expect a factor of 20 speedup if the backend garbled
circuit implementation adopts a JustGarble-like approach (using hardware AES-
NI) – assuming roughly 2700 Mbps bandwidth provisioned between each garbler
and evaluator pair.
Speedup. The obvious first metric to study is the speedup in the time to run each
application as a result of adding more processors. In our applications, computation
is the main bottleneck. Therefore, in the ideal case, we should observe a factor of x
speedup with x factor more processors.
Communication. Parallelization introduces communication overhead between gar-
blers and between evaluators. We study this overhead and compare it to the com-
munication between garblers and evaluators.
Accuracy. Although not directly related to parallelization, for completeness we
study the loss in accuracy obtained as a result of implementing the secure version
of the applications, both when using fixed-point representation and floating-point
representation of the reals.
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Figure 6.6: Computation time for increasing number of processors, showing an
almost linear decrease with the number of processors. The lines correspond to
different input lengths. For PageRank, gradient descent and ALS, the computation
























































Processors 4 8 16 32 Baseline Nikolaenko et al.
Figure 6.7: Computation time for increasing input size, showing an almost-linear
increase with the input size, with a small log2 factor incurred by the bitonic sort.
The lines correspond to different input lengths. For PageRank, gradient descent
and ALS, the computation time refers to the time required for one iteration.
In Figure 6.7a, the baseline is a sequential ORAM-based baseline using Circuit
ORAM [143]. Figure 6.7c compares our performance with the performance of Niko-
laenko et al. [119] who implemented the circuit using FastGC [82] and parallelized
at the circuit level using 32 processors.
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6.5.5 Main Results
Speedup. Figure 6.6 shows the total computation time across the different appli-
cations. For all applications except histogram we show the time of a single iteration
(consecutive iterations are independent). Since in our experimental setup computa-
tion is the bottleneck, the figures show an almost ideal linear speedup as the number
of processors grow. Figure 6.7 shows that our method is highly scalable with the
input size, with an almost linear increase (a factor of O(P/ log2 P )). Figure 6.7a
provides the time to compute a histogram using an oblivious RAM implementation.
We use the state-of-the-art Circuit ORAM [143] for this purpose. As the figure
shows, the baseline is 2 orders of magnitude slower compared to the parallel version
using two garblers and two evaluators.
Figure 6.7c provides the timing presented in Nikolaenko et al. [120] using 32
processors. As the figure shows, using a similar hardware architecture, we manage to
achieve a speedup of roughly×16 compared to their results. Most of the performance
gains comes from the usage of GraphSC architecture – whereas Nikolaenko et al.
used a multi-threaded version of FastGC [82] as the secure computation backend.
Total Work. Figure 6.8 shows that the total amount of work grows very slowly
with respect to the number of processors, indicating that we indeed achieved a very
low overhead in the total work (and overall circuit size).
Communication. Figure 6.9a and Figure 6.9b show the amount of total com-
munication and per processor communication, respectively, for running gradient
descent. Each plot shows both the communication between garblers and evalua-
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Figure 6.8: Total work in terms of # AND gates, normalized such that the 4 proces-
sor case is 1×. The different curves correspond to different input lengths. Plots are
in a log-log scale, showing the expected small increase to the number of processors
P . Recall that our theoretical analysis suggests that the total amount of work is
O(P logP + M), where M := |V| + |E| is the graph size. In practice, since we use
bitonic sort, the actual total work is O(P log2 P +M).
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(b) Communication per proc.
Figure 6.9: Communication of garbler-evaluator (GE) and garbler-garbler (GG) for
gradient descent (input length 2048).
tors, and the overhead introduced by the communication between garblers (com-
munication between evaluators is identical). Figure 6.9a shows that the total com-
munication between garblers and evaluators remains constant as we increase the
number of processors, showing that parallelization does not introduce overhead to
the garblers-to-evaluator communication. Furthermore, the garbler-to-garbler (GG)
communication is significantly lower than the garblers-to-evaluator communication,
showing that the communication overhead due to parallelization is low. As expected,
adding more processors increases the total communication between garblers, follow-
ing log2 P (where P is the number of processors), due to the bitonic sort. Figure 6.9b
shows the communications per-processor (dividing the results of Figure 6.9a by P ).
This helps understand overheads in our setting, where, for example, a cloud provider
that provides secure computation services (garbling or evaluating) is interested in
the communication costs of its facility rather than the total costs. As the num-
ber of processors increase, the “out-going” communication (e.g., a provider running
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Figure 6.10: Comparison with cleartext implementation on GraphLab for gradient
descent (input length 32K)
garblers see the communication with evaluators as “out-going” communication) de-
creases. The GG communication (or EE communication) remains roughly the same
(following log2 P/P ), and significantly lower than the “out-going” communication.
Comparison with a Cleartext Baseline. To better understand the overhead
that is incurred from cryptography, we compared GraphSC’s execution time with
GraphLab [2, 68, 105], a state-of-the-art framework for running graph-parallel al-
gorithms on clear text. We compute the slowdown relative to an insecure base-
line, assuming that the same number of processors is employed for GraphLab and
GraphSC. Using both frameworks, we ran Matrix Factorization using gradient de-
scent with input length of 32K. For the cleartext experiments, we ran 1000 iterations
of gradient descent 3 times, and computed the average time for a single iteration.
Figure 6.10 shows that GraphSC is about 200K - 500K times slower than
GraphLab when run on 2 to 16 processors. Since GraphLab is highly optimized
and extremely fast, such a large discrepancy is expected. Nevertheless, we note that
increasing parallelism decreases this slowdown, as overheads and communication
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Table 6.2: Summary of machines used in large-scale experiment, performing matrix
factorization over the MovieLens 1M ratings dataset.
Machine Processors Type JVM Memory Size Num Ratings
1 16 Garbler 64 GB 256K
2 16 Evaluator 60.8 GB 256K
3 6 Garbler 24 GB 96K
3 6 Evaluator 24 GB 96K
4 15 Garbler 58.5 GB 240K
5 15 Evaluator 58.5 GB 240K
6 27 Garbler 113.4 GB 432K
7 27 Evaluator 121.5 GB 432K
Total 128 524.7 GB 1M
costs impact both systems.
6.5.6 Running at Scale
In order to have a full-scale experiment of our system, we ran matrix factor-
ization using gradient descent on the real-world MovieLens dataset that contains 1
million ratings provided by 6040 users to 3883 movies [4]. We factorized the matrix
to users and movie feature vectors, each vector with a dimension of 10. We used
40-bit fixed-point representation for reals, with 20 bits reserved for the fractional
part. We ran the experiment on an heterogeneous set of machines that we have in
the lab. Table 6.2 summarizes the machines and the allocation of data across them.
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A single iteration of gradient descent took roughly 13 hours to run on 7 ma-
chines with 128 processors, at ˜104 MB data size (i.e., 1M entries). As prior machine
learning literature reports [19,84], about 20 iterations are necessary for convergence
for the same MovieLens dataset – which would take about 11 days with 128 pro-
cessors. In practice, this means that the recommendation system can be retrained
every 11 days. As mentioned earlier, about 20× speedup is immediately attainable
by switching to a JustGarble-like back end implementation with hardware AES-NI,
and assuming 2700 Mbps bandwidth between each garbler-evaluator pair. One can
also speed up the execution by provisioning more processors.
In comparison, as far as we know, the closest large-scale experiment in running
secure matrix factorization was recently performed by Nikolaenko et al. [119]. The
authors used 16K ratings and 32 processors to factorize a matrix (on a machine
similar to machine 7 in Table 6.2), taking almost 3 hours to complete. The authors
could not scale further because their framework runs on a single machine.
6.5.7 Performance Profiling
Finally, we perform micro-benchmarks to better understand the time the ap-
plications spend in the different parts of the computation and network transmissions.
Figure 6.11 shows the breakdown of the overall execution between various opera-
tions for PageRank and gradient descent. Figure 6.12 shows a similar breakdown
for different input sizes. As the plots show, the garbler is computation-intensive
whereas the evaluator spends a considerable amount of time waiting for the gar-
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(c) Gradient Descent: Garbler
















(d) Gradient Descent: Evaluator
Figure 6.11: A breakdown of the execution times of the garbler and evaluator run-
ning one iteration of PageRank and gradient descent for an input size of 2048 entries
Here I/O overhead means the time a processor spends blocking on I/O. The remain-
ing time is reported as CPU time.
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(c) Gradient Descent: Garbler
















(d) Gradient Descent: Evaluator
Figure 6.12: A breakdown of the execution times of the garbler and evaluator run-
ning one iteration of PageRank and gradient descent for an increasing input size
using 8 processors for garblers and 8 for evaluators.
bled tables (receive is a blocking operation). In our implementation, the garbler
computes 4 hashes to garble each gate, and the evaluator computes only 1 hash
for evaluation. This explains why the evaluation time is smaller than the garbling
time. Since the computation tasks under consideration are superlinear in the size of
the inputs, we see that the time spent on oblivious transfer (both communication
and computation) is insignificant in comparison to the time for garbling/evaluating.



























(b) Across data centers
Figure 6.13: Performance of PageRank. Figure 6.13a shows performance for 4 and
8 processors at varying bandwidths. The dotted vertical line indicates the inflexion
point for 8 processors, below which the bandwidth becomes a bottleneck, resulting
in reduced performance. Figure 6.13b shows the performance of PageRank running
on geographically distant data centers (Oregon and North Virginia).
AES-NI instructions. We expect that the garbling and evaluation CPU will reduce
noticeably if hardware AES-NI were employed [16]. We leave it for future work to
port GraphSC to a C-based implementation capable of employing hardware AES-NI
features.
6.5.8 Amazon AWS Experiments
We conduct two experiments on Amazon AWS machines. First, we study the
performance of the system under different bandwidths on the same AWS data cen-
ter (Figure 6.13a). Second, to test the performance on a more realistic deployment,
where the garbler and evaluator are not co-located, we also conduct experiments
by deploying GraphSC on a pair of AWS virtual machines located in different geo-
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graphical regions (Figure 6.13b).
The time reported for these experiments should not be compared to the earlier
experiments as different machines were used.
Setup. For the experiments with varying bandwidths, both garblers and evaluators
were located in the same data center (Oregon - US West). For the experiment across
data centers, the garblers were located in Oregon (US West) and the evaluators
were located in N. Virginia (US East). We ran our experiments on shared instances
running on Intel Xeon CPU E5-2666 v3 processors clocked at 2.9 GHz. Each of our
virtual machines consisted of 16 cores and 30 GB of RAM.
Results for Varying Bandwidths. Since communication between garblers and
evaluators is a key component in system performance, we further study the band-
width requirements of the system on a real-world deployment.
We measure the time for a single PageRank iteration with input length of 16K
entries. We vary the bandwidth using tc [6], a tool for bandwidth manipulation,
and then measure the exact bandwidth between machines using iperf [3].
Figure 6.13a shows the execution time for two setups, one with 4 processors
(2 garblers and 2 evaluators) and the second with 8 processors. Using 4 processors
the required bandwidth is always lower than the capacity of the link, thus the
execution time remains the same throughout the experiment. However, when using 8
processors the total bandwidth required is higher, and when the available bandwidth
is below 570 Mbps the link becomes saturated. The saturation point indicates that
each garbler-evaluator pair requires a bandwidth of 570/4 ≈ 142 Mbps. GraphSC
has an effective throughput of ˜ 0.58M gates/sec between a pair of processors on our
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Amazon AWS instances. Each gate has a size of 240 bits. Hence, the theoretical
bandwidth required is 0.58 × 240 × 106/220 ≈ 133 Mbps. Considering GraphSC
is implemented in Java, garbage collection happens intermittently due to which
the communication link is not used effectively. Hence, the implementation requires
slightly more bandwidth than the theoretical calculation.
Given such bandwidth requirements, the available bandwidth in our AWS
setup, i.e., 2 Gbps between the machines, will saturate beyond roughly 14 garbler-
evaluator pairs (28 processors). At this point, the linear speedup trend w.r.t. the
number of processors (as shown in Figure 6.6) will stop, unless larger bandwidth
becomes available. In a real deployment scenario, the total bandwidth can be in-
creased by having multiple machines for garbling and evaluating, hence supporting
more processors without affecting the speedup.
Results for Cross-Data-Center Experiments. For this experiment, the garblers
are hosted in the AWS Oregon data center and the evaluators are hosted in the AWS
North Virginia data center. We measure the execution time of a single iteration
of PageRank for different input lengths. As in the previous experiment, we used
machines with 2Gbps network links, however, measuring the TCP throughput with
iperf resulted in ˜50 Mbps per TCP connection. By increasing the receiver TCP
buffer size we managed to increase the effective throughput for each TCP connection
to ˜400 Mbps.
Figure 6.13b shows that this realistic deployment manages to sustain a linear
speedup when increasing the number of processors. Moreover, even 16 processors
do not saturate the 2 Gbps link, meaning that the geographical distance does not
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Table 6.3: Summary of key evaluation results (1 iteration).
Experiment Input size Time (32 processors)
Histogram 1K - 0.5M 4 sec - 34 min
PageRank 4K - 128K 20 sec - 15.5 min
Gradient Descent 1K - 32K 47 sec - 34 min




large scale) (128 processors)
impact the speedup resulting from adding additional processors. We note that if
more than 14 garbler-evaluator pairs are needed (to further reduce execution time),
AWS provides higher capacity links (e.g., 10 Gbps), thereby allowing even higher
degrees of parallelism.
During the computation, the garbler garbles gates and sends it to the evalua-
tor. As there are no round trips involved (i.e. garbler does not wait to receive data
from the evaluator), the time required for computation across data centers is the
same as in the LAN setting.
6.5.9 Summary of Main Results
To summarize, Table 6.3 highlights some of the results, and we present the
main findings:
• As mandated from “big-data” algorithms, GraphSC provides high scalability
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with the input size, exhibiting an almost linear increase with the input size (up
to poly-log factor).
• Parallelization provides an almost ideal linear improvement in execution time
with small communication overhead (especially on computation-intensive tasks),
both in a LAN based setting and across data centers.
• GraphSC can work on real workloads. We ran a first-of-its-kind large-scale
secure matrix factorization experiment, factorizing a matrix comprised of the
MovieLens 1M ratings dataset within 13 hours on a heterogeneous set of 7
machines with a total of 128 processors.
• GraphSC supports fixed-point and floating-point reals representation, yielding
an overall low rounding errors (provided sufficient fraction bits) compared to
execution in the clear.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced GraphSC, a parallel data-oblivious and secure frame-
work for efficient implementation and execution of algorithms on large datasets.
GraphSC seamlessly integrates modern parallel programming paradigms that are
familiar to a wide range of developers into an secure data-oblivious framework.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have shown four contributions to advance the under-
standing of oblivious computation, both theoretically and in practice. Specifically,
• We show an ORAM construction which achieved a sub-logarithmic bandwidth
blowup while requiring the servers to perform an inexpensive XOR computa-
tion.
• We show the first perfectly-secure OPRAM construction, achieving O(log3N)
simulation overhead and O(logN(logm+ log logN)) depth blowup when the
PRAM has m CPUs and stores N blocks of data.
• We described two systems – HOP and GraphSC – to address the problem of
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